# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
East Europe

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**Serbs Give UN Evidence Against Bosnians, Croats**

*AU0111194395 Paris AFP in English*
*1823 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Nov 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs on Wednesday [1 November] handed over evidence to the UN war crimes tribunal implicating top Bosnian and Croatian officials in atrocities in Moslem and Croat camps, a Serb representative said.

The dossiers, based on testimony from 10 victims or witnesses, attest to the killing of 60 Serbs and "the atrocious torture of many others," Slavko Sibaleja, 41, chairman of the Association of Camp Detainees 1991, told a press conference here.

The documents also give the "names of 10 to 20 perpetrators" including "very high officials of the Bosnian and Croatian Governments," he said before the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia.

"Nobody has clean hands in the Yugoslav conflict. Moslems and Croats are not the sole victims. We should contribute to a more realistic picture," Sibaleja said.

In a statement published here, South African tribunal prosecutor Richard Goldstone confirmed the tribunal had received "a number of dossiers containing allegations of torture, ill-treatment and other violations of international humanitarian law."

According to the statement, Goldstone "welcomed the opportunity to cooperate with the association and its members, and undertook to examine the material and carry out follow-up inquiries and interviews."

The statement added: "The prosecutor considers this development a very positive step which will broaden the scope of his operations, facilitating investigations into crimes committed against Serbs."

The non-governmental and apolitical Association of Camp Detainees 1991, based in Belgrade, brings together some 500 members who are "principally but not exclusively Serbs."

All of them were detained in camps in Bosnia and Croatia before taking refuge in the rump Yugoslavia.

The association said it estimated there were some 500 prison camps where Serbs had been detained, mainly in central Bosnia and the areas around Mostar, Zenica and Tuzla.

The UN tribunal has so far charged 43 people, including 42 Bosnian Serbs and one Croat.

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**Commentary Views Military Cooperation With Greece**

*AU3110202995 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Oct 95 p 7*

[Commentary by Vasil Popov: "Military Diplomacy as a Continuation of Classical Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two factors became evident during the recent visit of the Bulgarian defense minister to Greece. Conflicts carried out by the military are not necessarily wanted by those directly engaged in fighting. As war is the continuation of politics by other means, so cooperation in the military field is a continuation of classical diplomacy. Furthermore, in certain cases contacts between the military outpace foreign policy steps.

Those basic truths have an importance also in a small but so "capricious" region as the Balkans.

The question regarding an eventual tripartite Athens-Sofia-Bucharest military meeting evoked smiles on the part of Dimitur Pavlov and Yerasimos Arsenis, who replied that such a meeting has not been discussed yet with the third country. It also was pointed out that the establishment of a military axis is not involved. Such meetings could be in the spirit of the Conventional Weapons Treaty and deal primarily with the arms imbalance in the region.

According to articles in the Greek press, NATO's plan envisages an intervention in Northern Greece in the case of an eventual Greek-Turkish ethnic conflict. It is obvious that such a development would directly affect Bulgaria, especially the Rhodopes, Kurdzhali, and the other close regions. Perhaps the two ministers were outraged by the question, but they did not show it. The Greek side published a subsequent denial which refuted the press articles.

A Greek journalist asked Minister Pavlov whether Bulgaria is so much in love with NATO that it urgently seeks membership in the alliance. Joining the alliance is not a love encounter and it is not influenced by sympathy and antipathy. It is a serious decision based on an assessment, that will determine the strategy of the candidate-country for decades in the future, Minister Pavlov said.

Bulgaria and Greece have contacts at the military level, which recently expanded. This summer Greek commando troops took part in the "Rambo-95" exercise in Bulgaria. The delegation led by Pavlov observed maneuvers at the Megalo-Pevko base, where paratroopers jumped in the sea, commando troops blew up a quay, and special troops climbed a 200-meter high rock and destroyed a radar installation.

Since it is well known that the strong ones command respect, let us strengthen the Bulgarian Army along with implementing diplomatic moves.

**Commentary Examines Politics of Indzhova Candidacy**

*AU0211123695 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 31 Oct 95 p 7*

[Commentary by Velislava Dureva: "Decoy That Resembled an Apple"]

[FBIS Translated Text] God, your actions are miraculous, and you created miracles on the night of the elections!

The president was right when he said that the election results would be sad. Indeed, they were sad. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] lost the elections with the same result with which it also lost the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, it celebrated its loss as a glorious victory. In the meantime, our state was renamed. According to Ahmed Dogan [leader of the Rights and Freedoms Movement] the country is called Kurdzhali, and, according to Ivan Kostov [SDS leader],—Sofia. Everyone and his own state.

On election night, the voters who dozed in front of their television sets received a happy message, which lit up everything like the Bethlehem star. Impatient political scientists elated the population with the message that a new and independent politician called Reneta [Indzhova] was born, that she headed for a battle against the terrible elements of nature, and, afterward, valiantly, as a real lady, she withdrew from the battlefield. She did this for the benefit of somebody and in accordance with a previous agreement. Eager political scientists who are close to this specific somebody heralded the birth of the aforementioned new and independent political personality. The truth is that we actually got another George Ganchev [Bulgarian Business Bloc leader], who, unlike the original Ganchev, cannot sing. One thing is sure—the somebody and the new politician will be a curious duo at the presidential elections.

Mrs. Indzhova's defeat is both personal and political, despite the fact that it also will be celebrated as a victory—by the SDS. Thus the SDS-People's Union drama, which continued for long months, logically ended as a touching melodrama. If somebody expected something else—he was wrong. This is so because the green apples in our country usually turn out to be blue [SDS], especially when one bites them. What remains to be seen is only the price of the reconciliation.

Reneta herself will hardly celebrate. Concocted ratings produce terrible revenges, and legends often prove to be

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false legends. The "Indzhova" case indeed falls in this category.

Reneta Indzhova did not lose because she participated in the elections for the post of Sofia mayor, but because she was rehearsing for the presidential elections. To put it more precisely, it was the president who rehearsed through her. He wanted to see what he could do alone. He saw, and the results were sad.

The president used his "masculine girl" as a wooden duck decoy that is used to lure other ducks and similar birds. Usually, it also is hit by a pellet, and then, if not too badly damaged, is stored for further use.

This is the fate of every decoy, even when it resembles an apple!

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**Klaus: 'Arafat Visit Would Cause Discord**

*AU0111163295 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 26 Oct 95 p 3*

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "Ownership Is Finding a Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Martinkova] You once declared that the aim of coupon privatization was to find a first owner for the enterprises, not the real owner. Does the sale of shares from the Harvard funds to a U.S. investor mean the start of the road toward real owners for the enterprises?

[Klaus] I am a little surprised by the extraordinary attention that is being paid to this issue. The extent of trading in these shares does not essentially differ from the volume of trading on our stock market; the only more pronounced feature is that they are concentrated in one person. I envisage that the ownership structure of our companies will change spontaneously and continuously. This is something that no government in the world will arrange ever again. It will find its own fixed point, a certain balance of its own. This process is taking place in a manner in which there is no reason to interfere from the outside.

[Martinkova] In the fashionable subdivision of Czech politicians into Euroskeptics, Eurooptimists, and Eurorealists, you are ranked in the first category. How does this tie in with the fact that, in its memorandum on the application to the EU, the government describes admission into the Union as being in the Czech Republic's essential interest?

[Klaus] For purely domestic political reasons, in an attempt to be different, someone started to disseminate the tags Euroskepticism and Eurooptimism, which are common words in Europe but are still a little premature in our country. Nothing at all follows on from their use concerning an individual's real attitude toward the ongoing European integration process. I have even written several articles on this for your daily. A complicated matter like this cannot be put into one word—whether it is optimism, realism, or pessimism.

[Martinkova] Did it not come as a surprise to you that President Havel has invited Yasir 'Arafat to visit?

[Klaus] It is becoming boring for me to reply that I find out about such things from the media, but this is the case. I think that Mr. 'Arafat's potential visit to our country would certainly be a source of intense domestic exchanges of views and conflicts concerning whether it was necessary to invite him or not. So I would rather not add anything more to this.

**Klaus-Kalvoda War of Words Extends to Conference**

*AU0111165695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Oct 95 p 2*

[Article by "(jik)" and CTK: "The Prime Minister Said That Kalvoda Talked Him Out of Attending the ODA Conference; He Denies This"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Vaclav Klaus, prime minister and Civic Democratic Party [ODS] chairman, declared yesterday that he had wanted to attend the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] weekend [21-22 October] conference, but Jan Kalvoda had talked him out of it. He has denied this, however, and said that Klaus wanted to send the leader of the ODS Deputies' Club, Jiri Honajzer, instead of coming himself.

"Chairman Kalvoda explained to me that this was a working conference not a major conference like the congress, which is held once a year. And it was even explained to me that attendance was not necessary," said the ODS chairman on Czech Radio. He added that he received this explanation with raised eyebrows.

Kalvoda rejected Klaus's version of events yesterday and added that, because Klaus had wanted to send Honajzer to the conference in his place, he could hardly have talked him out of it. "I wrote to all of the coalition chairmen about a month ago and invited them to the conference. I was then told that Messrs. Honajzer, Marek Benda, and Vilem Holan would be coming instead. And, because I was interested in ensuring that all of the chairmen were there, I asked them to come to our conference in March," explained the ODA chairman.

Kalvoda criticized the government at the ODA weekend conference for not keeping its promises. He said that the ODS's pragmatic disposition allows it to adjust its ideals according to the actual strength of the wind and the weather forecast. Klaus said first thing on 23 October that Kalvoda's remarks were unfair and impair the coalition's fragile coexistence.

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**Comment: Meciar Reaction to EU, U.S. Demarches**

*AU0211105895 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Oct 95 p 4*

[Commentary by Juraj Hrabko: "Vivat Slovakia, the Time Is Ripe..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week's flood of demarches has forced the Slovak prime minister to react to the state of democracy in the country under the Tatra mountains, but also in the rest of the world. "Shame on all those in the Slovak Republic who cast doubt on democracy as a system of relations and look for guarantees of democracy in a person." One can absolutely agree with this statement. Only, the prime minister should not ascribe those negative features just to "all those in the Slovak Republic," but should find a second for himself and should search his own conscience. And he should do something about himself because there really is something sick about it when shameless persons look for a guarantee of democracy in him. The justification of this proposal is confirmed by Vladimir Meciar's subsequent words [in his 27 October Slovak Radio interview]: "The Government Policy Statement is valid and cannot be challenged." Let me add that this holds true, in particular, for its chapter on privatization, in which it is stated, among other things: "The government will ensure the continuation of the second wave of coupon privatization without unnecessary delay. We will offer for coupon privatization a part of the shares of shareholding companies formed out of state enterprises in such a way that the majority packages of shares are privatized through sale to strategic investors under contractually guaranteed conditions of the privatized entities' long-term development. The government will seek to ensure that also shares from the portfolio of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic are offered for the second wave of coupon privatization." It is, indeed, outrageous when someone reproaches the government for noncompliance with its Policy Statement, or questions its compliance with it. The prime minister's geopolitical reflections were then a true gem. "We are exceptionally well-positioned and exceptionally important strategically. Even if someone may question whether they will accept us or not, do not worry, they need us and want us all." The above statement should not be commented on, but savored. Among the unmistakable signs that the Slovak Republic is a truly democratic country, from which the rest of the world still has plenty to learn, are, furthermore, the result of Dusan Macuska's year-long inquiry, according to which Democratic Union deputies were not elected to parliament in accordance with the electoral law, or the triple filing of charges against Peter Vacok, the [dismissed] investigator of the abduction of a Slovak Republic citizen abroad. Therefore, it really is difficult to comprehend why not only the EU, but also the United States, have awarded the executive power in Slovakia a lower mark for conduct. Something is not in order here—or someone.

**Weiss Views Reasons for, Reactions to Demarches**

*AU0111165895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Oct 95 p 4*

[Article by SDL Chairman Peter Weiss: "We Ourselves Want To Get There, No One Is Forcing Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If there is anything in which the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] agrees with the opposition political parties today, it is that the Slovak Republic's integration into the EU and NATO is in our fundamental state and national interest. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] endorsed the part of the government's Policy Statement that unequivocally speaks about the government's commitment to establishing conditions for the realization of this interest. The Slovak Government Policy Statement, the text of the European Agreement on the Slovak Republic's Association With the EU, which went into effect on 1 February 1995, and the text of the application for EU membership which the Slovak prime minister presented in June to Jacques Chirac, president of the French Republic, the then EU presiding country, prove clearly and unambiguously that the Slovak Government had pledged to observe the rules valid in the EU and NATO quite voluntarily. No one forced it.

No one is going to draw us by force into these communities of states, even though they repeatedly make it clear that, for all sorts of political, security, economic, and cultural reasons, they would like to see us among themselves. Therefore, we cannot be indifferent to what the politicians, journalists, and the public of countries, with which we ourselves intend to become integrated—and, what is more, have a national and state interest in becoming integrated—think about developments in Slovakia and the policies of its government. The fact that the Slovak Republic has for the second time become the addressee of a demarche from EU countries, which was followed by a U.S. Government demarche, is a serious reason for concern. All the more so as Slovakia is the only EU associate member country to have come in for such attention.

Blaming the three marches on the opposition that is slinging mud abroad at the young Slovak Republic betrays an embarrassing inability to look into the mirror at one's own conduct. Tough talk about refusing to be someone else's lapdog [odmietani mopslikovania] is only an expression of political weakness and of the

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inability to exercise power gained in the elections in a democratic and civilized way, free of hatred and wrath.

Still less should the representatives of the government coalition feel offended that the members of the club that the Slovak Republic wants to join take an interest in how we behave politically at home and that, in some instances, they view critically the way in which the ruling coalition handles power. This still represents interest in Slovakia. Things will become really bad only when this interest is replaced by resignation and indifference toward our country.

Those who feel offended would do better if they delved into their own memory and remembered the long parliamentary night of last November, which one government coalition deputy commented with the words "the revenge was sweet," and another female government coalition deputy justified with words about democracy being terror by the majority.

They should ask themselves whether it was inevitable to fill the Slovak Television Council, the Slovak Radio Council, the National Property Fund Presidium and Executive Committee, and the Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the Slovak Information Service exclusively with people proposed by the government coalition; whether it was wise not to give the parliamentary opposition even one post of deputy chairman in one of the 11 National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] committees; whether it was expedient to carry out 4,000 personnel changes in the state administration on the basis of political criteria and through Action Five [probably refers to a local administrative initiative]; or whether it was necessary to pass the anticonstitutional law on the abolition of privatization projects [approved by the preceding government]....

They should ponder whether it was, and is, politically productive to subordinate the development and the functioning of the state and its reputation in the world to the personal and collective craving for revenge against a HZDS founding member, former HZDS deputy chairman, and, subsequently, president, proposed by and elected predominantly by that movement; whether it was appropriate to establish so many parliamentary commissions of inquiry aimed at the discreditation and harassment of the opposition; whether it is wise to issue threats, through the chairman of the investigative commission for clarifying the causes that led to the (alleged) crisis of the constitutional system in March 1994, that "the findings of the commission will have their continuation in proceedings by criminal prosecution bodies," which can be interpreted to mean that political trials will be staged against deputies who dared make use of Article 114 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, according to which the NRSR can pass a vote of no-confidence in the government at any time....

Or they should search their conscience and ask whether it is normal when the director of Slovak Radio, a public corporation, is a deputy of the ruling movement and when the monitoring of the main news program of Slovak Television, another public corporation, over a period of two months shows that personalities from the government coalition were given 272 minutes and personalities from the opposition 16 minutes; or whether it is tolerable, from the viewpoint of citizens' legal certainty and their faith in justice, for the already third investigator to investigate the case of a Slovak Republic citizen's abduction abroad....

It would be possible to continue asking similar questions for a long time. Let us add to them bons mots uttered by representatives of the ruling coalition, such as, that the Constitutional Court is another sick element on the political scene; for what do we need an independent judiciary; for Gypsies one needs a small courtyard and a short whip; or, I have nothing against Hungarian goulash, especially when made of the chopped leaders of the Hungarian Coalition. Let us also recall the repeated attempts by representatives of one ruling party to rehabilitate Jozef Tiso and the Ludakist regime of wartime Slovak Republic.

When one considers all this, together with the vulgar vocabulary, the labeling of people who hold different views as traitors and janissaries, and the brutality that representatives of the ruling coalition have introduced into Slovak politics, it takes real courage to declare that there is no doubt that the Slovak Republic is a democratic country. Let us add to this, statements by the chairmen of two coalition parties who openly challenge the programmatic statements of their own government by adding their signatures to statements that the EU implements barbaric policy, by embracing Slovakia's neutrality, or by rejecting NATO's enlargement. The umbrage taken by representatives of the government coalition at EU and NATO demarches reminds one of the behavior of adolescents who want to go into a philharmonic concert wearing a sweat suit, chant offensive slogans, and are then surprised when they are not admitted into the concert hall.

The image of a country is, first and foremost, the work of government politicians. They are in the center of attention. Slovakia's reputation in the world depends, and will depend, on what they say and do. It is naive to expect that the EU and NATO will adjust their internal rules to the behavior of our immature and irresponsible politicians, even if Slovakia lies in the heart of Europe.

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**DS Issues Appeal for Defense of Democracy**

*AU0211105795 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Oct 95 p 4*

["Statement by the Democratic Party," issued at a meeting of the Democratic Party Republican Council in Martin; date not given—"abridged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Party [DS] Republican Council considers the political situation in Slovakia to be coming dramatically to a head and to be alarming.

The government coalition of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Association of Workers of Slovakia, and Slovak National Party is incapable of living up to a single preelection promise and of implementing the Government Policy Statement. The coalition has not transformed the positive macroeconomic indicators into the essential restructuring of the economy or into higher living standards for the population. Since the inauguration of the government, the coalition has transformed an economy based on competition into an economy of protectionism and corruption, intertwined with the self-serving political interests of a small group of party affiliates. The steps taken by the government coalition since the elections have been marked by violence and directed against the interests of wide sections of the population. The government coalition has ceased to respect the elementary principles of a democratic state and is striving to eliminate, in an anticonstitutional way, the president of the republic and to change the election results by eliminating the Democratic Union from parliament. It is artificially and provocatively turning large sections of the population into internal enemies of the country. The government coalition has started criminalizing the work of the police and is turning the secret service into an uncontrollable state within the state. At the same time, applying police methods, it is interfering in an unprecedented way in the life of the churches, and it wants to interfere in the life of schools in an anticonstitutional way and to limit the freedom of research in the social sciences.

All this has led to manifold sharp protests from democratic European countries and to a second demarche from the EU. This demarche can only be understood as a serious warning that, with this government, the Slovak Republic cannot become part of democratic European structures, which is against the vital interests of its citizens. The EU's concern has been seconded, in an unusually vigorous manner, by the U.S. Administration's demarche.

The DS is calling on all political parties respecting democracy, all special interest groups, the trade unions, the representatives of towns and villages, the universities, the scientific community, the cultural workers, the environmentalists, the democratic representatives of minorities, and the representatives of churches and civic initiatives to close ranks in order to score victory in the struggle for democracy and the prosperity of all citizens of the Slovak Republic.

The DS gives its word to the citizens that it will put all its strength into this struggle.

**EBRD Criticizes Slovnaft Privatization**

*AU0111163495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Oct p 5*

[Report by TASR: "FINANCIAL TIMES: EBRD Criticizes Method of Selling Slovnaft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] on Tuesday [24 October] sharply criticized the fact that the management of the Slovnaft a.s. is gradually buying up the shares of the company under its management.

As the daily FINANCIAL TIMES reports, the EBRD acquired 10.5 percent of Slovnaft shares at the beginning of this year. The thorn in the side of the world financial institution is the fact that 39 percent of the company's shares with a market value of $112 million have wound up in the hands of 19 Slovnaft managers. The EBRD did everything it could to prevent this deal, but to no avail.

Jiri Huebner, chairman of the EBRD Section for the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, said on Tuesday that the EBRD considers this course of action "unfortunate because it can be a source of complications." The EBRD stated its fears also in discussions in Slovnaft and with representatives of the National Property Fund of [FNM] the Slovak Republic, which is directly responsible for this sale.

The EBRD offered five proposals that could help solve the situation. It seems that matters have moved ahead because one of the proposals is being discussed in greater detail. However, even Jiri Huebner was unable to say how the matter will be solved. It is possible that the EBRD will try to sell its stake in Slovnaft back to the FNM.

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**Survey on Opinion of Present Compared With 1988**

*AU0211123895 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 Oct 95 p 3*

[Report by "ax": "According to an Academy of Sciences Survey, Almost Three-Quarters Claim That They Were Better Off Prior to 1989"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—As many as 73.3 percent are convinced that, overall, people like them were better off prior to 1989, while 25.7 percent think that they are better off today. This transpires from the results of a sociological survey, entitled "Protagonists and Strategy of Transformation and Modernization," that the Sociological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences carried out in July and August, using a representative sample of 956 respondents. The survey was part of a more extensive project involving the Czech Republic and Poland. Roughly the same proportion of respondents (73 percent) believe that people like them will live a better life in Slovakia in five or six years, whereas 23 percent are of the opinion that they are better off now than they will be in five or six years. When comparing present society with society in the 1988, 90.9 percent of the respondents think that inequality among people has widened, according to 6.5 percent it has remained the same, and only 2.7 percent think that people now are more equal. Connected with this is also the assessment by 52.8 percent of the respondents that social justice has declined compared with 1988, while 29.8 percent believe that it has increased, and 17.8 percent believe that it has remained the same. The growth of individual freedom has been noticed by 55.9 percent of the respondents, its decline by 17 percent of the respondents, and 27 percent think that the level of individual freedom is the same. Similarly, 54.3 percent of the respondents believe that, compared with 1988, the chances of self-realization have increased for the majority of people, 25.8 percent are of the opinion that they have declined, and, according to 19.9 percent, the chances of self-realization are the same. A total of 30.3 percent of the respondents perceive the changes taking place in our country as bringing more new threats rather than new opportunities, 10.6 percent see more new opportunities, and 59.1 percent see both opportunities and threats. Only 18.8 percent of the respondents are convinced that the newly emerged opportunities will allow them personally to quickly realize their personal plans and intentions, whereas 81.2 percent do not believe that they are among people who will succeed in accomplishing this.

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**Horn Reports London Talks 'Very Successful'**

*LD0111204295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Jozsef Barat reports from London on Prime Minister Gyula Horn's closing news conference.

[Barat] Good evening. Gyula Horn's news conference ended a few minutes ago at the Hungarian Embassy in London. He regards his talks as very successful. The British Government supports the Hungarian Government's endeavors for starting talks on Hungary's EU entry as early as the beginning of 1998. The talks will start with several countries; however, admission will not be influenced by some kind of bloc attitude, it is performance that will matter.

The British Government also confirmed that a schedule for NATO enlargement—that is, which countries can prepare for NATO entry and when we can expect admission—will be drawn up after December. [passage omitted]

There was also mention of the Balkan crisis. The sides agree that now there is a greater chance for the creation of peace. However, a comprehensive settlement is necessary, including Croatia, that is, Slavonia. Hungary will definitely participate in the restoration process.

It is an important development that Great Britain, in contrast with earlier views, now supports Hungary's admission to the OECD in 1996. [passage omitted]

**MP's Visit Latin America To Boost Economic Ties**

*LD0111221895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A three-member parliamentary delegation has visited Latin America and have briefed the media on their return. Agnes Koroncz reports.

[Koroncz] The meetings of three members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Latin America were focused on business and the economy. Matyas Eorsi, Andras Barsony and Gyorgy Csoti had talks in Cuba, Mexico, and Chile on how relations could be made more lively with these geographically distant countries.

The talks in Cuba on promoting the nearly frozen economic ties were free of politics and ideology. They perhaps managed to achieve a breakthrough in the renewal of economic cooperation and the repayment of a $200 million Cuban debt at a later date.

Mexico's experiences in implementing a stabilization program following the financial crisis are important. Mexico can also give assistance in our efforts to access NAFTA.

Chile and Hungary could take on the role of a bridge between Latin America and East-Central Europe.

According to the three foreign policy experts, Hungarian foreign policy has gone beyond Europe, although the boosting of ties with Latin America in fact means extending euro-atlantic integration.

**Keleti Discusses Army Staff Cuts, Reorganization**

*LD0111191095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] This year, army staff will be reduced by 11,000. By January the number of soldiers will be 81,000, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti told a meeting of officers in Veszprem on the reform of the armed forces. Gyula Horvath reports.

[Horvath] In contrast with opposition views, prior to taking measures in connection with the reform of the armed forces, the staff carried out a careful analysis. Priority has been given to the defense of our country's airspace, and security policy considerations will be extensively met alongside the continual maintenance of military preparedness.

This is proven by the fact that the staff of the Veszprem Air Defense headquarters will not be reduced; what is more, it will be increased from 19,000 to 20,000, because beginning 15 December the Bakony combat helicopter regiment and the Tokol and Szolnok carrier helicopter units will be attached to the Veszprem Air Defense headquarters.

According to Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, the staff reduction will make it possible for the army to implement a 10-billion-forint development instead of this year's 2-billion-forint allocation.

**Security Surveillance of Defense Committee Proposed**

*LD0211112295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Imre Mecs proposes to extend national security surveillance to members of the parliament's Defense Committee.

The committee's chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] considers this necessary, because, in the course of their work, committee members become acquainted with state secrets as well.

The SZDSZ politician's proposal for an amendment to the relevant law is supported by Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, according to whom the proposal's approval would satisfactorily solve the problem of the protection of military secrets.

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## MDF Chairman Views Opposition Prospects, Tasks

*AU0211150495 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 28 Oct 95 p 7*

[Interview with MDF Chairman Lajos Fur by Gabriel Toth Oszy; place and date not given: "The Party Chairmen Should Talk About Basic Issues"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Oszy] What alarm signals do you see in Hungary's domestic policy?

[Fur] Unfortunately, I see an increasing number of alarm signals in our domestic life. I know from our economic experts that serious problems have accumulated, partly because the government failed to act for a long time, and partly because it acted hastily and without due consideration. Next year's budget is not suitable for creating the necessary structural reorganization, something that would guarantee the competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. This restrictive thinking is a great burden on society and exceeds our society's tolerance level: Hundreds of thousands have drifted under the subsistence level. This cannot be in harmony with the slogan announced by the Antall-cabinet, one that we called the social market economy. Society should not be cut in two, because this will lead to serious tensions. If we are unable to stop these processes, Hungary will drift into a very serious situation by 1997, both economically and socially. [passage omitted]

[Oszy] It has been rumored in the corridors of the National Assembly that the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] negotiated with the heads of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] on being ready to support the MSZP if the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] leave the coalition.

[Fur] There are personal contacts between parliamentary deputies and I think this is natural. However, there has never been any talk of any interparty cooperation between these three parties. Ivan Szabo and Imre Konya met Gyula Horn twice, and they reported on the talks, and I would know about it if the prime minister were to bring up this issue.

[Oszy] You did not participate in these meetings, although the invitation was sent to you personally. At the time, you said that an exchange of views would be necessary on the level of party chairmen, but not primarily on legislative issues. Are you still in favor of high-level meetings?

[Fur] Yes, if the meeting in question is properly prepared professionally. We should discuss basic issues, namely, that the coalition should discard its restrictive economic policy; we should also discuss the state of health care and the demographic situation. We should examine the points on which we agree and we could cooperate. I would like to stress that we should not hold a friendly exchange of views, because there is no sense in holding such a meeting. In my view, professional groups would formulate certain proposals that we accept by joint agreement, and we also accept to implement them. [passage omitted]

[Oszy] How do you see the situation in your own party?

[Fur] The coming months will be determining ones for the MDF. A lot will be decided at the MSZP congress in November and the SZDSZ meeting of deputies in December. In such a new situation, it is possible that the MDF will have to reevaluate the situation at the beginning of 1996 even at the highest level, and it will also have to work out a new program and a new strategy, and probably will also have to draw the necessary personnel consequences. I can also envisage early elections in Hungary.

[Oszy] In your view, what are the chances for such early elections?

[Fur] If the SZDSZ leaves the coalition, and this can happen, action might also begin within the MSZP, and then new elections will have to be called.

[Oszy] I suppose you do not deny the fact that there are also "movements" within the MDF. Your party is rather divided on issues of alliance.

[Fur] My opinion is that personal debates should be settled within the party. It is unacceptable for MDF politicians to discuss alliance issues and to participate in the activity of other political organizations without authorization from the party's leading bodies.

[Oszy] What if the KDNP says "no" to the tripartite cooperation on 11 November?

[Fur] In that case, we will have to prepare for independent political activity. The MDF will only be successful if it can turn into a disciplined party, a party that respects the internal hierarchy and shows strong unity, a disciplined party engaged in tough politics. The party can only survive in the increasingly tense political situation if it chooses this way.

[Oszy] If the KDNP leaves, would you continue cooperation with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]?

[Fur] Such a division of opposition forces would not be successful. I am convinced that a tripartite cooperation that is open toward the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] is essential not only for the parties and the national forces, but also for Hungary's future.

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**Milosevic, Tudjman Agree To Normalize Relations**

*LD0211073395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0345 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dayton, Nov 2 (TANJUG) — Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia agreed on Wednesday afternoon (local time) to work on the full normalization of relations between their countries.

Milosevic and Tudjman met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, where peace talks on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina began on Wednesday, at the request of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The two presidents support a peaceful settlement of the problem of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (Sector East, or the Srem-Baranja Region), on the basis of talks between the Croatian Government and representatives of the Serb people of that region.

Milosevic and Tudjman asked international mediators, UN representative Thorvald Stoltenberg and U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith to return to that region on Thursday to continue their mediation even more intensely.

Sector East (the Srem-Baranja Region) is the only remaining of once four zones protected by the United Nations, populated predominantly by Krajina Serbs, which has not been captured by Croatian troops.

Over the recent weeks, threats have been heard from Zagreb that Croatia would resolve the problem of this region using force, like it did in August with the Knin Krajina Region (Sectors South and North), and in May with the western Slavonia Region (Sector West).

On Wednesday, opening the peace talks in Dayton, Christopher emphasized that the problem of this region must be resolved peacefully.

Milosevic and Tudjman agreed that the normalization of relations between the two states be based on full respect of internationally recognized human rights for all citizens of their respective countries.

The two presidents agreed, also, that the normalization be based also on the right of all refugees and displaced persons in the two countries to return to their homes, recover their property, or be given just compensation.

In early August alone, during the aggression on Knin Krajina, about 250,000 Krajina Serbs were expelled from Croatia, and 189,000 of these found refuge in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The ethnic territories of Krajina Serbs in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, with the exception of the Srem-Baranja Region, have been completely cleansed, so that there are currently in Krajina fewer than 3,000 Serbs, most of them elderly people.

The Milosevic-Tudjman meeting was attended by Warren Christopher and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

**Article Views SDA 'Platform' on Peace Negotiations**

*AU0211121895 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 23 Oct 95 p 2*

[Article by S. Luckin: "State Capable of Survival"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] sent a clear message from the meeting in Fojnica that it is time for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be stopped and for the armed fight to be replaced by a patient political fight. That course, announced in the speech of the president of the presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, was expressed in the 20 points of the ruling party for the coming peace negotiations in the United States, which will be forwarded to the state negotiating team.

However, from the fact that those are the standpoints of the most influential party in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the fact that Izetbegovic personally participated in their creation, it can clearly be expected that they anticipate the objectives that the representatives of the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities will try to achieve in the United States. The basic task remains the political fight for the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia- Herzegovina.

**End of Dilemmas About Division**

The chances for that to be achieved are much better than in all earlier negotiations. In the past three and a half years, and particularly in the last few months, the military situation in the state has changed significantly, and with the expansion of the free territories, which now exceed the earlier 30 percent and even the 51 percent planned for the federation, the political power of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities rose rapidly. Milosevic is aware of that power, and therefore we can expect the coming negotiations under the patronage of the United States to erase the dilemmas on any sort of division of Bosnia-Herzegovina once and for all.

However, on the other hand, which is obvious from Izetbegovic's words in Fojnica, there is a justified fear that the final achievement of sovereignty and integrity might turn into a short-lived victory. What awaits Bosnia-Herzegovina is the transformation of the internal arrangement, and that is precisely where the traps lie;

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traps in which those who are presently trying to divide this state might find ground for a future division.

It is to be expected that Milosevic, and even Tudjman, as they could not do it with the help of weapons, will try to use the negotiations to establish a system in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will not be within the function of the state, but in which Serbia and Croatia will always have an ally for new divisions. Precisely because of that danger, in his speech, Izetbegovic insisted on a precise definition of the central functions and institutions. According to Izetbegovic, the minimum for the survival of the state is to have a parliament, presidency, government, constitutional court, and central bank. The central authorities must control foreign affairs, defense, the protection of human rights and freedoms, citizenship, the protection of the borders, communications, money, customs, international trade, the budget, and finance on the state level. Izetbegovic does not reconcile himself with getting a Bosnia- Herzegovina that will exist formally, but the army of which will be commanded from Belgrade or Zagreb, and the money of which will be the Croatian kuna and the Yugoslav dinar. Such a model exists in no country in the world, and it could not survive in Bosnia-Herzegovina either, so it is logical that, eventually, that would result in its disintegration.

**Federation as Warning**

Sarajevo also asks for a deadline to be set for the implementation of the peace agreement if it is reached. That cannot be longer than one year. Izetbegovic said clearly that the peacekeeping forces cannot remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina longer than that, and he also required the withdrawal of the Croatian Army from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina no later than 30 days after the peace agreement is signed. It is obvious that the purpose of this is for the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be given over in the first place to its citizens. As long as the United States, Russia, France, or any other state has troops here, it will be able to influence the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the same goes for Serbia and Croatia.

The new Bosnia-Herzegovina, if it is built with political means, will have to get rid of another burden at the very start. That is, as Izetbegovic characterized it, "the criminal regimes and nationalistic fanatics." An opportunity for the final victory over them is in the democratic elections, namely in direct democratic elections of all bodies, from the parliament to the presidency. By the amputation of that malignant growth from the body of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the neighbors would be deprived of the possibility of spreading stories about their respective nations being endangered, which served as the introduction to the present aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**How To Arrange Bosnia-Herzegovina**

But, for an internal settlement of relationships in the state in which sufficiently strong mechanisms for the protection of the national rights of every nation must be secured, what is necessary are guarantees from the neighbors. In Point 17, Izetbegovic asked for Serbia and Croatia to "state formally that they have no territorial pretensions towards the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they will not incite separatist and secessionist tendencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The SDA platform consisting of 20 points, as expressed in Izetbegovic's speech, is the biggest step in drawing the outlines of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina so far. Until these peace talks, the basis of all requests was the preservation of the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has not been omitted this time either, but it is evident that the focus has now been moved from the outer borders to the internal arrangement. The negotiations in the United States at the end of October will try to find a formula for the final ending of the war. For the SDA, every internal transformation of the state must be carried out in such a way as to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina with enough strength to be able to resist any similar assault on its borders in the future. As for what will go on within those borders, it is the problem of the peoples which live here, and not of Belgrade or Zagreb.

However, if they insist on cutting up Bosnia-Herzegovina to suit their wishes, a final agreement will hardly be reached at all. And in that case, everything that has been done so far will collapse. Izetbegovic sent a clear message that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed," and that "we will negotiate where we can and make war where we have to." Those words are sufficient warning to the other participants of the negotiations that we will not agree to peace at any price, and that it is finally time for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be planned in Sarajevo, instead of Belgrade and Zagreb.

**SDP Discusses Peace Process at News Conference**

*AU0111200295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The current negotiating process in the United States, the initiative on the formation of a separate federal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the elections in the Republic of Croatia were topics addressed at today's news conference by the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SDP].

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The SDP expects the Bosnia-Herzegovina negotiating team to not accept at any price the possibility of secession of any part of the republic, and to defend the idea of a territorially integral and ethnically indivisible state. This party expects that the concept of a federation of cantons over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina will win in Ohio, and that the interim arrangements will be temporary, without the possibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina's dissolution. The ultimate aim of the negotiations should be a Bosnia-Herzegovina that will be as similar as possible to what it was before the war, Nijaz Skenderagic, member of the SDP Presidency, stressed. The SDP insists that the priority in the negotiations be given to the constitutional organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One of the main questions concerning the peace negotiations is what Tudjman has in mind in Ohio. Since the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been greater Serbian but also greater Croatian aspirations toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Croatian authorities have still not given up. What we are particularly concerned about is whether the atmosphere of Karadjordjevo [cite on 1993 Tudjman-Milosevic talks on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina] will be felt in Ohio, and to what degree that atmosphere can stifle the peace initiative. Ohio is the key place for the solution to the concept of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state, but also the concept of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDP leaders believe.

**Serb Leader Doubts Equal Treatment in Ohio**

*LD0111174395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1607 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[Quotation marks as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 1 Nov (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, said today that the Serb delegation at the Ohio talks would not be treated equally, as privileges will be sought for the Muslims and Croats.

In an interview for tomorrow's issue of [Serb] OSLOBODJENJE, Krajisnik said that it would be very difficult in America, "because the latest messages indicate that the mediators and our enemies will come up with fresh surprises."

"Four issues will be particularly difficult. First of all, the Contact Group offered us a confederation with Serbia, and Holbrooke is now saying that this option will be eliminated at the very start because the Muslims are against it," Krajisnik said.

According to him, the West has promised the Serb Republic adequate territorial links, i.e. that its eastern and western parts would be linked by a 20 km wide corridor, but now there is an indication that this will not be permitted.

The novelty is also a position that Holbrooke has assumed that the Serbs should not be given access to the sea, nor would he allow the partition of Sarajevo, which means that they will try to give the entire city to the Muslim-Croat federation," the Serb assembly president says.

Krajisnik made it clear that the Serb delegation in Dayton would strive to secure the agreed minimum of interests for the Serb people, mainly through the implementation of the principles adopted in Geneva and New York, and went on to say:

"It is our duty to return Serb ethnic areas. We do not have the right to give up or trade towns such as Sanski Most, Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, and others. We will not accept the situation on the ground, which has changed drastically over the past three months."

Krajisnik said that as the head of the "all-Serb delegation" at the talks, Slobodan Milosevic would do his best to represent the interests of the entire Serb nation and noted that it had been agreed that the sanctions should not be more important than freedom."

Speaking about the future of the Serb Republic, Krajisnik said that "before the war in which they gained a state of their own, the [Bosnian] Serbs were second-class citizens" and that after the war there would be two states on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina loosely linked in a way that would prevent outvoting.

**Serbs Claim Croats, Bosnians Violating Cease-Fire**

*AU3110171895*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT on 31 October carries within its regular 1100 GMT newscast several reports on alleged cease-fire violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The studio announcer begins by citing the Bosnian Serb military reporting that "yesterday enemy forces continued to severely violate the cease-fire on several fronts. On the [Bosanska] Krupa-Sanski Most front, Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] units occasionally used small arms fire. On the Teslic and Doboj fronts they used small arms and antiaircraft fire."

The announcer continues that "the Ustashas [World War II Croatian fascists] opened [words indistinct] fire on the Serb defense lines from the Crni Vrh area, on the Manjaca front, several times," while on the Orasje front they "used antiaircraft weapons to fire at Serb lines."

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Savo Guzina then reports on the situation in the Sarajevo area, saying that "Muslim provocations have continued, as has the war tension on this front. On the Vogosca front there were the most provocations," where, "apart from heavy infantry fire on [names indistinct] in Vogosca, as well as Serb positions in the (?central) part of the outer border ring, particularly elevation 867, the Muslims fired four rifle grenades from the Kamenicke Stijene area towards [name indistinct]." He adds that "in the old town and in Novo Sarajevo light provocative fire and occasional artillery fire was registered; and fire was also directed at the Serb defense lines in the mountains south of the city, but there were no consequences." He adds that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army "has made quite an unexpected move: [Words indistinct] they placed a 40-mm Bofors at Sokolje, pointing at the army barracks in Rajlovac."

The studio announcer then says that news has just arrived that Croatian forces "have been violating the cease-fire on the Orasje front, firing six mortar bombs from the Vidovice area towards the Serb village of [name indistinct] between 0810 and 0830 today."

Vesna Rudan, reporting on the situation on the Herzegovina front, says that "yesterday members of the regular Croatian Army launched several attacks from a distance on the positions of the Herzegovina Corps in the Popovo Polje area." She adds that "Croatian troops used antiaircraft guns and machine guns to fire on Serb positions in Ravne Glave in the southern part of Popovo Polje. There were no casualties on the Serb side, but since their lives were in danger, they returned fire." She also says that "on the Konjic-Kalinovik part of the Herzegovina front the Muslims used small arms to fire from the [name indistinct] area at Serb positions in the area around the bridge. Serb forces did not respond, and there were no major consequences."

### Envoy Suggests UN Confusion in Fall of Srebrenica

*AU3110142595 Paris AFP in English*
*1412 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 31 (AFP) — UN envoy Yasushi Akashi Tuesday claimed the United Nations may have been "confused" over Bosnian Serb intentions against the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica they seized in July, leading to the feared massacre of thousands of mainly Moslem men.

He said however it was "not clear" any UN action could have saved Srebrenica, defended by around 450 Dutch UN troops.

Akashi said he ordered "close air support" — UN code words for pinprick air strikes — as the town was already falling at just after midday on July 11.

This had to stop "several hours later" when the Dutch defence minister Joris Voorhoeve called demanding the action stop for fear the Serbs would take reprisals on their Dutch soldiers.

Asked why he had not ordered action sooner or more vigorous full "airstrikes," he said: "Hindsight is always wiser than action at that moment."

Akashi suggested he had had reports on different occasions that the Serbs had stopped, only to find that they had advanced again.

"Maybe it confused the judgement on our side," he said.

"Air strikes were not being considered, only close air support," the UN envoy said.

Akashi, leaving his post Tuesday, told reporters "it was not clear anything could have been done" to save Srebrenica, a former Bosnian government enclave and so-called UN "safe area" in eastern Bosnia, taken by Serb forces on July 11.

Monday, the British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT reported however that UN force commander for ex-Yugoslavia Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier had urged UN diplomats in May to abandon Srebrenica and other safe areas.

The newspaper said Janvier had openly expressed a desire to abandon the enclave and that the way he handled the attacks on Srebrenica and another enclave — Zepa — led senior UN officers to conclude that he had deliberately allowed them to fall.

U.S. officials have put the number of those missing from Srebrenica at up to 8,000. The United Nations is still denied access to the area which is currently reported being resettled with Krajina Serbs pushed out of Croatia in August.

### UNSC 'Action' Demanded

*AU3110201195 Paris AFP in English*
*2002 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[Report by Sheri Prasso]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Oct 31 (AFP) — Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic, on the eve of U.S.-brokered peace talks, asked the UN Security Council on Tuesday [31 October] to take responsibility for the fall of UN safe areas in Bosnia during the summer.

"Srebrenica and Zepa happened during the Security Council's watch ... (and) this unprecendented crime requires special attention and action by the Security

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Council," Sacirbegovic said in a letter to the members of the body.

Security Council acting chairman Ibrahim Gambari said in response that a report from the UN Secretariat had been requested, and that further action may be forthcoming when it is received.

Moslem men of fighting age were rounded up after the fall of Srebrenica in July and U.S. officials have estimated that up to 8,000 of them have since "disappeared" and are feared dead. Many were thought to be buried in mass graves in the area.

The United Nations and independent humanitarian agencies have not been able to gain access to areas in eastern Bosnia in order to make the report the UN has requested.

Sacirbegovic said that the safe areas supposedly under UN protection "were overrun with thousands of innocent people being massacred while the rest were subject to other crimes, including rape and ethnic cleansing."

"If not for the sake of the thousands of victims, then the Security Council should undertake this review for the sake of its own credibility by determining why its own resolutions were undermined," his letter said.

Speaking to journalists outside the council chambers, Sacirbegovic said that someone needed to take responsibility and noted that the Dutch battalion had already undertaken a study.

"Why did the United Nations sell out these people?" he said. "Someone sold them out. Obviously the United Nations took away from us the right and responsibility to defend them."

The designation of the UN safe areas at the same time the Bosnian government was under an arms embargo prevented the army from being able to defend the UN-created enclaves in Bosnian Serb territory.

On Monday, he said the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, General Bernard Janvier, bears tremendous personal responsibility for the deaths of thousands when the safe areas fell to Bosnian Serbs in July.

But Tuesday he backed away from the criticism.

"Maybe he is the executor of someone else's position," he said without elaborating. [passage omitted]

### Chirac's 'Order' Not To Intervene

*AU0111151995 Paris AFP in English 1410 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Berlin, Nov 1 (AFP) — French UN commander General Bernard Janvier withheld air support from Srebrenica as it fell to Bosnian Serbs, on the order of French President Jacques Chirac, a German newspaper said here Wednesday [1 November] citing French and UN sources.

The left-wing TAGESZEITUNG newspaper said that after Bosnian Serbs attacked the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica on July 6, Janvier refused on five occasions to command the air intervention called for by Dutch peacekeepers stationed there.

Chirac had given orders against air attacks at the beginning to July, even before the attack on Srebrenica, the newspaper said, quoting sources close to the French government and the UN command in Zagreb.

French and US secret services, which monitor the telephone conversations of Serb chiefs of staff and take part in air reconnaissance operations, were aware of preparations for the operation against Srebrenica since the middle of June, the newspaper said.

It reported that, within the "contact group" on Bosnia, Britain, France, and Russia had since December been calling for a more realistic peace plan, which would involve relinquishing the three Moslem UN-declared safe areas of Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa.

The two other "contact group" members Germany and the United States were initially against the strategy.

However, at a Security Council meeting on May 24, 1995, when Janvier again proposed abandoning the enclaves, Washington and Bonn tacitly consented, according to the newspaper.

Srebrenica fell to Bosnian Serbs on July 11, despite the presence of Dutch peacekeepers responsible for its defence.

Some 8,000 inhabitants of the safe area subsequently went missing, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC.)

The French government refused to comment on the report Wednesday, although a spokesman repeated the French position that it had always held that the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO should maintain an attitude of "great firmness."

### Srebrenica Refugees Describe Executions, Atrocities

*AU3110205495*

[FBIS Editorial Report] The current affairs program "Auslandsjournal" carried by Mainz ZDF Television Network in German at 2000 GMT on 30 October includes a 5-minute report by Juergen Bollmann on crimes committed by Bosnian Serb forces following their capture of the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, a UN safe haven, in July. The report includes eyewitness

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accounts of atrocities and massacres that occurred in Srebrenica and the surrounding area at the time.

A Bosnian Muslim explains how he and 2,500 other men were imprisoned in a hall, where they were beaten and then led in groups to a field, where they were shot by Bosnian Serb troops. The man says that he survived because he was taken for dead and lay under a pile of corpses until he was able to flee. Another refugee recounts that following these executions, a man would walk up to the bodies and ask whether anyone needed help. Anyone who was still alive and made a sound would be immediately shot.

The announcer says that Bosnian Government forces have found evidence of numerous atrocities in areas that they have recaptured. Soldiers are shown entering a house where they say that they found the bodies of 11 male civilians, including a 17-year-old. One of the soldiers says that the men had not been shot, but that their skulls had been crushed. Footage is shown of a quarry where executions were carried out, and another survivor describes how excavators and trucks were used to move bodies to mass graves. A woman who was staying in the UN refugee camp at Srebrenica when the city fell is then interviewed on how Serb troops were able freely to enter the camp and take male inmates prisoner. She says that she personally saw eight decapitated bodies in a stream next to the camp where refugees would collect water, and that UN troops must have been fully aware of what was happening. The report ends with a clip of civilians expelled from Srebrenica at a refugee camp in Tuzla.

**War Crimes Agency: Thousands Killed in Srebrenica**

*AU3010165295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Oct 95*

[Report by Edina Isakovic from Tuzla — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The suffering of the people of Podrinje, particularly those of Srebrenica and Zepa, has been without precedent in this war. The fact alone that the fate of some 10,000 Srebrenica people is still unknown speaks volumes about the seriousness of the crimes that Karadzic's Chetniks committed against the innocent population of this small town in Podrinje.

The commission for gathering evidence on war crimes of the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton has been working intensively to collect data on the gruesome crimes committed in Srebrenica. Rifat Karic, chairman of this commission, says:

[Karic] The fate of the people of Srebrenica and Zepa in Podrinje was tragic, and became a main topic of discussion in the world. It has been used as evidence of the Serbian aggression, as evidence of the intent at committing genocide, and as evidence of genocide itself. Everything that happened in Srebrenica and surrounding Srebrenica was broadcast by almost all the television stations in the world, so people saw the horrors and the torment of over 40,000 innocent people from Srebrenica and Zepa.

As for figures, 10,000 to 12,000 people were either killed or missing: 5,000 to 6,000 were killed, and about 5,000 to 6,000 people are still missing. [passage omitted]

[Isakovic] The commission for gathering evidence of war crimes also has information that there are about 15 concentration camps on the territory of Serbia, which clearly points to the aggressor's genocidal activities.

The conclusion here is that the crimes committed in Srebrenica are considered the worst crimes committed in Europe after World War II. The crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia must not be forgotten, and all the criminals must face the court of justice in The Hague.

**Witness Implicates Karadzic in Prijedor Crimes**

*AU0111162895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[Report by Rafija Kulasin — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] All the information so far about the suffering of the Bosniaks and Croats indicates that the most massive and monstrous crimes have been committed in the Prijedor municipality. The intensity of the criminal terror since 1992 until today has hardly ever let up. Mrs. Mujkanovic from the Prijedor village of Biscani recounts the crimes:

[Mujkanovic] In 1994 [word indistinct] they slit the throat of Faruk Rizvic and killed his wife and his sister-in-law. She used to work in the ECG department at the hospital; Fadila she was called. They slit the throat of Faruk Rizvic. The man who did it was ordered, he was told that he had to bring the head of Faruk Rizvic, and if he did not, he would be killed. One night they came and killed the wife and sister-in-law with a gun and then slit Faruk's throat. He [words indistinct]. A Serb lived in his house on the second floor, but he could not help him since he knew that they would also kill him if he had tried to help. Faruk's throat was slit. When the imam came to bury him — he was our imam, called Said, he stayed — no one wanted to help bury a Muslim, so when he came to bury Faruk Rizvic, he found his body without the head. His head was taken away by the cut-throat who had to prove to Karadzic and [?Zeljaja] that

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he had killed him. This is the truth. I know because his wife and sister-in-law were my cousins, so I went to see. I saw the headless body of Faruk Rizvic. The two women were killed.

They also killed Asim Kadic and his wife. They killed Efet Terzic and his wife. They took away young people. A van would appear in front of a house, and when a blue van appeared in front of a house, you knew that you would never see those people again. They took away people, and some they killed and buried, but no one knows where. I do not know whether it was in [word indistinct] or somewhere there, no one knows that, but the [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] 5th Corps will find all that when it arrives. Around Prijedor there are almost as many graves as there were Mt. Kozara people.

There is a place near Prijedor, it is called Brdo [Matarusko]. There were 11 villages there — I was born in one of them — they killed there all the men between the ages of nine and 90. They killed my sister's son-in-law, Smajl Rizvic. They killed him in Keraterm. How did they kill him? Not with a weapon. They threw in something with gas into the hall. 566 people were suffocated in one night. Smajl Rizvic was among them, as was Seid Krupic, my sister's son. They were suffocated, but we do not know where they were buried.

**Rights Group Protests 'Open Violations' by Croats**

*AU3110171695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Committee for the Protection of Human Rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina has issued a statement, which stresses the following:

In the interest of setting up the Federation, the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina have for some time been turning the blind eye to the open violations of international norms and human rights of a certain category of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia.

As is known, the return of non-Croats to the territory of our country under the control of Croatian forces has been prevented. In this way they have been prevented from exercising their civil freedoms and property rights. The pinnacle of this hegemonic and chauvinist policy happened with the so-called election right of the diaspora to vote in the parliamentary elections in Croatia.

Considering that such political projects directly reflect on the state of human rights, the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina demands that state and political structures react in accordance with their rights and duties.

**Red Cross on 'Critical' Refugee Situation in RS**

*LD0111191195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1607 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 1 Nov (SRNA) — According to the Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, over 22,000 refugees are still on the move in the Bosnian Serb Republic with Banja Luka as their main destination.

Refugees are arriving in Banja Luka daily. Many of them have spent days on the road. The majority of the refugees are being accommodated in abandoned factories, schools, and inhabitable buildings, Red Cross spokesman Snezana Stoskovic said.

She described the refugee situation in the area as "critical and uncertain," and cited the example of the Modrica municipality where as many as 1,200 refugees are being accommodated in two refugee centers. With the refugees accommodated privately this figure increases to 15,930.

The main problems encountered by the refugee centers throughout the Serb Republic are: difficult living conditions, uncertainty, cold weather, and for some of them the fact that in addition to the elderly and children they have to look after the wounded who no longer require medical help, Mrs. Stoskovic told SRNA.

We urgently need heating appliances and fuel, baby food, diapers, mattresses, warm clothing, and shoes. Currently there are 45,000 refugees in the area of Banja Luka and another 55,149 in the areas of Prijedor, Modrica, and Omarska, Mrs. Stoskovic said. [passage omitted]

**Serbs Deny Banja Luka, Prijedor Detention Camps**

*LD3110173495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1616 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 31 Oct (TANJUG) — Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milovanovic, head of the press center of the main headquarters of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic army, told TANJUG today that there were no detention camps for Muslims or Croats in the Banja Luka and Prijedor areas, thus denying reports spread by certain international media.

He believes that this is yet another propaganda campaign founded on lies and aimed at discrediting the Serb side before the beginning of the peace talks in the United States.

Milutinovic bases his opinion on the fact that foreign media and certain aid organizations have been intensifying their efforts to prove these allegations, particularly in Banja Luka and the surrounding area.

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Several representatives of the press and humanitarian organizations could personally see that these reports contain only a new batch of unfounded accusations against Serbs, he said.

"The main aim of this propaganda campaign, prepared in world workshops of lies, is not only to level accusations against the Serb side, but to hide the terrible truth about 200,000 Serb refugees from the western parts of the Serb Republic, who were driven out of their homes by Croats and Muslims in the latest wave of ethnic cleasing following the autumn offensive," Milutinovic believes.

"The real truth is that these refugees are living in difficult conditions, many of them still facing the problem of no decent accommodation and food, to say nothing about other qualities of life," Milutinovic said.

**Commentary Analyzes Attempt on Karadzic's Life**

*AU3110080195 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Oct 95 p 8*

[Commentary by Josko Dadic: "Attempt on Karadzic's Life: Chaos in Banja Luka!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is difficult to predict what consequences the attempt on the life of Radovan Karadzic, president of the so-called Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] — which was, according to a Bosnia-Herzegovina TV report, carried out on Monday [16 October] in Banja Luka by members of "Group 93," who had also organized a coup in the Bosnian Serbs' "metropolis" in September 1993 — will have on the current Bosnian Serb leadership, but it is quite certain that the chaos in Banja Luka, as throughout the little Serb parastate, is about to reach a climax. According to news agency reports, Karadzic was only wounded, but no one knows where he is at the moment.

**Another Coup?**

We will soon see whether another coup will occur in Banja Luka, similar to the one that occurred in September 1993, when Serb soldiers went out into the streets in tanks and personnel carriers, accusing the Pale military and political leadership of corruption and war profiteering. In the early morning of Friday, 10 September 1993, members of the 16th Krajina brigade went out into the streets along with a military police battalion, who had the moral support of the members of the 93d mixed air force brigade from Zaluzani airport. The local radio immediately broadcast a proclamation of Ostoja Zec, the commander of the rebellious soldiers, which stated that an "emergency committee" had been established, the purpose of which was to "on behalf of all the soldiers on the fronts and the many victims of the fighting" uproot "the war profiteers" and all those "who have betrayed the interests of the Serb people."

The next day, on Saturday, 11 September 1993, the leaders of the coup presented their two demands on television. One of the demands was made to the civilian authorities and the other to the commander of the Krajina Corps, Lieutenant General Momir Talic. In the first demand the soldiers demanded that the financial position of disabled war veterans be urgently improved, that war profiteering be publicly condemned, that all the owners of private businesses be subject to state control and that they accept compulsory work orders in the war, that military salaries be three times the guaranteed minimum wage in the "Serb republic," that funds be provided for fuel, food, and similar things from sales tax funds, that housing be provided for the families of the soldiers, and that the status of emigrants be regulated by law. At the same time, the soldiers demanded of their Gen. Talic that the problem of the soldiers' financial position be urgently resolved, that military police only carry out the jobs within their competence, that it discharge all those unable to fight and involve them in the economy, that all the military personnel who had retired but had become involved in service again be discharged, and that "proceedings be instituted before the court of honor and the military prosecutor concerning the public responsibility of all the officers who caused the loss of a large number of soldiers, as well as of territory and material goods, with their ignorance of military tactics."

**The Beginning of the End**

Immediately after this proclamation was read on local TV, on the night between Saturday and Sunday, certain unidentified individuals took over the TV transmitter, the result of which was that the people in the entire Banja Luka area could not watch TV. In the first several days of the coup Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic did not dare enter the town, but negotiated with the mutinous soldiers from the town suburbs. However, once the mutiny had started to spread outside Banja Luka, that is, after the Prijedor motorized brigade expressed solidarity with the Banja Luka mutineers, Karadzic managed to reach an agreement with the "disobedient" soldiers. On 16 September 1993, six days after the mutiny started, the tanks and personnel carriers of the Banja Luka mutineers began to withdraw from the town's streets.

This is what happened two years ago. However, political and military conditions have drastically changed for the Bosnian Serbs in the meantime. Now that Croatian and Bosniak forces have liberated huge areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Serbs had held under occupa-

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tion for over three years, in the past several months, and after they almost reached Prijedor and Banja Luka, the Serb political and military leadership, already eroded, has now started to disintegrate. The assembly of the so-called "Serb republic" thus replaced Generals Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir, Djordje Vukic, and Grujo Goric, as well as a number of lower-ranking commanders on Sunday in Banja Luka. Moreover, Dusan Kozic, the prime minister of the "Serb republic," has submitted his resignation, while Radovan Karadzic addressed the representatives, accusing Belgrade of being responsible for the loss of territory and frequent defeats. The attempt on Karadzic's life occurred just a day after that.

It remains to be seen whether the Bosnian Serb leader will definitely "be left out of the game" after this, or he will manage to carry out a maneuver such as the one in September 1993 and thus save his skin again. However, this is not so important after all, since, regardless of the outcome of "the Karadzic case," the Serb house of cards in Bosnia-Herzegovina has finally started to collapse for ever. The question is only how many, if any, will manage to keep the pack in their hands.

**Existence of 'Mysterious' Patriotic Front Examined**

*AU3010205995 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 95 p 7*

[Report by N. Odalovic and M. Mikuljanac: "Illegal Workshop for Open Letters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The mysterious "Patriotic Front," the organization that, according to the idea of its founders, should unite a broad spectrum of political forces in the Serb Republic [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina], has been faced with serious temptation right from the beginning of its activity, as an open letter, similar to the one sent to Radovan Karadzic, should have been sent to Slobodan Milosevic.

The signing of the open letter to the Serbian president was first postponed. After that many people avoided signing it. The whole episode puts the originally announced "neutral orientation" of the organization, and the allegations "that it had no aspirations to come to power, but only represents a group that should exert pressure," in question.

The Patriotic Front still does not have an official leadership, nor is it registered as a political organization (some people think that its activities are therefore illegal), and it is currently led by a nine-member coordination committee, but nobody wants to tell the public who its members are. According to our information, a kind of electoral meeting will be held some time next week and the organization will until then work in informal meetings, according to the principle "everyone who comes is welcome."

The doubts about the Patriotic Front's ambitions are being raised because of the secrets about the members, and the fact that it is supposed to consist of members from different political parties. The letter to Karadzic was signed by 12 organizations, from the left (the Socialist Party of Serbia and the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia) to the right (the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian National Renewal). The Women's Association of the Serb Republic and the Association of Private Employers of the Serb Republic were guests at the meeting, too.

The obvious wish of these parties with opposite interests to be present in the organization currently being established clearly confirms that it might become powerful, because of the general fear that the present crisis might turn into a revolution. If it comes to such a scenario, many people would naturally like to be at the barricades.

The followers of the Patriotic Front have not yet realized who is behind the initiative for its establishment. Our source, who wanted to remain anonymous and who is active at working sessions of the Front, still does not know whether Belgrade is behind the whole thing or if it is an honest and autonomous alternative to the present leadership.

Vojislav Seselj, whose followers are the only ones who have so far publicly announced that they are Patriotic Front members, claims that "all this is, unfortunately, a big fraud committed by the treacherous Socialist and Communist Parties." Nikola Poplasen, former chairman of the Radical Party in the Serb Republic, has told NASA BORBA that he was one of the signatories of the Karadzic letter, because of which he had had to resign from his high-ranking party position, although he still had good relations with the Belgrade headquarters of the Serbian Radical Party.

"At the present moment, the Front must insist on a rapid reorganization of the army and the police, because the force that we have can enable us both quickly to regain the territories that we have lost and to gain access to the sea," he continued. He thinks that the internal relations within the Front will be sorted out soon, since "the documents prepared for the establishment of the organization are patriotically oriented, so it will be seen who is afraid of signing them."

Another Radical Party member, Pantelija Damjanovic (the owner of the largest Banja Luka hotel, Hotel "Bosna") has joined the Patriotic Front and has stated that he supports the coming closer of the Yugoslav

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United Left, the Socialist Party of Serbia, and all other parties in the Serb Republic.

The Socialist Party is still indecisive about its engagement in the Patriotic Front. Drago Ilic, the chairman of the Serb Republic's party branch, refused to sign the letter to Milosevic, but Zivko Radisic, vice chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, did sign.

New open letters can certainly be expected, regardless of how the events in the "Patriotic Front" unfold and who sets the avalanche of dissatisfaction and poverty in the Serb Republic's population into motion.

**[Box, p 7]**

**The Letter to Milosevic**

In this letter to the Serbian president, the Patriotic Front requests him to influence the officers of the Serb Republic army into reorganizing the army and going to the front lines, so as to protect the Serb people with its military power, which is under control now, to precisely define the borders to be defended by the army and to publicly say that the Serb Republic wants to merge with Serbia and the FRY.

"In this way, you will justify the awakening of the Serbian national spirit that you initiated several days ago. If you do not do anything, we, the Serbs from the remaining parts of the Serb Republic, can only conclude that you have changed your mind, that you have left us in the lurch, even betrayed us." This is how the letter ends.

**Banja Luka Local Party Leader Resigns**

*LD2710183695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 27 Oct (TANJUG) — Professor Dr. Marko Rajcevic, the president of the Banja Luka Municipal Board of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS — the ruling Bosnian Serb party], has tendered his irrevocable resignation, TANJUG has learned from reliable sources.

It has been learned unofficially that Rajcevic announced his decision in the presence of SDS Chairman Radovan Karadzic and that he explained it with "personal reasons."

Among the reasons are, according to the unofficial source, his duties at the law faculty, as well as the overall situation created after the fall of the 13 western Bosnian Serb municipalities to the Muslim and Croatian hands.

Last night's session did not discuss the election of the new SDS Banja Luka Municipal Board chairman nor when these elections will be held.

**Serb Radio Doboj Resumes Broadcasting**

*LD3110173095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1638 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 31 Oct (TANJUG) — Serb Radio Doboj resumed its regular broadcasts today on the new frequency of 92.9 MHz, after a four-day interruption.

After part of this radio's broadcasting facilities were destroyed in the recent actions by NATO planes, funds for the procurement of new equipment were secured by the municipality of Doboj and sponsors in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The audibility of this revamped radio station, which puts out programs 24 hours per day, is significantly greater than before the aggression.

**Air Force Training First Generation of Pilots**

*AU0111171995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Air Force has also contributed greatly to the strengthening of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Today the first generation of pilots of the Air Force has begun its training. Sefik Mujkic reports:

[Begin recording] [Mujkic] During the period of limited combat operations and cease-fire, the Air Force of our army has devoted all its attention to the preparations for the training of the first generation of pilots. Mr. Hajro Nurkovic, deputy commander for morale and political issues in this unit, assessed the activities so far concerning this training.

[Nurkovic] I can tell you that all the technical activities and preparations have been completed. Training plans and programs have been drawn for the general part, for the [words indistinct], and the flight training in cooperation with the [word indistinct] for military education, and the center of military schools. High quality exams, and instructors [words indistinct] have been selected. The Air Force has a sufficient number of experienced flight instructors.

We have also undertaken activities on the accommodation of trainees, and [word indistinct], and so on. The medical exams have also been carried out. There were about 500 candidates, but the Air Force Command received 250 application forms, and the Air Force Command went through these and selected 126 candidates for the medical exam.

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[Mujkic] Today the training of the first generation of pilots of our army's Air Force began in the premises of the flight unit. Colonel Erdin Rustic, commander of the Air Force and Air Defense, was the first to address the trainees. Speaking about the training and responsibilities, Colonel Rustic stressed that this was a select group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members that must not make mistakes [words indistinct]. Also it will be dealing with expensive technology, and every mistake in the Air Force is very expensive.

Sefket Rustanovic also spoke to the trainees on the behalf of the command of the center of military schools, as did Major Ramiz Bajraktarevic, commander of the school for military officers.

The pilot training takes 14 months and is conducted in three phases: The first is the general military part, then the theoretical specialist part, and finally the specialist flight training in the units of the Air Force. [end recording]

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**'Unofficial' Results of Deputy Elections Issued**

*LD0111145595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia has issued its report number 20 with preliminary and unofficial results of elections for the Croatian Assembly's Chamber of Deputies. Jasenka Dudic has a report:

[Dudic] The latest report contains details on election results from 6,678 polling stations of the overall number of 6,684 stations, where 2,413,395 voters turned out to vote.

HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] is in the lead with 45.20%.

The joint state list of HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly], HNS [Croatian People's Party], HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union], and SBHS has won 18.26% of the vote; HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party] 11,56%; and SDP 8.93% of the vote.

The HSP [Croatian Party of Rights], according to the preliminary results, has won 5% of the vote—the treshold required for entering the Chamber of Deputies. [passage omitted]

Final results of the elections will not be announced on 3 November as had been planned because the elections are to be repeated in several polling stations in Rijeka, Pozega, and Dugo Selo on 5 November, due to irregularities.

**Authorities Annul Several Election Results**

*AU0111191095 Paris AFP in English 1901 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 1 (AFP)—Croatian authorities Wednesday [1 November] annulled election results in several constituencies after discovering "irregularities," state-run radio said Wednesday.

The radio did not say how many constituencies in Sunday's legislative voting were affected but said that irregularities had occurred in polling stations in the Adriatic port city of Rijeka, the eastern town of Pozega, and the Zagreb suburb of Dugo Selo.

**Opposition Warns About Election Irregularity**

*LD0111160495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1542 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 1 (TANJUG)—Croatian opposition parties have expressed serious doubts about the regularity of the Sunday [29 October] parliamentary elections in certain election districts and are announcing they will demand the nullifying of those election results.

Leader of the Croatian Peasant Party Zlatko Tomcic, who together with four coalition partners obtained the largest number of votes for the opposition, has found fault with the European Council monitoring mission.

Tomcic called rash and biased the claims made by commission representatives that the elections in Croatian had been conducted in a completely regular fashion.

'I cannot begin to understand that a professional group of international representatives makes a final assessment about the regularity of elections before they are over', he added.

Tomcic pointed out that there are very serious reasons to doubt the correctness of elections in certain election districts. He warned particularly about the sudden surge of votes for the candidate of the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in Dubrovnik, Foreign Minister Mate Granic.

Granic suddenly gained 44 percent of votes, down from 33 percent, although he was trailing the oppositon candidate. The same thing happened in Varazdin, a city in north Croatia, and in some other places.

'It is indicative that the last results are always in favor of the party in power, which is incredible', Tomic said.

Drazen Budisa's Croatian Social Democratic Party (HSLS) has announced that it will demand the nullifying of the elections in one election district in Zagreb where its candidate, 'on the basis of incomplete results', was declared the winner, and then only a few hours later the commission announced that the HDZ candidate had won.

**Sarinic Urges NATO Deployment on Border**

*AU0211112395 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 95 pp 4-5*

[Interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, Head of Croatian delegation in negotiations with Slavonian Serbs, by Olga Ramljak; place and date not given: "NATO Will Protect Our Border With Serbia!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia, desiring peace, carefully follows every movement in the negotiations with the Serbs from the still occupied territory, rejoicing at every positive shift, ever disappointed when the good news proves to be a false hope. As the deadline for achieving a solution approaches, expectations grow greater, as well as impatience. Therefore, between the two meetings—in Osijek and Erdut—we spoke to Eng. Hrvoje Sarinic, Head of the President's Office, who is

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in charge of public and secret negotiations with rebel Serbs.

[Ramljak] The negotiations in Osijek ended with your announcement that there had been a little shift. Can you explain a bit more about it?

[Sarinic] I know that you would all like to see results and that our public expects that from the negotiators. Meanwhile, we have been building slowly, patiently, and for a long time in the negotiating process. The first step of that process was Erdut, in which we agreed upon the principles. That is as if you have been laying bricks, as you people from Dalmatia say. With many bricks we must build the final building, that is, we have to build them into the document on the establishment of the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia, so, the point in question is the final document about the final and complete reintegration of eastern Slavonia, western Srijem, and Baranja into Croatia. After Erdut, there was the meeting at the Embassy in Zagreb, where we did not achieve a lot, for logistical reasons so to speak. Nevertheless, Osijek has been a small step forward for me.

[Ramljak] Why?

[Sarinic] Almost formally, what we said and established beyond dispute in point 11, at our meeting in Erdut. They said in Osijek that they accepted reintegration into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia, however, of course, they still want to talk and negotiate about all the rights of the Serbs, about the carrying out of our Constitutional Minority Law, about the transitional period.

**They Have Been Wasting Time**

[Ramljak] Croatia has left the possibility of a one-year transitional period until reintegration is complete. Are Croatian negotiators sticking to this, that is, what do the Serbs want?

[Sarinic] They have asked for five years, now they have agreed to three years. We do not agree to three years, for us, the only possibility is a year. Besides, it is very likely that NATO will come into that area, and as you know, NATO does not stay on for a long time.

Croatia wants to achieve something concrete before 31st October, when the negotiations of the three presidents commence in the United States. Therefore the negotiating process has been speeded up: on Wednesday in Erdut, as well as on Saturday and Sunday, 28th and 29th October in Zagreb. We will work hard to formulate and possibly sign the document that I mentioned a moment ago.

[Ramljak] What are the chances that the goal will be realized?

[Sarinic] We are on line to reach the agreement. Namely, my impression is that the Serbs have drawn a conclusion from everything that has happened and that their approach is now different from what it has been in the past two and a half years of negotiations. Whether this document will or will not be signed I cannot predict with certainty. You yourself know how our negotiations hitherto have been finishing. For instance, I had a secret meeting with one of their generals in June last year, when they "took a picture of me." In liberated Knin a document has been found, marked "top secret" from which one can see their view of the negotiations. It is a four-page study that shows what the enemy is like, and in particular shows its objective. Their objective is to "mix up" as many arguments as possible, "so that one does not know at all what it is, and the time has already been wasted."

[Ramljak] Can you tell us who the author of that document is?

[Sarinic] The author is their General Mile Novakovic, and the point in question is my portrait as seen from their eyes, that is the negotiation strategy from their viewpoint.

**Temporary Authority**

[Ramljak] Let us get back to the document that was to be signed this weekend in Zagreb. What kind of document is it, and what would this document contain?

[Sarinic] Listen, that is a basic document, but before this some other problems should be solved. That is, the length of the transitional period and the structure of the temporary authorities. We have suggested that the temporary authority should consist of one member of the European Union, Russia, the United States, the Croatian Government, and one Croat, one Serb, and one representative of the minorities from that area. They demand that there be also one United Nations representative. Our stand is that the UN Security Council formalize the issue of the establishment of such authority with one resolution, but we do not need the UN here, because, unfortunately, on the ground the UN have proved as they have proved.

If NATO comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is almost certain that it will, Croatia requests a parallel solution, and the international community has accepted that as one package of solutions, as advocated by Milosevic in one of the last talks I had with him; and now I confess that I have been in public and secret contact with him. Then he said something like: "Well, perhaps we can

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solve that ourselves." Milosevic's tactics were that the sanctions imposed on Serbia be lifted after the solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then he himself would solve the disputes with Croatia. These stalling tactics are simply out of the question, and the international community is now on Croatia's side. And now the only problem is to what degree and level we shall finalize this document before 31st October. We would certainly like that. We would like to go to the United States with a, so to speak, pretty mature document.

On the other hand, one can assume that Milosevic wants to come to the United States with all the cards in his hand. You know that he has received authorization from the Bosnian Serbs, and this was a surprise for the Serbian Orthodox Church, too, to represent the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if the Croatian Serbs would mandate him—Milosevic would then represent "the entire Serbianhood." That would, of course, give him a stronger position in negotiations. So, very likely, I estimate, this document will not be finalized, in which Milosevic would hold all the reins in his hands. However, we could bring that document to the level where there would be only one or two problems that would be dealt with later on.

**Serb Requests**

[Ramljak] You have defined the transitional period as a moot point. What else is a problem?

[Sarinic] By the acceptance point 11 in Erdut, the possibility of any kind of referendum was canceled and reintegration into Croatian constitutional and legal and territorial system was recognized. If they are in Croatia, the minimum they ask for is broad autonomy, special status, and so on and so forth. Point 11 binds them to issue writs for the elections for the local government. If we assume that by that they have accepted that there is no referendum at all, the only remaining question is how to define the authority in the transitional period, organize the police and above all provide for the return of 80,000 people who were banished from their homes as early as in 1991. We have already talked about the structure of the authorities, and when we talk about the police, they demand a 50-50 that is, 50 percent their own, and 50 percent Croatian police. That is out of the question. Croatian displaced persons will not return until the establishment of the police corresponding, according to the ethnic structure, to the 1991 census.

[Ramljak] How do you intend to provide for the immediate return of the displaced persons?

[Sarinic] That is in the document and everybody agreed on it. Now, the question is how to carry that out. Croatian houses are inhabited by Serbs. To the Serbs who are Croatian citizens, and those who are likely to become Croatian citizens, we have offered an option to return to their homes in Croatia where they come from, or to stay, but to find accommodation for themselves, or to get back to the countries where they come from. During the course of that process, one should take care about those who have not soaked their hands in blood, and who have decided to stay. The international community will help in this. If they return, one has to see where they return to, because in the process of normalization one should take care about that, too. We have been negotiating that 60 days after the signing of the agreement, the process would begin, assisted by the international community. The key and imperative point is that, by the agreement, it is provided that the displaced return to their homes. There are many other details, so that we will be negotiating very intensively on Saturday and Sunday, if necessary round the clock to finalize everything we can. That document would be the resume of everything that has been achieved and of all the problems that remain open.

**Milosevic Has Key**

[Ramljak] Is it possible to return people immediately to the towns like, for instance, Ilok and Beli Manastir, which have remained populated on the whole, or to Vukovar, which has been totally devastated?

[Sarinic] That is clearly the main problem. Vukovar has been devastated, and they have reconstructed only a dozen houses, which they show to strangers. Therefore I have said that it was a process that will be going on for a certain period of time and the Croatian state and the international community will have to help to solve it as soon as possible. There is no magic wand. Vukovar has been destroyed. As soon as the agreement is signed, that part of Croatia will immediately have to become a big construction site. And the displaced will have an opportunity to at least go to see their, sadly, destroyed houses, for the first time since they were banished. These will be human tragedies, and we shall all have to get involved in their solution, but the most important thing is that we can tell them immediately: "Pack your suitcases!"

If we succeed in achieving that under these conditions, it will nevertheless be a great step forward, because there will be no bloodshed.

I know that my role as negotiator has been the most unpopular role I have ever had, but I will tell you that I have also been proud of it. Because we have been doing everything and we will do everything we can to get the people back without bloodshed and to help them reconstruct what has been destroyed.

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[Ramljak] What is the biggest problem for you in that thankless role?

[Sarinic] It is my problem because I am negotiating with Serbs in self-proclaimed positions. They have not been elected in any elections, so we are turning more to Belgrade in the negotiations. I repeat once more: The key is in Milosevic's hands and he is playing his own game in all that. And Milosevic has to protect his existence on the political stage of Serbia, too. He is strong when carried by the wings of war, but when it comes to peace, he has to think about his political stability, because there has been a lot of bloodshed and many promises of Greater Serbia, and now the results are almost invisible. Already today he has to think about his position in the post-conflict period.

[Ramljak] If the agreement on peaceful reintegration is signed, when will Croatia come to its borders?

[Sarinic] Immediately after the signing, the Croatian police and customs will arrive at the Croatian borders, with the full support of the international community. We have already talked about the way they will be deployed, so that our police will not be only on the customs crossings, but along the whole border on the western bank of the Danube and on the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The question is, which of the international forces will come. We have plainly said in Osijek that UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] is out of the question. I repeat, it is very likely that NATO will come.

**NATO: 7,000 Troops**

[Ramljak] What will that mean?

[Sarinic] Its first task will be to disarm all paramilitary units, and Croatia demands that all the equipment be taken over that way. We have asked, of course, that all the Yugoslav Army units from Serbia, return to where they came from. They say there are no such units there. If that is true, that is even better. Anyway, as soon as the agreement is signed, they really will not be there. Then, the police will be organized according to the 1991 census, the transitional authorities will be established. There Croatia sticks to its own proposal and does not agree on the appointment of any administrator or any kind of colonial administration. The transitional administration has to be organized in such a way that it covers all components in the normalization of life. If NATO comes, in that short period there will be no need for the Croatian Army to enter the border area of Croatia toward Serbia.

[Ramljak] What would happen if it came to the other solution?

[Sarinic] In that case we would insist that, apart from the Croatian police and customs, our army is deployed in the five-kilometer wide border area. Croatia will insist on the arrival of NATO, because we do not see any other way of solving it. We assure you, we will firmly stick to that. I cannot grant that NATO will come, but I can insist that Croatia strongly insist upon it.

[Ramljak] How many NATO troops would it take for a good protection of the Croatian border?

[Sarinic] By our calculation it would take 5,000-7,000 people for a period of a year.

[Ramljak] You have mentioned the implementation of the Constitutional Law on Minorities. That is not a question of only Croatian-Serbian relations, because there are a number of minorities in the territory of the Vukovar-Srijem county, but the majority population there has always been Croatian. Which part of the Constitutional Law on Minorities should be applied for that area?

[Sarinic] The answer is very simple: A special district solution is out of the question. It is out of the question that the situation from Knin and Glina be transferred to eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. The ethnic structure will be reflected in the local government organs, and the Serbs will look after their legitimate rights within the framework of Croatian laws, and the task and obligation of the Croatian authority is to carry that out, but there will be no special status at all.

**[Box, p 4]**

**Combinations for Dubrovnik**

[Ramljak] What will happen with the south of Croatia regarding NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the north of Croatia?

[Sarinic] You refer, of course, to Prevlaka, Dubrovnik, and its hinterland. So far this question has not been raised in the negotiations. That is something that can be solved when we come to the solution as a whole. Our interest is certainly to strengthen the safety of Dubrovnik. The town is still endangered by war and provocations. The whole of this delicate problem will also demand some blending of solutions regarding the hinterland of Dubrovnik. It is not unknown that we have said that the Serbs had asked for 50 kilometers, and that we had only been talking about the peak of Ostro. We will talk about it when there is something more concrete.

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[Box, p 4]

**Novakovic on Sarinic**

According to a document marked "military, top secret," number 029/94, sent to the "President of the Republic, Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Main Headquarters of the Serb Army of Krajina" by General Mile Novakovic—Hrvoje Sarinic is "a convinced Croatian nationalist."

The document then says that he is a person fully trusted by Tudjman, a skillful intellectual, chosen to be the head of the Croatian delegation because he wants to show that "rebel Serbs are an internal Croatian security problem." Sarinic, according to Novakovic, is well informed about the problem, the international participants and the technology of the process of negotiating... He tries to dominate by creating an impression of intellectual superiority, education, and culture, and he puts the mask of the stands of the international factors on the Croatian stands, while, in Novakovic's eyes, Sarinic hides his hatred toward the Serbs in pretended peacemaking and intentions for general progress. How should one confront him, Mile asks and gives an immediate answer: "When discussing with him, we should not give our counterargument to every argument he has, but we should look for a logical mistake in his argument. So—if he draws an apple, do not draw an even nicer apple, but draw a worm on his, if he draws a portrait of some beauty, do not draw a more beautiful one, but draw a mustache on his."

This is the way General Novakovic defines what the Serb side wants from the negotiations: "Particularly now that he is helped by the understanding of the international factors, Hrvoje Sarinic will most often use the argument that they are offering everything, and that we simply do not want an agreement. He should not be allowed to parade too much with this."

**Visit to Graves Canceled Despite 'Breakthrough'**

*AU0211120095 Paris AFP in English*
*1138 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 2 (AFP)—Croatians have called off a visit to relatives' grave in the country's last Serb-held area because of security guarantees, emphasising the problems there despite a "breakthrough" at Bosnia talks, a UN official said Thursday [2 November].

The news came as Croatian and Serbian presidents, meeting in Ohio, agreed to work personally to negotiate a peaceful solution to the dispute over Serb-held Eastern Slavonia.

Twenty-six Croatians had planned to visit the graves of relatives in the devastated town of Vukovar but the cancellation emphasised the difficulties of integrating peacefully Croatians and rebel Serbs who fought a bloody war over Serb-held Eastern Slavonia in 1991, the official told AFP.

The UN official, speaking by telephone from Erdut in the Serb-held region, said the visit had been agreed at meetings between the UN, Croatian and Serb negotiators Monday.

Its cancellation by the Croatians over "Serb security guarantees" was perhaps intended to keep indignation over the brutal 1991 destruction of Vukovar alive in peoples' minds, said the official, who asked not to be named.

Few details have been released so far of the accord reached in Ohio, on Eastern Slavonia on the first day of wider Bosnia peace talks Wednesday.

All that was formally agreed appeared to be that Serbia and Croatia would not intervene militarily, but precisely how the 10,000 Serb rebel troops and militia in would be persuaded to leave and where they would go if there was no use of force was not clear.

US and UN officials in Zagreb said they had as yet no information on whether it meant the rebel Serb forces in the area had agreed to the peaceful return and what would happen to rebel Serb civilians.

UN officials told AFP last week there were some 168,000 people living in Eastern Slavonia, a tiny area on the Croatian border with Serbia.

US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, who has been brokering talks on Eastern Slavonia, was to leave the United States later Thursday and return to Zagreb.

Negotiations with local Croatian officials and the rebel Serbs would be organised, officials in Ohio said. US and UN officials in Zagreb could early Thursday give no details of where or when the talks might take place.

Croatian officials in Zagreb meanwhile refused to comment on the talks, saying any comment to be made that would be issued in the United States.

Few here consider, however, it will be easy to peacefully integrate two communities filled with bitter hatreds from the 1991 war and warn that a genuinely deal for a peaceful reintegration is still someway off.

Any reintegration of the area into Croatia, peaceful or not, would be likely to see the departure of thousands of the rebel Serbs from the region, unless very stringent security guarantees for the Serbs are written into any

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deal and backed up on the ground, UN officials in the area say.

**Croatian Army Fires on Serbs in E. Slavonia**

*LD0211121295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1141 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 2 Nov (SRNA)—Overnight and this morning the Croatian army opened sporadic fire from artillery and infantry weapons on Serb positions and populated areas in the zone of operation of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps of the Serb Army of Krajina [SVK].

The Vukovar-based Corps Command specified that this morning the positions of the Baranja division and the Serb residential areas and positions along the Zoo-Veliko Polje and Podravlje-Kopacki Rit lines bore the brunt of the Croatian fire coming from the direction of Belisce.

Sporadic firing could be heard along the Nustar-Brsadin and Osijek-Tenja lines. Three mortar shells were fired from the area of Tomin Hrast in the direction of the Serb village of Sodolovci.

There were no casualties among either the Serb fighters or the Serb population.

**Serb Paramilitary Leader Returns to E. Slavonia**

*LD0211000595 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2230 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] War criminal Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan has returned to Erdut in eastern Slavonia, the base of his so-called volunteer guard, after a series of crimes committed in the Banja Luka area over the past few weeks. On the eve of the Dayton talks, Arkan sent a message to the Croatian and international public saying that he could hardly wait for Croatia to begin liberating its occupied areas. [video shows logo for BM Television, not further identified]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Raznatovic, what is your assessment of the current situation in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, and do you think that an escalation of the war is possible?

[Arkan] To tell you the truth, I can hardly wait for an escalation of the war. We are prepared to stop any attack by the aggressor and make him pay dearly for the fall of western Slavonia and atrocities committed in Krajina. Therefore, I sincerely hope that it will be the beginning of Franjo Tudjman's end if he dares to attack eastern Slavonia.

[Correspondent] Negotiations between the Serb delegation representing the Srem-Baranja area and the Croatian side are in progress. What do you think about the results achieved so far, and what will the final outcome be?

[Arkan] I have already said clearly and categorically that there is not much room for negotiations with them. The only options are the blue zone—i.e., UN protectorate—or war. I hope that they are intelligent enough. After all Tudjman has just won the elections, and he should be intelligent enough not to jeopardize his people's and his own fate.

[Correspondent] Finally, what is your message to the people and the soldiers of the Srem-Baranja region?

[Arkan] They should be disciplined, they should not consume any alcohol, they should be prepared and fortify their positions. It is up to us to defend ourselves and to persevere. [end recording]

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**Bulgarian 'Multigroup' Linked to Gligorov Attack**

*AU0211085795 Skopje MIC in English 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the article for the newspaper THESSALONIKI, conveyed in the Sofia daily 24 HOURS [24 CHASA], the head of the Greek information agency from Thessaloniki accuses Bulgaria and the Sofia firm "Multigroup" of being connected with the assassination attempt on the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

In his text, Spiros Kuzinopoulos quotes the Macedonian Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, who said that a multinational group based in one of the neighboring countries took part in organizing the assassination.

24 HOURS writes that the Macedonian press published the news, even at the start of the investigation, that the explosive used in the assassination was brought into the country from Bulgaria. "I believe that 'Multigroup' is an economic group, founded in Bulgaria, and that it has connections with the Mafia. I believe it got rich by trading illegally with Serbia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], violating the embargo against FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia in the process."

According to Kuzinopoulos, "Multigroup" was directly connected with the former KGB and the Russian interests in Bulgaria. In the conclusion, Kuzinopoulos explains his allegations with the thesis about the plans of Sofia for a Great Bulgaria.

In its reaction to these allegations, the management of the firm "Multigroup" assesses the text as a provocation "at a time when the peace processes in the Balkans are taking place." According to the chief secretary of "Multigroup," Bojko Graganov, "the group will take measures in relation to the spreading of such incorrect information that threatens the reputation and good name of 'Multigroup,'" the Sofia daily 24 HOURS writes in its issue today.

**EU 'Will Probably Open' Embassy 'Next Month'**

*AU0211143095 Skopje MIC in English 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The European Union will probably open an embassy in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] next month. This was stated yesterday by Doris Pack, who is leading the six-member delegation of the European Parliament for Southeast Europe, which is in Macedonia at the invitation of Parliamentary Speaker Stojan Andov.

In the statement for the press, Pack said that the delegation she is leading is taking a number of steps for providing concrete help to Macedonia.

"I'm very pleased to be here at this moment, in this new situation between this country and its neighbor. The resolution of these problems can start off a new era of solving the questions between this country and the EU. As you know, the PHARE program and the agreement on cooperation can start being realized now. It is of great help that we are here precisely now, in order to submit a report to our Commission on interethnic relations in Brussels after we return. I was in Macedonia three years ago, as well, and I can say that many things have improved," said Doris Pack.

In Macedonia, the delegation met with the coordinators of the parliamentary groups in the Macedonian Parliament, while at the meeting with the members of the Commission on foreign politics, it was said that Macedonia's association with the EU was one of the next steps and goals of the Macedonian Government.

The guests expressed a large interest in Macedonia's overall relations with Albania and Bulgaria, whereby the president of the Commission, Ilinka Mitreva informed the guests that the relations with Albania are correct, whereas Bulgaria, despite having recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, seems to be showing that, in effect, it does not recognize the Macedonian nation and language.

Yesterday, the delegation of the European Parliament had a meeting with the members of the Council for interethnic relations of the Macedonian Parliament, talks with representatives of some NGOs, with the management of the Macedonian Radio Television, the editors of the programs in Albanian, Turkish, Rhoman, Vlach and Serbian language, as well as Radmila Kiprijanova, the president of the University "Sts. Cyril and Methodius."

The guests from the European Parliament will be received by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski today, the Minister of Economy Risto Ivanov, Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski and Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski. Their schedule also includes meetings with representatives of the Commerce Chamber and the Federation of Unions of Macedonia, the president of the Executive Committee and the representatives of the parties represented in the Tetovo Municipal Assembly.

**FYROM, Greece Agree on Rail Transport of Oil**

*LD0111175495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1639 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—The Greek rail company and the rail company of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] have reached agreement on the number of tanker trains

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for the transport of crude oil and other goods between the two neighboring Balkan states, Skopje papers say today.

Talks between experts of the two rail companies concluded with the signing of a joint protocol defininig a daily quota of nine tanker trains for the transport of crude oil and oil derivatives, and two more trains for the transport of other goods from the Greek port of Thessaloniki to Skopje and vice versa. [passage omitted]

**Law Governing Ministry of Internal Affairs**

*95BA0327A Skopje SLUZBEN VESNIK in Macedonian 6 Apr 95 No 19 pp 381-388*

[Ukase on Passing the Law on Internal Affairs]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 75, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the President of the Republic of Macedonia and the Chairman of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia issue the following:

## UKASE ON PASSING THE LAW ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Law on Internal Affairs, submitted at the 29 March 1995 session of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia was voted upon.

No. 08-1292/1

Kiro Gligorov, President of the Republic of Macedonia

Stojan Andov, Chairman of the Assembly of Macedonia

Skopje, 29 March 1995

## LAW ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### I. General Stipulations

**Article 1.** In the sense of the present law, the term internal affairs refers to the following:

Protecting the life, personal safety, and property of the citizens;

Preventing the commission of crimes, finding and apprehending the perpetrators of crimes, and their delivery to the proper authority;

Protecting the freedoms and rights of man and the citizen as guaranteed by the constitution;

Preventing the destruction by violent means of democratic institutions approved by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia;

Maintaining public order and peace;

Preventing the dissemination of national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance;

Protecting the safety of specific individuals and projects;

Regulating and controlling traffic on roads and other activities related to road traffic safety;

Controlling the crossing of the state borders, movement, and staying in the border zone;

The stay and movements of foreigners;

Settling and resolving border incidents and other violations of the state borders;

Erecting, controlling, and maintaining the signs indicating the border strip on land and water;

Providing protection from fires and explosions;

Organizing conditions related to the production, trade, procurement, ownership and bearing of arms, and actions related to weapons and ammunition;

Production, trade, storage, transportation, and protection from explosive and other dangerous materials, and the storage and protection from flammable liquids and gases;

Controlling the occupation and vacating of residences and domiciles of the citizens;

Assisting in the elimination of the consequences caused by natural catastrophes and epidemics, which could threaten the life and health of citizens and property;

Investigating and developing areas under its supervision; and

Other activities ratified by the law.

**Article 2.** Internal projects, as stipulated in Article 1 of this law, shall be carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (subsequently, the Ministry) and the Security and Counterintelligence Directory as an agency of the Ministry.

**Article 3.** Citizens, enterprises, and other juridical persons and state authorities shall assist in the proper performance of the work under the Ministry's jurisdiction.

Within the limits of its jurisdiction, the Ministry shall give specialized assistance to citizens, enterprises, and other juridical persons and state agencies in the implementation of the stipulated rights and commitments, and in protecting the life and personal safety of citizens and property.

**Article 4.** The Ministry shall provide expert help to enterprises and other juridical persons and state agencies in matters related to physical and technical protection,

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supervise the implementation of and regulations on protective measures and check the ability of the personnel for physical defense in handling weapons.

**Article 5.** The Ministry shall inform the public on issues pertaining to its jurisdiction.

The Ministry shall provide information, data, and reports on issues within its jurisdiction of immediate interest to citizens, enterprises, and other juridical persons and state authorities.

No information, data, or reports shall be issued if they constitute state, military, commercial, or official secret, as stipulated in a law or any other regulation.

Information, data, and reports as per Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall be issued by the minister of internal affairs (subsequently, the Minister) or an official authorized by him.

**Article 6.** The personnel of the Ministry shall carry out their work and assignments in accordance with the rights, obligations, and authorizations approved by the law and other legal stipulations.

A Ministry employee must carry out the orders issued by the Minister or by an individual authorized by him, relative to the implementation of the Ministry's functions, unless the execution of such regulations is a crime.

**Article 7.**

The Ministry personnel must protect and preserve the life and property of the citizens in the course of performing their duties and assignments. They must respect the freedoms and rights of the man and the citizen, and apply, in accordance with the rules, and use ways and means of coercion approved by this or other regulations.

## II. COMPETENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY

### 1. Police

**Article 8.** The direct safeguard of public order and tranquility, the regulation and control of road traffic, control in crossing the state borders, the safety of lakes, and other activities as per Article 1 of this law, whose nature or conditions require the activities of uniformed Ministry personnel, shall be carried out by the police.

The policemen are the uniformed part of the Ministry. Their uniform shall display their rank, and shall be armed and properly equipped.

**Article 9.** Each township shall have no less than one police station for direct implementation of police and other domestic activities.

**Article 10.** The police may carry out the stipulations of Article 8 of this law in civilian clothing should this be ordered by their immediate supervisor or by an official authorized by him.

If the public order and tranquility are violated on a larger scale, the Minister may instruct other authorized officials as per Article 24, Paragraph 2 of this law, to carry out specific activities in uniform.

**Article 11.** In order to protect the security of the Republic of Macedonia under the conditions of war or emergency, or should the public order and tranquility be violated on a larger scale, the Minister may organize police units in charge of performing specific tasks by policemen and candidate-policemen, police cadets older than 18, students, and individuals auditing courses for policemen, the personnel of the institution for the training of cadres for the needs of the Ministry, and police reservists.

The individuals as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall be considered authorized officials in the sense of Article 24, Paragraph 2 of this law, for the duration of the assignments for which the unit was formed.

### 2. Criminal Police

**Article 12.** The prevention of crime and the identification and apprehension of criminals, criminalistic-technical work, control over the stay and movement of foreigners, inspectoral supervision for the prevention of fires and explosions, as well other activities as per Article 1 of this law, shall be the duty of the Ministry's Criminal Police.

### 3. Security and Counterintelligence Directorate

**Article 13.** A Security and Counterintelligence Directorate (subsequently, Directorate) shall be created to perform activities related to security and counterintelligence, as an Agency within the Ministry.

Security and counterintelligence in the sense of Paragraph 1 of this article shall involve activities related to defense against espionage, terrorism, or other activities aimed at threatening or destroying by violent means the democratic institutions approved by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as providing protection from graver forms of organized crime.

The Directorate shall be headed by a director who shall be named by the minister and approved by the government of the Republic of Macedonia to a four-year term.

**Article 14.** The director shall act independently in carrying out the activities of the Directorate and shall

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report to the minister and to the government of the Republic of Macedonia.

**Article 15.** By proposal of the director of the Directorate, the minister shall issue rules on the organization of the work and the table of organization of the Directorate, with the agreement of the government of the Republic of Macedonia.

The table of organization of the Directorate shall describe the positions involving special duties and authorizations.

**Article 16.** In the course of carrying out activities within their jurisdiction, the Directorate personnel have the right to collect data, reports, and information within the limit of their activities.

Private citizens, agencies, enterprises, and other juridical persons must help the Directorate's personnel in suitably carrying out their tasks.

### 3.1. Control Over the Work of the Directorate

**Article 17.** The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia shall control the work of the Directorate through a respective commission (subsequently, the Commission).

**Article 18.** The Commission shall report to the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia on the implementation of activities no less than once annually.

Prior to submitting the report as per Paragraph 1 of this article, the Commission must submit the report to the government of the Republic of Macedonia which can add to it from the view point of protecting the secrecy of some of its activities.

**Article 19.** The Directorate's director must submit and provide to the Commission all reports and data within the range of its activities.

Reports and data submitted at the Commission's session shall be classified as state secrets.

**Article 20.** Conclusions related to the report submitted by the Commission shall be presented by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia to the government of the Republic of Macedonia.

## III. MINISTRY SPECIAL DUTIES AND AUTHORIZATIONS AND RIGHT AND DUTIES OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIALS

**Article 21.** The Ministry's personnel with special duties and authorization shall use the stipulated ways and means in the performance of their activities.

The personnel as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall be responsible for the legality of the ways and means used by them.

**Article 22.** Under wartime conditions, the Ministry personnel shall be mobilized and recruited for carrying out assignments in the struggle or for other projects related to the defense and security of the Republic of Macedonia.

In wartime and under emergency conditions, the Ministry personnel must help to eliminate the consequences caused by natural disasters and epidemics.

**Article 23.** Based on the motivated requests by the proper entity for the implementation of an executive decision submitted by a state agency, the Ministry shall provide aid if, in the course of implementing the request, it encounters physical obstruction or if such obstruction could be justifiably expected, as well as in all other cases as approved by the law. A request for assistance must be submitted to the Ministry no less than five days prior to its execution, accept in urgent and immediate cases.

The request as per Paragraph 1 of this article must be answered by the minister or by an official authorized by him at the proper time.

The cost of such assistance must be borne by the petitioner.

**Article 24.** Ministry employees with special duties and authorizations stipulated by the law are considered authorized officials.

In the sense of this law, the following are classified as authorized employees:

1. Members of the police and the operative personnel;

2. Personnel engaged in work directly related to police and operational activities, and

3. The minister, his deputy, leading personnel and others heading specific organizational units.

The legal act on table of organization in the Ministry shall list the jobs requiring special duties and authorizations in the sense of Paragraph 2 of this article.

**Article 25.** The model and procedures for issuing identification documents to authorized officials shall be decided by the minister.

The authorized personnel, in accordance with the regulations on performing special duties and authorizations, shall own and carry official weapons, ammunition, and other stipulated items and equipment.

**Article 26.** Authorized employees must perform their duties whatever the circumstances, regardless of whether they act in their official capacities or whether such activities are based on the nature of their work.

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The authorized employees must carry out the activities as per Paragraph 1 of this article even when such performance involves risks to their life.

**Article 27.** The authorized employees have the right to ask citizens to identify themselves.

The identification documents may be retained only for the time needed to check the identity, after which they must be immediately returned to the citizen.

If the citizen refuses to or cannot prove his identity, he may be detained for the time required to check his identity but for no longer than three hours.

An individual detained as per Paragraph 3 of this article must be given the opportunity to prove his identity by any other means.

**Article 28.** The authorized uniformed employee must show proper identification in the course of his official duties, if so requested by the citizen.

An authorized employee engaged in performing his official duties while wearing civilian clothes must identify himself first.

If in the course of performing official duties it becomes necessary to enter a house or a living area, the authorized employee must identify himself first and then present the search warrant.

**Article 29.** Authorized Ministry employees have the right to detain an individual for no longer than 24 hours if said individual violates or threatens the public order and tranquility, and if the resumption of public order and tranquility or the elimination of the threat to the same may not be achieved in any other way, as well as if the individual has been assigned by a foreign security agency, or else they must take the individual to the proper authority.

The authorized Ministry employees must inform the person detained or deprived of his freedom of the reasons for said actions and inform him of his rights, as approved by the constitution and the law.

Authorized employees must not expose detained individuals to the curiosity of the public.

The detained individual has the right to appeal to the minister within 12 hours from the time of detention.

The appeal does not postpone the implementation of the resolution.

The decision on the appeal must be submitted to the detained individual within 12 hours of the time the petition was filed.

If possible, the authorized employee must notify the family of the detained individual or the enterprise or agency employing said individual, if so requested by the individual, within three hours, and inform the individual of the reason for his detention and his right to defense counsel.

**Article 30.** In order to prevent criminal actions and to identify and apprehend perpetrators of criminal actions, to locate and secure objects and clues related to crimes, the authorized employees may block access to a specified area or target and prevent leaving such areas or projects without previous approval. Such measures remain in effect until the official actions have been completed.

Taking the steps stipulated in Paragraph 1 of this article may be ordered by the minister or by an authorized employee.

**Article 31.** Authorized employees on duty in public transportation facilities have the right to the free use of such facilities and to insurance like any other passenger.

In the cases stipulated in Paragraph 1 of this article, the citizen or the enterprise has the right to compensation for transporting authorized employees.

**Article 32.** If so required by the security of the Republic, in the detection and apprehension of perpetrators of crimes or of violations of the law, in protecting the life, personal safety, and property of the citizens, in maintaining public order and tranquility, and in ensuring transportation safety, or in controlling the crossing of the state borders, the authorized employees have the right to search transportation vehicles, individuals, and luggage, and direct the vehicles to a specific area for as long as necessary.

The stipulations of Paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to military vehicles.

**Article 33.** In engaging in hot pursuit for apprehending the perpetrator of a crime, in cases involving the transportation of crime victims, bad weather, or other adverse circumstances requiring transportation to the closest public health organization, and in implementing other official duties of a similar nature, the authorized employees and personnel with special duties and authorizations of the Directorate, are exclusively authorized to implement such official tasks, and have the right to use available transportation and communication facilities, if no other way is possible. The owners of such facilities shall be issued a document confirming the use of the facility if a vehicle or communication device has been used.

The owner or user of the vehicle or communications facility has the right to compensation for any damages caused as a result of the use of said facility.

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Compensations for damages as per Paragraph 2 of this article shall come from the budget of the Republic of Macedonia.

**Article 34.** The authorized employee may use means of coercion stipulated in a legal document of the government of the Republic of Macedonia in order to correct more severe violations of public order and tranquility, or surmount any opposition on the part of the individual who has violated said public order and tranquility, or else for an individual who must be captured, detained, or jailed, for an individual who opposes his detention or the detention of another individual or project, in order to ensure the forceful removal of individuals from a certain area as well as individuals who disobey the instructions of the authorized employee.

**Article 35.** The authorized employee may use a firearm if no other means of coercion are applicable, in the following cases;

1. To protect the life of the citizens;

2. To repeal a direct threat to his life;

3. To repeal an attack against an object or an individual whose security is threatened, and

4. To prevent the escape of an individual detained in the course of the commission of a crime, which calls for a prison term of no less than five years, as well as the escape of an individual deprived of his freedom or an individual for whom a warrant for deprivation of freedom for committing a crime has been issued.

**Article 36.** Authorized employees operating under the direct guidance of a senior official may use means of coercion or firearms only if so instructed by him.

**Article 37.** Before using means of coercion or a firearm in the cases stipulated in Articles 34 and 35 of the present law, the authorized employee must issue a warning to the individual against whom such means or weapons are to be used.

**Article 38.** The grounds, justification, and correctness of the use of the means of coercion or firearms must be assessed in each specific case by the immediate superior of the employee.

**Article 39.** If means of coercion or firearms have been used within the authorized limits and in accordance with the stipulations of Articles 34, 35, and 36 of this law, the authorized employee who has used them or the senior official who has instructed that they be used, as well as the individual who, as requested by the Ministry or the authorized employee, has assisted in the performance of official duties shall not be considered liable.

**Article 40.** In assuring the safety of lakes, the police have the right to stop a suspicious navigational facility, check the flag, look over the rigging, and search the vessel or pursue, capture, and take it to the proper authority if said vessel does not meet the legal stipulations, unless otherwise stipulated by an international treaty.

The stipulations of Paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to military vessels.

**Article 41.** Citizens, enterprises, and other juridical persons and agencies must observe the warnings and regulations issued by the minister or authorized officials in conducting operations related to security, and especially, in rescuing people threatened by natural disasters, epidemics, or other dangers.

**Article 42.** By citizens request the authorized employees must give them help and supply necessary information or else direct citizens to other authorized agencies or institutions.

**Article 43.** If an authorized employee performing special duties is taken to court for committing a crime or another violation for the use of force or firearms or because of other actions committed in the course of performing his duties, as well as involvement in a traffic accident with a motor vehicle in the course of his duties, the Ministry shall provide said employee with free legal aid for his trial.

The Ministry shall provide free legal aid also to a citizen who has assisted an authorized employee in carrying out his official duties if said employee is accused of committing a crime or a violation, or for action committed in connection with rendering assistance.

## IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BY THE MINISTRY

**Article 44.** In performing its duties, the Ministry may cooperate and exchange data with foreign police and state authorities, and organizations in other countries, and international internal affairs organizations.

## V. DEFENSE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE MINISTRY

**Article 45.** As a rule, the personnel of the Ministry shall operate on the basis of a plan in conducting military and other duties in the defense area.

In wartime or under emergency conditions, in order to protect the security of the Republic of Macedonia or prevent most severe violations of public order and tranquility, the Ministry shall hire individuals suitable for military service, who will sign a labor contract with the Ministry (subsequently, Reservists).

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The Reservists assigned to the police shall wear the uniform and carry the emblems of the respective police ranks.

Reservists called for implementing projects and assignments as per Paragraph 2 of this article remain at the disposal of the Ministry for the duration of the reasons for which they were summoned.

**Article 46.** The calling up of Reservists for training and exercises or in the cases stipulated in Article 45 of this law shall be the duty of the Ministry.

For the duration of the implementation of projects and assignments, the Reservists in the sense of Article 24 of the present law, shall have the duties and authorities of authorized officials.

**Article 47.** Reservists shall be paid for projects and assignments in accordance with the regulations on performing military duties and service as Reservists.

The funds for such payments as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall be provided by the Republic Budget.

The Ministry shall issue a legal regulation governing the summoning and employment of Reservists.

## VI. LABOR RELATIONS

### 1. Foundations of Labor Relations

**Article 48.** Any individual who, in addition to general conditions, meets the following special requirements, may establish a labor relationship with the Ministry:

1. Not to have been sentenced for a crime against the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Macedonia, or against the economy or the rights and freedoms of man and the citizen, the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia, his official duties, severe violations of the life and bodily harm, and property, or the commission of any crime committed for reasons of greed or dishonest motivations;

2. Not to be subject to criminal prosecution for a crime as per Paragraph 1, Item 1, of this article;

3. If a court sentence has not been issued for the sake of security measures and prohibition of performing a profession, activity, or duty for the duration of said measure, and

4. If he is physically and mentally able.

A worker who has been sentenced for the commission of a crime as per Paragraph 1, Item 1, of this article and who is being charged for job delinquency or is the subject of a safety measure prohibiting the pursuit of his profession, activity, or duty, shall have his labor relationship with the Ministry terminated as of the day of the enactment of the court sentence.

The minister shall issue a resolution on the termination of the labor relation as per Paragraph 2 of this article.

**Article 49.** The public announcement on hiring an individual by the Ministry may take longer than the time stipulated by the law, but must not exceed three months.

A labor relation with the Ministry without public competition or public announcement shall apply to jobs with special duties and authorizations as per Article 24 of this law, to scholarship students of the Ministry, and to secondary and higher school graduates of the Institute for the Training of Cadres for the Needs of the Ministry.

**Article 50.** Any individual who, in addition to meeting the conditions of Article 48, Paragraph 1, of this law, can meet the following prerequisites, may be accepted as a member of the police:

1. To be under the age of 25 if this is his first job, and

2. To be a fourth grade graduate in specialized training.

In the case of jobs with the police which, by the legal act on the table of organization of the Ministry, require higher or specialized training, individuals older than 25 may be hired.

**Article 51.** In carrying out specific projects for the police, a labor relation may be established for a specific time in the case of individuals who possess the necessary skill for the implementation of such projects.

**Article 52.** An individual who establishes a labor relation or holds a specific job requiring special duties and authorizations but lacks the necessary training in internal affairs shall be assigned to specialization in the respective training organizations or to other forms of specialization.

The jobs as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall be defined by the minister.

The time spent in specialization in the sense of Paragraph 1 of this article shall be counted as seniority.

**Article 53.** An employee assigned to additional specialization and advancement shall be provided with free housing and food and compensated for his transportation, housing and food expenditures.

**Article 54.** An employee who leaves of his own free will or because of an infraction shall be expelled from specialized training, for which reason his labor relation shall be terminated. He shall be asked to repay the cost of his specialization, housing, and food.

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**Article 55.** High school and university students who have graduated from the Institution as per Article 49 of this law and who establish a labor relation with the Ministry, as well as the personnel specializing in respective educational organizations at the expense of the Ministry, must maintain their labor relation with the Ministry no less than for double the length of the duration of their training and no less than two years if the training has taken less than one year.

An employee who fails to implement the stipulations of Paragraph 1 of this article must repay the expenses of his training and specialization.

### 2. Worker Placement

**Article 56.** An employee may be assigned to an organizational unit outside the headquarters of the Ministry and to a job consistent with his specialized training in the following cases:

1. Lack of employees with proper skills and work capabilities for the performance of specific projects and assignments;

2. Providing expert assistance in carrying out projects and assignments of the territorial organizational unit, and

3. More efficient implementation of the Ministry's functions.

An appeal to the resolution as per Paragraph 1 of this article may not delay the implementation of said resolution.

An employee as per Paragraph 1 of this article who, for unjustified reasons, within seven days of the day the resolution was issued, does not assume his position, shall have his labor relation terminated.

The decision on placing a employee within an organizational unit outside the Ministry's headquarters must be mandatorily reviewed once each subsequent year.

**Article 57.** In the case of the stipulations of Article 56 of this law, the employee has the right to a salary not to exceed the salary earned during the last month prior to his appointment, if the appointment is voluntary, a compensation not to exceed the amount of the monthly salary of the worker, compensation for travel and housing expenses, compensation for double expenditures if no housing or living facilities have been provided, seven days of paid leave per quarter, and compensation for transportation expenditures for visits with the family from which the employee has been separated.

If such an appointment exceeds six months, the employee must be provided with housing.

**Article 58.** An employee with special duties and authorization who, by decision of the health commission, is considered unable to carry out the work and the assignments requiring specialization and authorization, due to disturbed psychophysical or general state of health as a consequence of the damage caused in the course of the work or of vocational illness, shall be given a job consistent with the level of his specialized training and state of health.

The employee as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall retain all the rights based on the labor relation of the personnel in jobs in which he has worked in the past. He must meet the commitment of the new job.

**Article 59.** The psychophysical and general state of health of individuals or employees as per Article 48, Paragraph 1, Item 4, and Article 58 of this law must be approved by a health commission appointed by the minister.

The health commission as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall consist of a chairman, no less than two specialist physicians, one as an internist, and two Ministry employees. Whenever the health commission must evaluate the incapacity of a policeman, one of the two Ministry members must be a member of the police. If so required, the health commission may include other medical specialists.

The procedures of the health commission as per Paragraph 1 of this article shall be drafted by the minister in coordination with the minister of public health.

### 3. Working Time, Rest, and Other Rights and Obligations of the Employees

**Article 60.** The working time of Ministry employees may be longer than the legally stipulated maximal length of the work week, under circumstances requiring urgent assignments and tasks as per Article 1 of this law or in connection with such assignments and tasks.

**Article 61.** In cases of urgent Ministry requirements, the minister or an authorized employee may postpone or terminate the annual leave of an employee.

In the cases stipulated in Paragraph 1 of this article, the employee has the right to compensation for expenditures related to the postponement or termination of the annual paid leave.

**Article 62.** In the case of temporary disability, which has been incurred in the course or because of the implementation of projects and tasks, the authorized official has the right to compensation not to exceed the regular salary for the duration of his absence from the job.

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**Article 63.** The employee must protect state, official, military, or trade secrets which he has learned in the course of his job and assignments.

In the sense of this law, the following are classified official secrets:

1. Steps, actions, reports, documents, data, and sources of data within the scope of the Ministry, considered official secrets and assigned a corresponding degree of secrecy;

2. Steps, actions, reports, documents, data, and data sources relative to enterprises and other juridical persons or agencies that, in accordance with the law or any other regulation, are classified as official secrets, and

3. Data on the internal organization and table of organization within the Ministry.

**Article 64.** The duty to keep secrets as per Article 63 of the this law shall be valid also after the termination of the labor relation. Agreement for a release from this commitment on the preservation of secrets must be given by the minister.

The Minister shall issue a regulation on the means for filing and protecting documents, reports, data, and other acts which, according to the law or to any other regulation or resolution of an authorized authority are considered state, military, or official secret.

**Article 65.** The following shall also be considered violations of labor discipline:

1. Actions conflicting with the regulations and rules of the Ministry;

2. Failure to submit data or submitting inaccurately data acquired, according to regulations, from authorized agencies, organizations, or private citizens;

3. Indecent behavior towards others;

4. Failure to provide legal or other assistance within the limits of the employee's authorization to other parties in the implementation of their legitimate rights and legal interests;

5. Avoidance of medical examination for the certification of labor capabilities;

6. Avoidance of mandatory specialization training and advancement;

7. Gaining illegal personal advantages from operations and tasks;

8. Benefiting from or making possible benefits to someone else involving money or other valuable items entrusted to the employee in connection with his work and assignments;

9. Engaging in activities unrelated to the duties of the employee;

10. Guiding, expressing, and promoting party views and convictions in the course of the work and assignment, and

11. Engaging in activities considered criminal which, in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs, is a hinderance to establishing a labor relation with the Ministry, or engaging in activities constituting a more severe violation of public order and tranquility.

The employee may be temporary relieved from his work by the Ministry should a more severe violation of labor discipline occur.

If the labor relationship is terminated as a result of dismissal, the termination deadline may be shorter than the deadline stipulated in the law.

The right to a dismissal deadline does not apply if the dismissal is the result of a more severe violation of labor discipline.

More severe cases of violation of labor discipline, for which a worker may be relieved from the work, the length of the dismissal deadline, as well as cases which do not grant the right to such deadline shall be formulated with a legal act issued by the minister.

**Article 66.** Officials with special duties and authorizations may not engage in activities incompatible with their duties.

**Article 67.** The minister may forbid travelling abroad by a Ministry employee should this be deemed necessary for the sake of protecting the safety and the defense of the Republic of Macedonia.

**Article 68.** The Ministry must insure employees performing special duties and having special authorizations against death, bodily damage, or disability.

**Article 69.** Ministry employees who, in the course of performing their work and assignments, lose their life, will be buried at the expense of the Ministry; the family of the employee shall receive a one-time compensation totalling the sum of wages paid over the last twelve months. A citizen who, at the request of an authorized employee, renders assistance and, for this reason, suffers harm or becomes ill and, therefore, becomes unable to perform his work or becomes disabled, shall enjoy the same rights as those awarded to individuals with disability pensions and health insurance as the individuals who have had a labor accident.

If in the course of providing assistance the citizen loses his life, his family shall have the rights as per Paragraph

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1 of this article, and the rights to pension insurance similar to the family of a Ministry employee who has lost his life in the course of performing his work and assignments.

**Article 70.** Ministry employees have the right to strike providing that the regular performance of the work and assignments, as stipulated in Article 1 of this law are not violated.

In order to prevent any eventual harmful consequences from failure to perform internal projects for the duration of the strike, the minister or an authorized official has the right to ensure the necessary functioning of the organizational units in the course of the labor process.

On the basis of the measures stipulated in Paragraph 2 of this article, the employees must act in accordance with the respective regulations.

If the employees do not meet the stipulations of Paragraph 3 of this article, the minister or the authorized official must ensure that continuation of the labor process with replacement personnel.

**Article 71.** On the basis of a general rule, Ministry employees and other individuals may receive awards, and symbols of recognition, or acknowledgements.

**Article 72.** Considering the nature, type, and difficulty of the work and assignments carried out by employees with special duties and authorization, as well as the difficulty of the work and the special conditions under which it is done, salary funds for such work and assignments may be increased by as much as 30 percent.

**Article 73.** The government of the Republic of Macedonia shall issue legal regulations governing designations of rank and conditions for their acquisition by authorized employees, the uniform and the emblems on the uniform for individuals and targets which are being secured, the use of means of coercion, and firearms, as well as the activity and ways of providing skilled assistance to enterprises and other juridical persons and state authorities in projects involving physical and technical safety, special conditions for employment of individuals engaged in physical and technical safety, supervision over the implementation of the regulations on the means of providing protection and testing the ability of the personnel for physical defense in handling weapons.

**Article 74.** The minister is authorized to issue legal regulations on the following:

1. Doing the work of the Ministry;

2. Doing the work of the Directorate;

3. Signs indicating the border strip on land;

4. Duration of the clothing and uniforms of the police;

5. Prices of samples issued by the Ministry;

6. Ways of handling temporarily displaced or found objects;

7. Work and tasks which must be performed for the duration of the strike, and

8. Other regulations approved by the law.

In coordination with the minister of public health, the minister is authorized to issue legal regulations concerning the health and psychophysical stipulations which must be met by the individual who establishes a labor relation within the Ministry.

## VII. PROVISIONAL AND CONCLUDING STIPULATIONS

**Article 75.** Within one month of the enactment of this law, the Minister shall issue general rules on the organization, the work, and the table of organization for the Ministry.

**Article 76.** The legal regulations stipulated in this law shall be issued within six months from the day of enactment of this law.

Prior to the formulation of the regulations as per Paragraph 1 of this article, the existing regulations, in as much as they are consistent with this law, shall apply.

**Article 77.** The enactment of this law invalidates the Law on Internal Affairs (SLUZBEN VESNIK NA SRM, Nos. 45/72, 8/73, 31/74, 24/80, 37/80, and 24/88 and SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA Nos. 36/91 and 19/92).

**Article 78.** The present law shall be enacted on the 8th day from the day of its publication in SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA.

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**'Poland-NATO Report' Summarized**

*WS0211095495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Oct 95 p 7*

[Article by "JSK" on a report discussing Polish prospects for NATO membership written by Andrzej Ananicz, secretary of state of the Presidential Chancellery; Przemyslaw Grudzinski, professor at the G.C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; former Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski; Janusz Onyszkiewicz, deputy chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission; Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, president of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; and Henryk Szlajfer, professor at the G.C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies: "Poland-NATO Report: Against Military and Political Isolation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The document dicussed here was prepared by a team of authors whose competence would be hard to dispute. Andrzej Ananicz, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, Andrzej Olechowski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Henryk Szlajfer have actively taken part in forming Polish foreign policy since 1989. They have coauthored and co-organized the Third Republic's diplomacy. Though no longer in government, they have retained a sense of responsibility for Poland's international position and its raisons d'etat. They have thus spoken up on an issue that is fundamental for the future of the nation, that of joining the Atlantic alliance.*

*Perhaps more than necessary has already been said in this regard—Poland's access to NATO has become a customary phrase used by politicians, not always backed by substance. In the flood of words, the actual and by no means negligible differences in this matter have been lost. The Poland/NATO report is a lucid exposition of the pro-Western option that maintains that Poland's admission to the European Union and the Atlantic alliance is the best guarantee of the interests and security of the country. The document, prepared with the inspiration of the euro-atlantic alliance and support of the Batory Foundation, analyzes the international situation from this point of view and formulates postulates for Polish international policies. Though one may choose to agree or disagree with these concepts, they certainly deserve careful scrutinity.*

—by Jan Skorzynski

* * *

"Poland is not in danger today," claims the Poland-NATO report. However, this does not take away the responsibility for finding a formula for Poland's security, which, if the worst were to happen, would guard our nation against political or military isolation. The authors of the report clearly state that only by joining the Atlantic alliance, for which there is no alternative, can this type of security be guaranteed. Their goal is to identify the stumbling blocks hindering these aspirations.

From 1989 onwards, each subsequent Polish Government has steadfastly maintained a pro-European and pro-euro-atlantic orientation. This pro-Western orientation in foreign policy has also been reaffirmed by the present Cabinet, the document stresses. Having at the same time established good relations with our neighbors to the East (Ukraine and Lithuania, in particular), Poland's entry into NATO and the European Union has become feasible. The process is proceeding sluggishly, however, and its dynamism is too weak for one to say that the critical point has already passed. Therefore, the present situation calls for Polish diplomacy to show "more decisiveness, tough pragmatism and to make use of new instruments and all of the advantages resulting from Poland's geostrategic position," the report concludes.

The benefits are mutual: NATO is important for Poland, and Poland is important for NATO, too. The alliance must be enlarged by Poland and other East European countries. It would be a formula for defeat if it were to retain its present shape and composition. Poland continues to be a highly sensitive area in Central European security and the stability of the entire continent. That will not suffice, however. "Poland can count on integration into the West only as a democratic country with a market-orientated economy and effective civilian control over its Armed Forces." However, in view of preparations for membership in the Atlantic alliance, much time has already been wasted, especially in the past two years. "The year 1996 must be a turning point in that internal process," the report states.

The immediate goal in the coming months will be to keep the process from slackening, which ought to come to an end with the admittance of new members to NATO. That has not been decided yet. The document recently prepared in Brussels provides no hard facts in this matter, addressing the issues of "how" and "why" without supplying a full answer, and leaving open the issues of "who" and "when."

The West is reluctant to give up its vision of a homogenous East and a closed "Western club," the report notices. Yet, one of the most significant results of changes begun in Central and East Europe in 1989-90 is the diversification of the former communist bloc. It should not be understood as creating new divisions but, rather, as an expression of diverse national interests of countries that have emerged from the previously monolithic bloc.

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Western strategists have not come up with an adequate reply to the challenges the downfall of the Yalta order has brought to the concept of European security. The report defines these as follows: broadening the area of stability, internationalization of European security, modernization of euro-atlantic relations (in other words: transformation of the NATO alliance), and a new form of relations with Russia and other countries created after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

"Poland and Europe still live in the shadow of the Cold War [...], if this state is to continue, the prognosis of a 'cold peace' will become a reality," the report warns.

**In the Eyes of the West**

The report critically reviews the proposition that Poland pare down its aspirations toward integration into the European Union. Our calling is to have a presence in the Union, the authors of the report respond. Yet neither the EU nor the Western European Union are the pillars of European security. "Only the North Atlantic alliance can be regarded as such a pillar of support. Entry into the Union and NATO should be treated in parallel—membership in one organization is supplemented by membership in the other, yet each is independent of the other." What attitude do Western nations maintain toward Polish aspirations? The United States involvement in Western Europe has weakened, though the experience of the war in Bosnia shows that the will, initiative, and leadership of the United States still have a fundamental bearing on the security of the Old Continent. "It is exceptionally important that official policies of the United States assume and publicly declare full integration of Central European countries into Western systems," the authors of the report recognize. The United States is in fact leading the process of NATO enlargement.

Germany, in its own, well-understood interest, has shown an understanding for our aims. It would, however, be advisable to apply moderation in evaluating German policies toward Poland and the enlargement of NATO. "While emphasizing and recognizing the enormous progress made in Polish-German relations, we cannot lose sight of the differences within German elites on the issue of the future of NATO and the fundamental cornerstones of the structure of European security," the report stresses. If the United States undertakes a clear initiative to broaden the alliance, Germany will surely support that move, "but not by itself." Yet neither Britain, Italy, nor France has fully defined its position. The authors of the report especially regret that France has not fully used its possibilities in Central Europe. One example is the low level of cooperation in the so-called Weimar triangle—uniting France, Germany, and Poland.

Western security policies are characterized by a lack of will power to face challenges in the aftermath of 1989, the report points out. The alliance has not yet elaborated a coherent analysis of political and military threats in present day Europe. "Policies geared toward temporary measures and short-term advantages have taken the upper hand."

**What Is Russia Aiming At?**

Western policies towards Central Europe are paralyzed by the uncertainty regarding Russia's role in world and European politics. In the confrontation between Central European interests and the politics conducted by Russian elites, the West has, up until now, maintained a stance favoring the latter.

The inclinations of these elites are the outcome of a deep feeling of geopolitical, military, and civilizational degradation of Russia, accompanied by a belief in the restoration to greatness of their state. Moscow leaders aim to revive an order based on balance of power not integration—cooperation with the West is thought of not as a value but, rather, as a bargaining tool. The purpose of the bargain is to block the enlargement of NATO for a period until Russia is once again able to co-decide about the shape of European security. The Commonwealth of Independent States and other instruments for the consolidation of the territory of the former Soviet Union are intended to reconstruct the geopolitical base for Russian might.

Moscow's policies toward Poland and Central Europe are subordinated to its plans of future European geopolitics, the report asserts. "The optimum plan is to retain a belt of militarily, politically, and economically weak states and to gradually step up Russia's presence in these areas until its actual might will allow for spheres of influence to be formed in these regions." Because the policy of opposing plans for the enlargement of the North Atlantic Pact has received internal consensus, its continuation may be expected. "Russia's negative attitude toward the enlargement of NATO should not be exaggerated, however." Russia does not at present command the material or political resources for creating an alternative to the Atlantic concept of enlarging Europe. "The question of the future of NATO and its opening up to Central Europe will be decided in the West, not in Moscow. The main problem for Polish diplomacy will be to obtain clear and strong support from Washington, London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn, and will not be Russia's veto."

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The Russian factor may constitute a real threat if, in the event of Western procrastination, security issues begin to be decided in the East, with the participation of local political forces interested in such a scenario. As a result, there will be a surge of anti-Russian sentiment in Poland and other countries of the region. Thus, the blocking of NATO enlargement may trigger unrest and uncertainty in this part of the continent.

In building democratic political and business institutions, external support is most essential—its absence or weakness may endanger democracy or the market. "That is particularly important now, when in Poland and neighboring regions the political forces derived from former communist parties are in power (the only exception being the Czech Republic)."

**Cooperation vs. Competition in the Region**

Our neighbors in Central and East Europe have no uniform position regarding NATO membership. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and Romania all declare their will to join the European Union. Belarus and Ukraine have not made known that they are prepared to, and the Bulgarian Goverment has demonstrated growing skepticism in this regard. Though it does not lie in our interests to point to our "competitors," the authors of the report write, it is obvious that NATO will not be able to "absorb" all candidate members at the same time. Such factors as stability of democratic institutions, "ethnic peace" within the borders of the country and with neighbors, direct territorial contact with NATO's present region of operation, input into the defense potential of the alliance, and so forth, will all have a bearing on that decision. "Viewed from this perspective, Poland's accession to the alliance will be a breakthrough step because its share in bringing stability to the region is the largest, and it plays an essential role in plans for linking Central European security to Western security and in building NATO's new political dynamism." Polish diplomacy ought to be prepared to placate possible fears in the region associated with this.

The report suggests that the activities of Poland, the Czech Republic, and other Central European countries be coordinated in the discussion preceding the NATO summit in December 1995. Cooperation is necessary, though it does not mean that realization of Polish interests can be hampered by problems of other countries. This ought to be explicitly told to our partners in the Visegrad Group.

The key to the stability of Central Europe as an important element in European structures lies in Polish-Czech relations, which need to be invigorated and strengthened. Likewise, Polish-Ukranian dialogue ought to regain its initial vigor and significance. "Poland's policies toward Ukraine should be geared toward upholding its pro-Western orientation, while broadening that country's room for maneuver on the international stage." Good relations with Kiev, the document stresses, are a guarantee that the region will no longer be treated instrumentally by the superpowers. The prospect of joining NATO should not deter us from improving regional cooperation, also with countries that probably will not be in the first group of new members (e.g., Romania and the Baltic states). A Poland that is well established in the region will be a much more serious and valuable partner to the West than an isolated Poland.

**What Needs To Be Done?**

Poland's goal is to join the NATO alliance in 1999, the 50th year of its existence. Thus, the postulative section of the report outlines steps that need to be taken on the domestic scene in view of the accession to the Atlantic alliance.

First of all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must resume its coordinating role in Polish foreign policy. A specially appointed body should formulate the strategy of this policy in the executive branch, including in it the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland. "The unity of foreign policy, at present undermined by 'political-economic barons' must definitely be restored and must be complete."

Second, the year 1996 should see the imposition of full democratic control over the Armed Forces. "Democratic states cannot tolerate the political autonomy of the General Staff and top brass. The institution of civilian control over the Armed Forces, viewed from the perspective of our attempts to join NATO, though not a sufficient condition for our membership in the alliance, may, if not effected, serve as an excellent pretext for access to be blocked."

Third, we must allocate more funds from the state budget for defense during the years 1996-2000. "It is also necessary to substantially increase immediate funding for the Partnership for Peace program and integration into NATO through a special budgetary provision carried out jointly by the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry."

Fourth, the report proposes that, with the help of nongovernment experts, the Defense and Foreign Ministeries prepare a white book on the strategy for Poland's security. "The presentation of a uniform medium- and long-term national defense policy, incorporating external factors and aspects of integration and given the stature of a legal act, would serve to forge a political consensus on national defense."

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**Policy Toward Russia**

"Freezing of the dialogue wth Russia ought not to affect Poland's position," the report proposes. The dialogue should not be limited to official government channels only; other avenues of contact with the political, business, military, and intellectual elites of that country should be pursued.

It would be hard to expect marked improvement in that area, given the internal situation in Russia. Russian leaders must know that friendly Russian-Polish relations will depend on whether Moscow accepts the political and defense integration of Europe. Yet it should be clearly stated, the report says, that Poland wants to and can talk to any Russian government that respects the sovereignty of our nation and international law. "Poland's policies are not and cannot be aimed at 'containing' or 'repulsing' Russia."

It is not worth nurturing the image of a foe, yet public opinion has the right to information about the real tendencies of Russian politics. "In fundamental issues, Poland cannot fail to speak up loudly (though that is not to say aggressively) about the opportunities and dangers coming from the East." On the other hand, Moscow can be offered "a pragmatic approach, strengthened by a desire to understand the interests of our neighbor." The authors of the document therefore propose that, for instance, after a decision for enlarging NATO has been reached, a debate be opened on the future of the Organization of European Security and Cooperation as well as other Pan-European institutions that ensure Russia's constructive participation.

**An Ante Factum Ally**

"The conflict with Russia is not an incidental dispute but, rather, the consequence of a divergent vision of the future of Europe. The reaching of a compromise in this matter is very difficult, though possible." In the meantime, Poland must primarily strive to develop and enlarge European structures. The notion that the enlargement of NATO is inevitable ought to be reinforced and rooted in the minds of elites in the West and the East. In pursuing such an activity, Poland should play the role of an ante factum ally. The goal is to convince NATO that the price for exclusion of Poland from "the NATO club" will be decidedly higher than the cost of integration.

Before we become a member of NATO, we will have huge tasks to perform in the state, the authors of the report write in conclusion. The two most important are to establish civilian control over the Army and to modernize the Armed Forces. "Without progress in these two areas, our membership in NATO will remain in doubt."

**[Box, p 7]**

**The Authors of the Report**

- Andrzej Ananicz—Under secretary of state 1992-94 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently secretary of state in the Chancellery of the President of Poland
- Przemyslaw Grudzinski—Under secretary of state 1992-93 in the Ministry of National Defense, currently a professor at the G.C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany
- Andrzej Olechowski—Minister of foreign affairs 1993-95, currently chairman of the Supervisory Board of Bank Handlowy S.A.
- Janusz Onyszkiewicz—Minister of national defense 1992-93, currently a member of parliament (Sejm) and deputy chairman of the parliamentary National Defense Commission
- Krzysztof Skubiszewski—Minister of foreign affairs 1989-93, currently president of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the Netherlands
- Henryk Szlajfer—Director of the Department of Studies and Planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professor at the G.C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany

**Bartoszewski Appeals for Continued Aid From EU**

*LD0111133495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish-Italian relations and the international situation are the subjects of Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski's talks in Italy. Bartoszewski started his visit today.

On 3 November, the Polish minister will be received by the pope at a private audience.

Yesterday in Luxembourg, Bartoszewski appealed to the representatives of the European Union not to reduce aid to the Central and East European countries as a result of the promise of aid to the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which is aimed at helping them in postwar reconstruction.

**Kwasniewski Interviewed on Campaign, Platform**

*WS0111155395 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 28-29 Oct 95 pp 1, 7*

[Interview with presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski by Ewa Rosolak and Dariusz Szymczy-

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cha; place and date not given: "I Feel the Responsibility"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [TRYBUNA] Do you not feel the responsibility you will have to bear if you lose the presidential elections? Winners are not judged. Losers...

[Kwasniewski] Aside from my conviction that success gives satisfaction and failure wisdom, I believe that failure in democratic Poland has a different dimension. It is not that as a result of democratic elections losers have to put their heads under the guillotine or leave the political scene. I believe that the very fact that so many people trust me and that I can form a political alternative—to Lech Walesa and his grouping, for instance—is also a value that Poland needs.

I believe that it often happens that a bad government is a smaller problem for the country than a bad opposition. Moreover, as our experiences show, it is not easy to change the opposition.

I am prepared to take on the responsibility for my activities as president. Now, if it turns out that some other person wins the elections, I will congratulate him and, feeling the responsibility, I will try to implement our program for Poland together with the biggest faction in parliament.

[TRYBUNA] Last May you told activists of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] the following: "Since you want me to run, I have to." Did you not want to run for the presidency?

[Kwasniewski] The reason I am running is not that I covet power or seek to satisfy my personal, political aspirations. This may sound pathetic, but, believe me, I am running in the elections because I feel a responsibility—taresponsibility to the voters who for a few years now have been voting for the SdRP and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], who have trusted them and pinned their hopes on them. I feel a responsibility to the SdRP and the SLD, and I feel a responsibility to myself as well. After all, there are situations in which a politician must subject himself to social verification. Democratic presidential elections are an occasion for that. Is it imaginable that a representative of the biggest parliamentary faction, which is part of the governing coalition and which is very popular with the people, simply does not run in the elections?

[TRYBUNA] However, in the SLD itself there were people who voiced different views. Let us recall remarks that Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz made last spring. He said that your running in the elections was premature and that it would contribute to the split in the political spectrum.

[Kwasniewski] Splits in the political spectrum are caused not by us, not by the SLD. We are interested in cooperation, which we proved by forming a coalition with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], a party that differs so greatly from us—on philosophical, political, and economic issues. It is we who believe that Poland needs political compromise and cooperation. However, it takes goodwill from all of the sides of the political spectrum to bridge gaps.

[TRYBUNA] Agreed. Nonetheless, the SLD could have tried to find a candidate outside the party.

[Kwasniewski] We put forward such a proposal. I myself submitted a motion in which I suggested that the PSL-SLD coalition build up its strength by fielding a single candidate for president.

[TRYBUNA] It was not some kind of game on your part?

[Kwasniewski] Such questions can torpedo any political initiative. It was a serious proposal, and I believe it was seriously turned down by the PSL.

I want to say this openly: Cooperation and compromise are achieved when all sides want them. Declarations made by the SLD and our goodwill do not suffice. Thus, when I am asked whether it was possible to field a different candidate in the presidential elections, I say the following: Yes, it was, but not at any price. Not at the price of losing our electorate, our identity, and our face. Meanwhile, as far as other participants in political life are concerned, there were not enough gestures of goodwill and respect for the SLD voters on their part. Thus, there was no reason for us to impose on anyone and offer our support to a candidate of another party.

[TRYBUNA] You are probably talking about the Freedom Union [UW], which officially considers the SLD to be a young lady with a big dowry who, however, conducted herself badly in the past.

[Kwasniewski] Yes, UW, among others. Even though some people in UW have considerable experience as far as young ladies who are conducting themselves badly are concerned...

I will say frankly that today I no longer know what game UW is playing. If this party said that it is interested in participation in any government because it is the only party that has good ministers, I could understand that. However, issuing opinions on just about everything and making no efforts to form an alliance or to obtain support—that I do not understand.

[TRYBUNA] Candidates are talking about nothing but the division of Poland into the postcommunist and post-Solidarity camps. This is to be proved by the choice

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between Kwasniewski and Walesa in the presidential elections.

[Kwasniewski] Public opinion polls show that more than half of Poles see those divisions, but at the same time they no longer matter to 62 percent of Poles. I kept saying that constantly recalling the old divisions is no longer as significant as it was six years ago.

People tend to discern the divisions that are occurring in Poland today and that are very numerous—such as the division into the poor and the very rich, into those who have found their places in the new economic system and those who cannot cope in the new reality, into those who feel like coequal citizens and those who feel like second-class citizens, into those who want to stay in Poland and those who want to emigrate. These social and economic divisions are even more numerous.

This should determine politicians' platforms and their activities. Let us leave historical divisions to historians.

[TRYBUNA] Is it not the case that you do not want to talk about calling people to account for their activities in the past because it is convenient for you?

[Kwasniewski] I speak about calling people to account for their deeds as well. Moreover, I do not mean amnesia...

[TRYBUNA] But perhaps you mean amnesty?

[Kwasniewski] No, I do not. I do not mean amnesty, either. A real problem is to adopt a rational approach to what is going on around us. It is necessary and unavoidable to assess history justly. However, assessments of history will not resolve the problems of unemployment, bleak prospects for young people, housing problems for the young. Nonetheless, most participants in political life propose amnesia regarding the current issues and problems that need to be resolved today.

[TRYBUNA] Whom you feel closer to—the 100 richest Poles, as published in WPROST, or the unemployed?

[Kwasniewski] To be a social democrat means respecting those who are making the national income, who are creating new workplaces, who are paying higher taxes. However, being a democrat also involves respect and activities for those who are less active, or, simply, who are poor.

[TRYBUNA] Thus, this means capitalism with a human face?

[Kwasniewski] This is an oversimplification. The dilemma of the SLD is something else: how to reconcile the rigors of a market economy with social needs, what to do to ensure economic growth and at the same time to take good care of employees. Good economic results are unimportant when employees revolt. Contemporary, rational social democracy proposes social capitalism. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] When there is nothing better to talk about, the charge that is leveled at the left wing is that it does not guarantee that the Polish raison d'etat will be taken care of. All you take care of is high posts, power, not the state. How do you define the Polish raison d'etat?

[Kwasniewski] Raison d'etat is not a property of any president, party, or parliament. Raison d'etat is what is the most important for all of us. The first element of the Polish raison d'etat is the strengthening of democracy. This can be achieved through construction of a democratic, legal state with an efficient judiciary, with laws that must be observed by all of us, with institutions working for citizens, and with a new democratic constitution.

The Polish raison d'etat involves maintenance of economic growth because it is our great chance that makes it possible for us to resolve Polish social problems: unemployment, poverty, and problems of young people who are beginning their adult lives.

The Polish raison d'etat also involves creation of a civil society that feels at home in local communities and in the state. This means strengthening territorial, local, and economic self-governments.

The Polish raison d'etat is also building a safe and appropriate place for our country in Europe.

The years 1995-2000 will decide whether Poland will be a player in the first European league or will find itself on the periphery of Europe—in the second or third league. Therefore, we must negotiate our membership in the EU. We must also make efforts to be incorporated in the European security system. Today NATO is this system.

While making our efforts on the international arena, we must also ensure the political stability and the economic growth of the country. We must see to it that Poland's arguments are presented in the right way to the world. All of this constitutes the Polish raison d'etat. I believe that these issues, which are equally close to all Poles, are at the same time the minimum responsibility that politicians running for high state posts have to bear.

[TRYBUNA] However, the devil is in the details. When we are talking about state security as an element of the Polish raison d'etat, it is impossible not to mention the article by General Wilecki in POLSKA ZBROJNA. In the article he accused politicians of ignoring defense needs.

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[Kwasniewski] I am familiar with the general's fears. I want to offer assurances that politicians have such fears as well. However, security of the state does not depend only on strong, mobile armed forces with modern equipment, even though this is a very important condition. Security of the state, in line with modern understanding of the term, is in the hands of the entire civil society. A state that is a stable element of European security, a desired partner in international relations, and a bridge in the trade and politics between the East and the West, can count on friends that are interested to see our economic successes. If we have many friends like these, enemies are not so terrible.

The SLD attaches great importance to military issues. However, budget problems do not affect that sector as much as education or the health service.

[TRYBUNA] You cannot promise that the Armed Forces will get 3 percent of the gross domestic product?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, I can, but they can receive it at an appropriate time, which would be rational from the social and economic point of view. I believe, however, that, aside from obvious financial needs, the Army should admit that there is a need for internal reforms that would prepare our Armed Forces for new combat conditions and a new configuration of forces in Europe.

[TRYBUNA] Are you going to win the elections?

[Kwasniewski] If you vote for me, if TRYBUNA readers vote for me. I am convinced that in these elections we can achieve success and seize the great, historic opportunity that has appeared in Poland. This historic opportunity is the time between the years 1995 and 2000. We may be part of the great process of European unification, of economic and democratic development. We may take advantage of an opportunity that rarely came to Poles in the past—the opportunity to peacefully become part of European normalcy.

Today, however, a week before the elections, I would like to thank my supporters and my campaign staffs. Without your support and your work, I would not be where I am. Once again, thank you and please vote for me on 5 November.

[TRYBUNA] Thank you for the interview.

**Wachowski Heads Walesa 'Secret Campaign Staff'**

*WS0211110895 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 2 Nov 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Mietek in Charge"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I will certainly not hang Wachowski," Walesa said in an interview for ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Indeed, Mieczyslaw Wachowski is not hanging, nor is he sailing the southern seas. Wachowski...drives and is in charge. He drives a luxury black Peugeot 605, plate number WIF 9732. This vehicle is owned by the Personal Security Unit. However, those who think that Walesa's trusted man is working as a bodyguard are wrong. Mieczyslaw Wachowski is in charge of Lech Walesa's secret campaign staff, operating from the palace in Otwock. Since this is a state-owned premise, soldiers of the Vistula units are protecting it from inquisitive people.

**Electoral Preferences Viewed, Explained**

*WS0111150095 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 28-29 Oct 95 pp 11-12*

[Article by Pawel Smolenski: "A Perfectly Banal Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several weeks ago, when the Poles thought in terms of "preelection idealism" instead of concrete things, it seemed that Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz could become an alternative to Aleksandr Kwasniewski and Lech Walesa. Everyone complained about Kwasniewski and Walesa. The NBP [National Bank of Poland] chairman held all the trump cards in her hands: She displayed only good traits, proved efficient in high echelons of power (after all, the National Bank of Poland is a high echelon of power, too), and no one except the experts accused her of anything. And suddenly, she has fallen.

[This happened] because complaining is part of the "preelection idealism," not the concrete sphere. We have already lived under Walesa and the Kwasniewski coalition; and we know what we can expect from them. As for Gronkiewicz-Waltz, it is anyone's guess what might happen. Why then take the risk?

**A Darker Shade of Gray**

Both right- and left-wing sociologists say that the Poland of 1995 does not want change. Every fourth individual wants to vote for the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] candidate, and, according to some polls, every third Pole favors him.

In recent years, Aleksandr Kwasniewski proved his political abilities and deftness, says a writer connected with the Freedom Union. He did not distance himself from the PRL [Polish People's Republic], preventing his camp, the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] descendant, from sinking into oblivion. He led his political camp to power, resorting to all-out criticism of the Solidarity- backed governments, only to continue to a large extent the Solidarity policy when the time came. He has accomplished spectacular things. Now he is pitching himself in the election campaign as a

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perfectly banal individual—as gray as the camp that stands behind him.

Banality can be seen on the SLD candidate's election posters featuring the face of Kwasniewski, a blue background, and white-red, barely visible letters. The posters look exactly like his election campaign—without dazzling ideas, dull, and excessively common. However, if one were to believe opinion polls, a campaign conducted that way brings good results. Is the "perfect banality" a trump card in a struggle for the Belweder?

Professor Janusz Czapinski, social psychologist and author of the above-mentioned metaphor about "preelectoral poetry," believes that elections are a period of time when we are forced to behave rationally. Therefore, we clearly realize the risks connected with changes. It can be seen with the naked eye that things are better than they used to be, while memories of bad things are still around. Therefore, it is no use deliberating on what may happen in the future; one should instead stand firmly on the ground.

The coming elections will be better understood if you see them in the context of the previous ones. In 1990, people thought that they did not have much to lose. So they were looking for a miracle man and believed in promises. This is why they followed Walesa and Tyminski. If the present situation looked like the one of five years ago, Lepper would be flying high now. Currently, he is nothing more than election folklore, Czapinski says.

In his mind, conservatism is an inherent part of the social election mechanism: Why change when the present situation is quite good? This is the reason every fourth Pole supports Kwasniewski and every fifth one favors Walesa.

Some people may be more right-wing, while others more left-wing, but all of them are basically ruled by the same mechanism. We have already been put through experiments and know that they hurt. So, we will not give the power away to an outsider because outsiders are not certain. As for those who are certain, we know them very well. Kwasniewski and Walesa resemble a Polonez car—all of its owners complain that it is a pseudocar and that it burns too much gas and breaks down too often. But when it comes to changing this car, many people would buy another Polonez, even if they had the opportunity to buy a real car. I know Polonezes, they think. If I buy a BMW, who knows what will happen to me?

A group longing for stabilization is steadily growing. Kwasniewski guarantees the coalition's course, and Poland started to emerge from crisis under its rule (it does not matter that, before this point, the country had to hit bottom to go up). He also provides grounds to hope for Walesa's downfall. Walesa is viewed likewise. Things were picking up during his rule. Besides, he promises to stop the communists.

And life, which was brand new several years ago and now tamed, goes on. Everybody has found some niche for himself by now and has things that he does not want to lose. Since early 1994, when the effects of macroeconomic indicators reached individual wallets, the financial condition of almost everyone improved—even the situation of the unemployed, who know where they can get welfare and how to find employment in the gray [economic] zone to avoid paying taxes, Czapinski explains. A situation has emerged where money changers go hand in hand with teachers: It is possible to find some good place in both the sphere governed by law and the one where this law is deficient. Then why should we need a revolution and change something? What do I care about the rich, even though I resent them? What do I care about power? As long as it does not beat me, I would not overthrow it—even though it favors the *nomenklatura*. I do not like it, but because I can somehow make a living, I could not care less.

**The Science of Forgetting**

The popularity of the SLD leader is based on the breakthrough achieved by the Balcerowicz plan, thinks Professor Hanna Swida-Ziemba, a sociologist from Warsaw University. Everything has changed in Poland, except the changes did not last too long. The breakthrough was strong in terms of quality, but it was spectacular enough—instead of a revolution, there was evolution lasting for long months. People were put into a different and alien world. They tried to explain problems that were completely new to them by using the only language they knew—the old one. They took notions from the past socialist system into a new reality but forgot what real socialism was like.

In the opinion of Swida-Ziemba, Poles have long practiced the exercise of forgetting. The entire PRL reality was built on a short memory. Under Gomulka, people had to forget about October 1956, under Gierek about December 1970, and during the period of martial law about Solidarity. Paradoxically, the Balcerowicz plan suited this short memory—we are building the new, therefore there is no use to bother ourselves with the old and the bad.

When memory fails, it does not matter where you come from. When a new reality is described in old terms, what matters is not the fact that Poland had, and still has, to

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go through a painful systemic transformation, but that power is "they," and it is "them," just as in the past, on whom everything depends and who are responsible for uncertainty, confusion, and the destruction of the old security.

The "they" associated with Solidarity have been out of power for two years now.

This is true, Swida-Ziemba replies, but the attitude toward the Solidarity-originated political elite remains the same. This elite is still present in politics, and the very presence of those who promised something and failed to keep their word does not look good. People associate promises by Solidarity in June 1989 with the Balcerowicz plan, overlooking the fact that the present economic growth would not have been possible without shock therapy. They match the promises with their hopes, adopting an attitude of a disillusioned lover: It had to be nice and wonderful, and it is not.

**The Debased Ethos**

In the opinion of Professor Janusz Reykowski, head of the Institute of Psychology at the Polish Science Academy, who participated in the Roundtable talks in 1989 on the government side, Solidarity circles had a simplified way of thinking about society. They thought that the overwhelming majority of society rejected the old system.

The rejection of the national list [of legislative seats reserved for communists], Reykowski says, and the 99 percent of Solidarity candidates elected to the Senate, were supposed to be proof of that perception. Meanwhile, as many as 40 percent of the 60 percent who went to the polls voted for the national list, and the Solidarity senators garnered 60-70 percent of the votes. The rejection of the PRL was neither as positive nor as sweeping as that perception assumed.

In the opinion of Pawel Spiewak, a sociologist and historian, things are not as they appear to be—they are worse. Because, if we were to associate communists with empty store shelves, pursuit of personal interests, and acting like princelings, and Solidarity politicians with faithfulness to the idea and great integrity, society would better remember times when many "ethos" [Solidarity] activists were guided by their personal interests.

The division into communists and Solidarity is no longer so accurate because some Solidarity people, endowed with power and people's trust, behaved very badly. Looking at the Polish political class from this angle, we would see that another chapter was added to the same book after 1989, Spiewak says.

The people's short memory allowed Kwasniewski to make the Solidarity idea a common heritage of post-communists and the former democratic opposition. Because he participated in the Roundtable talks, he, like the opposition, was dismantling the socialist system—even though this is not what the government side sought at that time. They say today that there is no turning back to the PRL, and democracy is just what Poland needs. This is a method to erase biographical differences because, when you hear such statements, you may think that, in fact, the opposition and the PZPR have always pursued the same goal.

Surveys conducted by sociologist Professor Mira Marody prove that, according to public opinion, a politician should above all be a professional because politics should be a well-performed job, a "professionalized vocation." From this perspective, we have only two professional politicians—Aleksandr Kwasniewski, who is the leader of the largest legislative faction and the ruling coalition, and Lech Walesa, who proved his professionalism over the five years of his presidency. In spite of forecasted tragedies, nothing bad had happened in Poland. This is why it does not come as a surprise that both of them enjoy the widest support. They guarantee that they can do their job.

Pawel Spiewak believes that indigenous human conservatism makes people choose a familiar evil over unpredictable reforms. They do not want to be shaken up and pushed out of the game. Choosing Kwasniewski offers them peace, and peace is always good.

Kwasniewski pictures the world of challenges but without problems, smooth, without ridges and harsh surfaces. Pointing to the ruling coalition, he says that in his world there will be no squabbles, discussions, or talks—all this chaos imputed to post-Solidarity parties. He knows what he wants, giving something to lean on and a sense of security. His speech is smooth and correct and contains common sense. He moves around within the limits of people's everyday life. He is a mass product of decent quality. This is why he is convincing and you can identify yourself with him. Even if there is something that people reject, it is not Kwasniewski himself but the tail of the PRL that is following him and his entourage, Spiewak adds.

A similar opinion is held by linguist Professor Michal Glowinski. Kwasniewski is not part of the PRL, he says. He has a good command of speech and has a gift of quickly reacting with short and comprehensible sentences. If there is someone whose speech has language holdovers from PRL times, it is Bubel, Kozluk, or Lepper. The language of Kwasniewski is a contradiction to Newspeak.

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If Kwasniewski were rid of his biography and cut out of the political context, he would perhaps be an ideal candidate. Glowinski says that he would then not be so resentful of Kwasniewski, even with his tail of PRL veterans.

This, however, is a strange tail. Since the mid-1960's, I was an ardent reader of TRYBUNA LUDU [communist newspaper], but I do not remember the names of the people who are now standing alongside Kwasniewski.

Because Glowinski, the author of many works on the language of communist propaganda, does not remember the names, it is useless to expect that an average voter will remember them. So maybe there is only a shadow and not a tail behind Kwasniewski?

Kwasniewski is not part of the PRL, nor does he distance himself from the Polish People's Republic or deny his biography. If anything, he pretends to be a naive person: I was in the PZPR at the very height of power because I had an illusion that I could change, reform, and make things more human. When it turned out that it was not possible, I joined the people who overthrew the failing system.

Kwasniewski is clearly weaker in accurately presenting his biography, Pawel Spiewak says. But it cannot be ruled out that naivete is wining over more sympathizers for him. There were not many heroic individuals in the PRL. Opportunism, dullness, and naivete were dominating traits. So, when Kwasniewski says he believed but did not make it, he, in a way, matches the collective biography of our nation. He is not unusual or heroic, nor does he represent our national conscience. He is an ordinary and regular guy—just like most people.

**Catholic Anticlericalism**

The 40 years of communism made religion a private matter confined to people's hearts. And private matters, as all sociological surveys show, are of particular value for Poles. This is why the entry into the world politics of the church and parties claiming its support prompted many Poles to think that top clergymen replaced former PZPR hacks. We fear the church but do not criticize it openly, exaggerating its ability to interfere in the private life of citizens to demonic sizes.

In the polls I conducted, Prof. Swida-Ziemba says, people voiced frightened opinions that the church could take their jobs and complicate the life of an ordinary family. The past two Solidarity governments, preaching about Christian values and the public role of the church and adopting the Antiabortion Law, committed the principal sin—they made a political entity out of the church and messily violated people's privacy.

Poland is perhaps the only country in the world whose people think they live in accord with the Lord and, at the same time, believe that there is no agreement with his servants on earth. Thus, everyone—Kwasniewski included—who adopts a firm position in discussions with the church scores a lot of points.

Kwasniewski is also supported in opposition against someone, almost all of my respondents said—against the Solidarity ethos and against those who wanted to mold Poles into an ideal society. Kwasniewski is far removed from idealism. This means that, if he does not want to change us, he understands our flaws. There is only one step from understanding to accepting, while there is as much distance from changes to rebuking for sins. This is why an opinion may prevail that initiators of changes want to improve us, while he simply loves us.

When the postcommunist coalition took power in 1993, the media raised a hew and cry that the SLD and the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] were destroying the state, stalling reforms, and pursuing party interests. At that same time, Poles started to have more and more money in their pockets. The shock therapy of Leszek Balcerowicz started to yield more than it once took away.

And again, Janusz Reykowski says, a theory had emerged that the left-wing team is bound to compromise itself and lead the country astray. But the opposite happened—various social groups felt a tangible improvement. This does not mean that only the present power should take credit for the improvement. The human mind, however, better appreciates the fact that the previously built structures have not been destroyed. Economic upturns increase tolerance toward authorities. The pessimistic predictions made this effect even more conspicuous: It had to be tough, but things were not so bad, which means that the power should get an extra bonus. It works like a spring: The more you press it, the higher it will spring back.

Then why is another leading coalition personality, Waldemar Pawlak [PSL leader], so low in the opinion polls? I ask.

Even though he lost support, Pawlak did not let the coalition lose its support. He has been away for several months now, so he cannot share the social experience of improvement. [sentence as published]

At a time when Solidarity was taking power, social expectations reached a climax, some of the respondents replied. Those expectations and abilities to fulfill them were divided by a gap that was bound to result in an electoral debacle in 1993. On the other hand, nothing grand was expected from the postcommunist coalition.

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So, even if it did not make good on its promises, the disappointment was not so great.

A psychological condition is responsible for marking off a particular candidate on the ballot list, sociology Professor Zygmunt Bauman says. People want Kwasniewski because he is sufficiently conservative and progressive: There will be some changes and some conservation of the status quo, everything given in small doses and slowly. In the past, the pace of change was too fast for the rank and file, adding to its confusion and lack of understanding. After all, human ability to adapt to a new environment is limited. Kwasniewski promises to reduce uncertainty.

If so, all plans to make changes are associated with irresponsibility, extremism, and political gamesmanship, while the swamp tranquillity offered by the coalition makes the impression that we have finally achieved the desired small stabilization.

**Correct Does Not Mean Efficient**

Hanna Swida-Ziemba believes that, in the Poland of 1995, attitudes favoring society and the common good are not in fashion. Because life has not yet been completely taken under control, the "run for your life" attitude is prevailing now.

Such sentiments make calls for being together and jointly resolving problems—the position of Jacek Kuron [Freedom Union]—look controversial, at the least. Many people reject this attitude out of hand, even when a proposal for reforms is correct. Kwasniewski prefers to be efficient rather than correct, and acceptable to everyone rather than controversial. It is surprising that people who favor the efficiency of a politician over his correctness agree in the long—but not electoral—run that a correct politician was right. Many of those polled said that they will not vote for Kuron, and immediately added that Kuron is such a decent man, Swida-Ziemba says.

According to an opinion widely spread in post-Solidarity circles, the PRL was a big evil. Meanwhile, people's minds picture the PRL reality in an extremely diversified way, Reykowski says. This diversity is the reason for various hopes that people pin on democracy. Some of them want the democracy growing and defending their freedoms, others value security and protection higher than freedom.

Does this mean that Kwasniewski's electorate largely consists of people who do not need freedom?

I believe, Reykowski replies, that a considerable part of this electorate has a limited sense of control over social reality. The world is incomprehensible, and I have nothing to say in it. Hence this criticism against the political class: Politicians are busy with their own problems, playing games to reach their petty private goals that, even worse, are hard to understand. The games are turning into arguments, arguments into brawls, and brawls at the top are a symbol of evil. The coalition ushered in more moderate relations and made the rules of political debate more civilized. Kwasniewski does his best to avoid conflicts.

Is it an ability inherited from his PRL past?

Maybe it is.

**Shame Within the Limits of Human Rights**

A sociologist connected with the Center Accord [PC] believes that Kwasniewski is attractive because of the force of his party. Like Walesa himself, the presidential post exerts a lot of influence, and strength and abilities act on people like a magnet on metal filings. Second, Kwasniewski justifies the correctness of many PRL figures' biographies.

When Solidarity took power, it did not make PRL-affiliated people frightened, the sociologist continues. It was a vague anxiety rather than a concrete feeling of fear, which does not fit in a liberal-democratic system. Although the spread of fear is not possible without persecutions, one can imagine persecutions that are within the limits of human rights.

The sociologist also wants the "vague anxiety" to elicit shame connected with one's own background. Fear and shame would stop ballot lists with the name of a postcommunist leader on it.

However, most of my respondents think that the decommunization drive, which was supposed to elicit "vague anxiety and shame," aroused fear and, instead of shame, the feeling of solidarity. Angry words, also aimed against friends (activists from the former democratic opposition), were followed by a humiliating defeat of the decommunization team. Everyone was stained—both those who wanted to publicize secret personal files and those who considered poking around in people's biographies a mean task. The only group that scored points on this was that of the onlookers—that is, the postcommunists.

The PC sociologist adds: We have made a revolution but forgotten about some books that come in handy in such times—Machiavelli's *The Prince*, for example. You can retain power when you hurt the rich and live in peace with the subjects. We went after the rich and, initiating reforms, we also encroached on the populace. Communists are wiser—they hurt the rich, taking their

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power and positions, but do not touch the poor, stalling reforms.

**The Opposition's Kwasniewski**

In the opinion of many of my respondents, Kwasniewski would stand a flimsy chance in the elections if the opposition managed to forge his double—a man who would not provoke passions and controversy, someone unusually usual and ordinary, whose biography would make quite a few people feel qualms of conscience. He would have to wear a suit that is a little better than those worn by his electorate, but not as good as to become an unachievable object of dreams. He would have to be young because the young are not responsible for the past—and handsome as a soap opera actor, but not to the point of being associated with Hollywood.

The "opposition's Kwasniewski" would have to be nice, smooth, and civil, in control of his nerves and dreams, a great speaker, but speaking, in fact, about nothing and standing somewhere between the PRL and the Third Polish Republic. He would not be allowed to promise people anything, nor could he demand anything from them. But, if the post-Solidarity opposition molded such a man, it would contradict itself.

Kwasniewski realized that the very participation in the elections implies a promise for improvement, the people with whom I talked went on to say. After all, no one wants power just to make things worse. In addition, he wants people to do nothing more than just cast a ballot with his name on it. The lack of demands also contains a promise: You do not have to be responsible, resourceful, enterprising, and help each other—you do not have to do anything, and your life will improve anyway. It will become better and without chaos—that is, reforms and changes. Things are better as they are today. And you know what we have today; you accept it and want to protect it.

The problem of the presidential election is not so much in Kwasniewski himself (the respondents summed up a list of the SLD leader's advantages) as it is in our collective mentality, in what we are like, what we want, and what we can admit. Like everyone else, we think symptomatically rather than analytically. This is why only those who are automatically associated with signs of improvement stand the best chance.

Maybe this is actually the case, even though the electoral outcome may be different. On the other hand, apart from the collective mentality, there is the economic and political reality, which after 1989 radically improved the situation in the country we inherited from communism. Those political changes brought in the camps that descended from Solidarity, while economic changes brought in the Balcerowicz plan. We are pushing this truth out of our consciousness because it hurts and reminds us of more difficult times.

Our political and economic reality boils down to the following statement: Without reforms, we would not have what we have now, and, without their continuation, we will not retain it. While today we enjoy the improvement—the result of what had been done before the coalition came to power—tomorrow we may dabble in the mud created by the sin of negligence that is currently being committed. There are still large minefields lurking ahead of us—the still unreformed pension and health insurance systems, the backward agriculture and mining industry, and large enterprises running only because of subsidies, to name just a few. If we do not start resolving these problems soon, the fragile upturn—what our citizens consider a sign of improvement—will fall down on our heads tomorrow. This is how the happy dream of Poles about stabilization may end.

**Condemnation of Use of Anti-Semitism in Campaign**

*LD0211103495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0835 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 2 Nov—Twenty-two intellectuals and politicians, including three presidential candidates, have issued a statement condemning the use of anti-Semitic accents in the election campaign.

"To some people the presidential campaign has given the opportunity for presenting the views originating in the worst tradition of Polish intolerance. Anti-Semitic accents in the election campaign reflect discredit on the society, which declares the willingness to join the united Europe. We feel under an obligation to protest against such a way of thinking...[ellipses as received]

"Members of our society should get rid of prejudice and phobia. Let us choose the future without prejudice and intolerance," the statement reads.

The statement was signed by, among others, Jacek Kuron, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Tadeusz Zielinski, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Bronislaw Geremek, Zofia Kuratowska, Adam Michnik, Szymon Szurmiej, Jerzy Turowicz, and Andrzej Wajda.

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**Defense Minister Interviewed on Bosnia, NATO**

*WS0111141495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Oct 95 p 7*

[Interview with Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Ryszard Bilski; place and date not given: "Expansion of NATO Is Necessary and Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bilski] How will the situation in the former Yugoslavia develop in the immediate future?

[Tinca] The U.S. initiative to resolve the Bosnian crisis created conditions allowing for ending the war through negotiations. The significance of that initiative is that the United States has presented the proof of its resolve and action to finally put an end to that conflict. The peace process will surely be difficult and depend on goodwill and understanding of the sides involved in the conflict. There are many problems yet which need to be resolved to make sure that this process will move in the right direction. I would single out here the issue of eastern Slavonia, the Banja Luka region, fears of the Muslims that the proposed territorial division is unfavorable for them, the situation of refugees, as well as the issue when and to what extent the embargo imposed on Serbia will be moderated.

However, chances of achieving peace have probably been never better before than they are now. The international community appears to be resolved to stop the war in Bosnia, while great superpowers (the United States, Russia, and others) are even interested in gaining diplomatic victories. Belgrade is displaying flexibility and seeking ways to quench the conflict. But one should use this time to prevent Bosnian Serbs from regrouping their forces, because it would be difficult later to get them to participate in the peace talks.

Despite its successes, Croatia is becoming increasingly dependent on certain Western countries. This allows those countries to exert favorable pressure on peaceful solutions. Also important is the fact that the percentage of territory currently controlled by the warring sides is nearing the percentage proposed by the Contact Group. Further changes could be made at the negotiating table.

For well-known reasons, Russia will seek to play an important role on the former Yugoslav territory. The election campaign in the Russian Federation will undoubtedly change this position of Moscow. I do not think, however, that Russia will achieve more in the political sphere if it distances itself from the efforts being put forth by the international community to resolve the Bosnian conflict. It should not be ruled out that if Russia looks after its own interests in the Balkans too much, this may to some extent prevent Belgrade from making a decision moving us closer to peace.

[Bilski] What do you think about security in the Balkans in the context of the situation in the former Yugoslavia?

[Tinca] There are no signs that this conflict may spill beyond the former Yugoslavia. Of course, there are quite a few threats to regional security in the Balkans, but such a risk also exits in other parts of Europe that appear to be unaffacted by such problems. An important task is to keep the situation in the former Yugoslavia under control and avert any escalation of tension. The continuing Croatian and Muslim attacks, as well as an attempt by Zagreb to forcefully reincorporate eastern Slavonia, could trigger such a process. It is quite possible that an open conflict between Serbia, backed by Russia, and Croatia, backed by the West, may initiate a chain reaction, with more and more states being embroiled in the fight and the situation getting out of control not only in the Balkans but all over Europe.

Funneling a considerable number of Serb refugees from Krajina and Bosnia to Kosovo and Vojvodina rekindled old ethnic tensions existing in this region and triggered a backlash from Albania, Hungary, and Greece. For Budapest, which made this issue a principal task of its foreign policy, it will be hard to refrain from engaging in problems of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, who must be in a really tough situation given the fact that Budapest is without any good reason concerned about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania. The situation in Kosovo may result in involvement of Albania. The gunrunning and activities of paramilitary groups near the Macedonian-Albanian border creates additional strains in the region.

In the long run, everything will depend on the leading European countries and the United States. The resolution can come from outside the Balkans. Those countries can play a positive role, and I think that they will be doing that, as the danger is too serious.

[Bilski] What role does Romania and the Romanian Army play in the stabilization of the Balkan crisis?

[Tinca] Romania's role in the Balkans is in many respects similar to the role played by Poland in the Baltic states. Romania is a Central European country (just as Poland) neighboring the Balkans. But it is not a Balkan country. Poland neighbors with Baltic states, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. But it itself is not a Baltic state.

Thanks to its economic, demographic, political, and military potential, as well as a system of developed relations with Balkan countries, Romania can make a considerable contribution to the process of moderating tensions

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and conflicts in this region. To better understand the situation in which Romania has found itself, please imagine what Poland could do if a conflict as large as the one in Yugoslavia broke out in the Baltics. We are not superpowers, but we are not small countries, either. You are the northern flank of Central Europe, while we represent its southern flank. Poland and Romania are European windows into the East. These windows can be closed if there is a storm, or open wide if the weather is fine.

When we were strong, there was peace everywhere. When we started to become weaker, storms were rampaging around us. I believe that Poland and Romania are two important pillars of Central Europe which it cannot do without.

As for the role played by the Romanian Army, it is purely defensive, and thanks to this we contributed to the stabilization in the region. At the same time, we maintain very good military relations with all of our neighbors. Serbs have never been our enemies, let alone the rest of the former Yugoslav peoples. In 1990, we decided that military contacts can spur improvement of political, economic, and cultural relations. As a result, we refused to send our troops on peacekeeping missions to neighboring countries, particularly to Bosnia.

[Bilski] How is the Romanian Army preparing for membership in the defensive NATO structures?

[Tinca] The decision to join NATO is well-grounded. As an active partner, we went from the position of "declarations and good intentions to a pragmatic position." We will invest every organizational and financial efforts to meet the compatibility requirements determined together with NATO. We have set main priorities. First of all, we want to work in compliance with the standards and norms adopted within the alliance and to develop the command, management, control, and logistic systems. We are also seeking to introduce democratic and civilian control over our Armed Forces, as well as the "transparency" of any military activity. We want to renew our military equipment as soon as possible according to NATO standards, especially in communications, air traffic, aviation, and ammunition.

As we see the Partnership for Peace program as a transition period on our way to full NATO membership, we will actively participate in it. In our opinion, the expansion of NATO is not only necessary, but also possible.

### Tokes Releases Alternative Reconciliation Proposal

*AU0211134695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 31 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes held a news conference at the headquarters of the Reform Bishopric of Oradea. Among other things, he said the following, quote: In many respects, I am not satisfied with the evolution of Romanian-Hungarian relations, particularly those regarding the financial assistance granted by the current government in Budapest to many Hungarian institutions in Romania. For instance, Gyorgy Keleti, Hungary's minister of defense, lets us believe that important steps forward were made along army lines. As a matter of fact, this is not true. Likewise, Mr. Tokes said, the activity of the Hungarian prime minister and foreign minister and of the whole current government is not more efficient or fruitful than that of the previous governments. We are only deceiving ourselves, Laszlo Tokes further said, if we believe that we can reach some results through demagogy or mere appearances of reconciliation. The Romanian Government should concretely prove that the policy of Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation is well received in Romania, too. Only then will it bear fruit, end of quote.

According to our correspondent, at the end of his news conference, Bishop Tokes released to the mass media a proposal entitled the Alternative Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation, which is based on the Italian-Austrian pattern regarding the accord on South Tirol. Mr. Laszlo Tokes told the journalists that the text of his proposal was sent today to Romania's President Ion Iliescu and to the president of the Hungarian Republic Arpad Goncz. He also said that his Alternative proposal will be sent today to the leadership of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], our correspondent reports.

### PNTCD President's Health Remains 'Critical'

*AU0211135595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 2 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The health condition of Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD], remains critical, without any signs of amelioration. Due to his lung insufficiency, they still have to use artificial breathing devices, says a medical bulletin released this morning following the patient's examination at 0730 hours.

Dr. Sorin Oprescu, director of the Bucharest University Hospital, said that the neurological and electroencephalographic clinical examinations showed minimal

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elements of diffuse brain activity, which is in concordance with the patient's lung insufficiency.

To this hour, our reporter could not learn any further details.

In the afternoon, a new medical bulletin is to be expected.

**Daily Wants PL'93 Leader Sued for Iliescu Insults**

*AU0211123995*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian on 25 October carries on page 1 a 200-word ROMPRES-attributed report on a news conference held by Dinu Patriciu, member of the Steering Committee of the Liberal Party '93 (PL'93), in Bucharest, on 24 October, entitled "Dinu Patriciu: 'We Have a President Who Is a Criminal and Traitor to the Country.'" The report points out that "Dinu Patriciu said at his news conference on Tuesday that 'we have a president who is a criminal and a traitor to the country.'" According to Patriciu, "this needs no further proof, since it is proven by the president's own deeds," such as "the signing of the treaty with Moscow and the recognition of the Republic of Moldova." Then, "the fact that this government has resorted to force to suppress peaceful demonstrations makes him a criminal, too." The PL'93 leader is quoted as having "asked the General Magistracy to file a lawsuit" against the president, because "one should not leave unpunished such gestures, which are no longer merely political, but also fall within the realm of the penal code."

Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 27 October on page 11 carries a 500-word article by Dan Andronic entitled: "EVENIMENTUL ZILEI Asks the General Magistracy To File a Lawsuit Against and Request the Lifting of the Parliamentary Immunity of Deputy Dinu Patriciu for Unqualified Insults Against Ion Iliescu." Referring to Patriciu's statements on 24 October, the author chides him for resorting to "the kind of language used by Corneliu Vadim Tudor (president of the Greater Romania Party—PRM), by calling Romania's president a criminal and traitor." The article goes on to say that "since EVENIMENTUL ZILEI is the newspaper that has made the greatest contribution to the campaign to punish Tudor for his insults against public figures, and since ridding the Romanian public life of practices a la Vadim Tudor is an absolute necessity, we ask the General Magistracy to file a lawsuit against and request the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of PL'93 Deputy Dinu Patriciu." The article goes on to say that "we believe the politicians should realize that to say whatever you like about someone, just for the sake of getting publicity, is not allowed."

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## Federal

### Kontic Asks UN To Allow Import of Russian Gas

*LD0111234795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1548 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic has asked the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council to allow the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] to import fuel for humanitarian purposes from Russia.

In a letter, which the Yugoslav ambassador to the UN, Vladislav Jovanovic, has already delivered to the committee's chairman, Emilio Cardenas, Prime Minister Kontic draws attention to the situation in the FRY made very difficult by the sanctions and notes that on 12 August of this year he asked the UN Security Council president in a letter lift the sanctions. "Maintaining the sanctions continues to have unprecedented economic, demographic, health, social, and development effects. The humanitarian situation in the FRY has been made even worse by the influx of additional 200,000 refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina. This means that the number of registered refugees seeking shelter in the FRY has reached 640,000," Kontic says in his letter.

The federal prime minister goes on to say that as a result of the sanctions the FRY has been forced to seek ways of securing basic requirements in medicine, fuel, and food since with its own resources the country cannot resolve the existing humanitarian tragedy adequately.

"Since the sanctions were first imposed, particular difficulties have been experienced in fuel supply for humanitarian cases... [TANJUG ellipses] I am, therefore, forced to ask the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee, set up under Resolutions 724 (1991), to allow the FRY to import from the Russian Federation 1,305,800 cubic meters of natural gas; 201,374 tonnes of mazouth; 237,167 tonnes of heating oil; and 3,527 tonnes of liquid gas needed for heating medical institutions, schools, and social welfare institutions as well as refugee centers."

Kontic points out that the FRY is forced to finance this import of fuel for humanitarian purposes with the money earned from by selling wheat and maize to the Russian Federation. He adds that a request for permission to import fuel has already been sent to the UN Security Council.

Ambassador Jovanovic has delivered the same request to the UN Security Council president.

"I am convinced, Your Excellency, that you are aware of the great responsibility facing the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee and that you will do your utmost to ensure that our request for the import of fuel is granted," Kontic says in his letter to Cardenas.

### Belgrade Denies Troops Helped Conquer Srebrenica

*AU0111160195 Paris AFP in English 1503 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 1 (AFP)—Rump Yugoslavia on Wednesday [1 November] denied US reports alleging its troops helped rebel Serbs in Bosnia conquer the eastern Bosnian Moslem enclave of Srebrenica last July.

The allegations, published by the WASHINGTON POST last Sunday, are part of a wider and deepening controversy involving the alleged slaughter of thousands of Moslem men in the enclave during and subsequent to its capture by the Bosnian Serbs.

But in a statement here, the government said reports that "the Yugoslav army participated directly or indirectly in operations to free the Moslem stronghold of Srebrenica are unfounded."

The statement also denied that prison camps for Bosnian Moslems had been set up in Serbia or Monetnegro.

### Government Denies Involvement

*LD0111161495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1409 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—The federal government today said there are no grounds for claims made by some Western countries that the Yugoslav Army took part in military operations in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and said the intention of such fabricated reports is to pressurize the Serbian side during the peace process and negotiations in Dayton.

The Federal Secretariat for Information has issued the following statement:

"The claim that the Yugoslav Army indirectly or directly took part in the operations to liberate the Muslim stronghold of Srebrenica in July this year is totally unfounded.

Such untruths, as well as the false claims that there are camps for Muslims on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, fall into the category of well-known elements of a campaign that always gains momentum at crucial times as regards securing peace in the flash points in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

This time there is an unambiguous intention to pressurize the Serbian side during the peace process and

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negotiations in Dayton, because not a single member of the Yugoslav Army took part in the battles around Srebrenica, and there are no camps for Muslim prisoners on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is advocating and supporting the identification and punishment of all war crimes and criminals, wherever they are and whichever warring party they belong to. The latest campaign waged by some Western media accusing, with no evidence, only the Serbs, does not contribute to this aim as its transparent aim is to wage propaganda war, the last thing the peace negotiations in Dayton need.

Not having an opportunity to stage-manage a third Markale, the forces that are obviously opposed to peace are trying by this sort of misinformation to divert the international community's attention from the constructive and peace-loving policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and thus reduce the chances for a positive outcome of the talks.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia again wishes to draw the attention of the international community to the dramatic fate of the remaining Serbs in Krajina, who have for months been paying with their lives because of their nationality. The international community is expected to react to the biggest ethnic cleansing that has taken place in the war in former Yugoslavia, in the wake of a savage aggression by Croatian troops against Krajina, and of aggression by the Croatian and Muslim troops against traditionally Serb ethnic areas in western and northwestern Bosnia, even after the cease-fire was signed.

Eyewitnesses' testimonies and evidence on this tragedy, which is still in progress, can never be compared with the false allegations launched by certain intelligence and propaganda centers which favor continuing the war," the statement by the Federal Secretariat for Information says in conclusion.

### Mladic Deputy Assails Charges

*LD0111163695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1449 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Colonel General Milan Gvero, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic [VRS], told a TANJUG reporter today that the latest accusations of ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica are designed to undermine the Serbian side's positions at the negotiations in Ohio.

He recalled earlier cases—such as an explosion in Vase Miskina street or two explosions in Merkale market in Sarajevo—which were blamed only on the Serbs despite inadequate evidence.

Saying that the negotiations in Dayton are a concerted attempt of the international community to secure a peace in the area of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gvero said there are some script writers who, in the absence of evidence against the Serbs, are attempting to insist on something that in their view might damage the Serbian positions.

In General Gveros's words, this is why the latest story about Srebrenica and the alleged involvement of the Yugoslav Army is designed to undermine the negotiating position of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the joint negotiating team of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic.

He added that a part of this campaign is also directed personally at General Ratko Mladic. It is, as he said, a skillfully prepared but poorly executed propaganda operation with a large number of players, including a great deal of improvisation and many fabricated or false elements about the events in Srebrenica.

General Gvero stressed that Srebrenica as well as Zepa have been resolved militarily and that everything the VRS has been doing was directly witnessed by numerous international arbiters, so any speculation is unfounded, because even some Muslim commanders have made statements denying these accusations against the VRS.

Shortly after they left Srebrenica, they said that they formed new units from Srebrenica's Muslims, who were promptly sent to the front line.

"They should explain to the families of their fighters their losses incurred following our entry into the territory they had controlled. They should not represent their losses in this way," the deputy chief of the General Staff said in conclusion.

### Refugee Association Appeals to Bosnian Negotiators

*LD0111153995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1337 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 1 (TANJUG)—The Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Yugoslavia has appealed to the Presidents of Russia and the United States and the participants in the Ohio summit on Bosnia to stop the war and ensure a safe return of refugees to their homes.

Association President Milorad Muratovic told a press conference on Tuesday that the refugees expected the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to

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issue provisional passports for them to enable their free movement.

The association demanded that all refugees, regardless of their nationality and the location of their homes, be granted equal rights in receiving humanitarian aid and accomodation, as well as legal and political protection.

At a recent session, the association adopted a program on the return of refugees to their earlier places of residence and their inalianable property rights, Muratovic said.

The program said that self-organization of refugees should be given priority, and that local authorities and international institutions were obliged to protect them and guarantee their safe status.

About 700,000 refugees and displaced persons are currently registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one third of whom are non-Serbs.

**Official: Refugees in Vojvodina Need Drugs, Food**

*LD0111151295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1449 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Nov 1 (TANJUG)—The 200,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia registered in the Serbian province of Vojvodina are badly in need of drugs, food, fuel, clothes and shoes, the president of the Vojvodina provincial headquarters for refugees, Zivorad Smiljanic, said.

In most cases the refugees are accomodated with their relatives and friends in 85,000 families which are also in a very difficult financial situation, after the aid announced by humanitarian organizations failed to arrive, he said.

Smiljanic said the UNHCR intends to finance with 2.3 million dollars the adapting of accomodation space.

He said a large number of refugees have expressed the desire to return to their homes, but in an organized manner and with firm international guarantees.

**Interior Minister on New Draft Citizenship Law**

*LD0111192095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1734 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 1 (TANJUG)—The aim of a new law on citizenship is the continuity of Yugoslav citizenship as part of the continuity of Yugoslavia, Interior Minister Vukasin Jokanovic told TANJUG.

The draft laws on citizenship, passports, residence for foreigners and the security of state borders submitted to the federal parliament proceed from the highest standards and democratic achievements in the international practice, Jokanovic said Wednesday.

The draft regulations on federal and republican citizenships give precedence to federal citizenship over the republican, as opposed to the 1974 constitutional solutions under which federal citizenship resulted from the republican, the federal minister specified.

'Citizens who had Serbian or Montenegrin citizenship on the day of the proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, April 27, 1992, would automatically, by the force of law, be considered citizens of the F.R.Y.', Jokanovic said.

He specified that citizens of the former Yugoslav republics would get the F.R.Y. citizenship if they had had permanent residence in Serbia or Montenegro on April 27, 1992 and on condition they applied to be registered as Yugoslav citizens within a year from the date the new law took effect.

The interior minister said the draft law envisaged the possibility of dual citizenship only in exceptional cases.

'The draft law does not use the term 'refugees' but envisages for displaced persons from the war-affected regions who have fled to the F.R.Y. a procedure for the obtaining of Yugoslav citizenship,' Jokanovic explained.

He specified that the Federal Interior Ministry would consider each individual request and decide whether a displaced person met the necessary requirements for Yugoslav citizenship.

'Those citizens who will have no possibility to return to their previous place of residence but do meet the general legal requirements will get Yugoslav citizenship,' the minister specified.

'If it is established that Yugoslav citizenship has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, falsely supplied information or other irregularities,' such persons will be stripped of Yugoslav citizenship, the minister stressed.

He said the status of limitation did not apply in such instances.

**Premier, Special Purpose Industrialists Meet**

*LD0111231095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1604 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Nov (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic today received representatives of the special purpose industry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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The talks on the current issues concerning the industry were attended by Jovan Zebic and Nikola Sainovic, federal deputy prime ministers, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, and Federal Interior Minister Vukasin Jokanovic, the Federal Secretariat of Information said.

Directors of special purpose factories spoke about the difficulties that had faced them and other sectors of the economy since the former Yugoslavia was broken up and sanctions were imposed. They particularly discussed the status, the economic and ownership restructuring, and the future development of the special purpose industry.

Kontic noted the state's interest in the development and progress of the special purpose industry and said that its faster incorporation in the market economy was needed, the Federal Secretariat said.

## Serbia

### Opposition Parties Call for Speaker's Dismissal

*LD0111200995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1817 GMT 1 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 1 (TANJUG)—The parliament clubs of three Serbian opposition parties—the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia—demanded Wednesday the dismissal of Serbian Parliament Speaker Dragan Tomic, who is a member of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia.

During a break from deliberations, representatives of the three opposition parties told journalists that 22 deputies had signed the demand for dismissal because Tomic 'has not been performing his duties in accordance with the constitution, laws, and the regulations of the Serbian parliament'.

According to the opposition deputies, Tomic had 'made possible the canceling of live TV coverage of parliament sessions' and allowed three deputies of the radical party Nikola Pasic, now called the New Democracy, to take part in the deliberations. New Democracy is a coalition party of the ruling socialists.

In the Serbian parliament, which has 250 deputies, socialists have 123, and New Democracy six deputies.

Ljiljana Lucic (DS) said that the party had sent a letter to the president of the republic to inform him about the irregularity of the work of parliament, adding that a 'parliamentary crisis' had started in Serbia.

### POLITIKA's Vendors Stage Strike

*AU0211115695*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian on 1 November on page 11 carries several reports on a strike staged by the vendors of Politika company in Belgrade.

According to a 600-word report by Zoran Petrovic, "the vendors in Politika's newsstands in the center of Belgrade, New Belgrade, Zemun, and Cukarica began a strike in front of the Politika company's building yesterday. Disgusted with the company's decision to lease newsstands, the full and part-time vendors and those who have been working in the newsstands through the youth job center for many years, held a protest, shouting, 'resignations,' 'resignations,' and 'thieves.' We demand that the company's management stop issuing the 10-year leases for Politika's 50 newsstands ranging in price between 5,000 and 10,000 German marks. The vendors had not even been informed about this company's move, and therefore, fearing for their future, staged a public protest unprecedented in Politika's history."

According to the report, some of the vendors had not known anything about the leasing until they were asked by "new owners" to vacate the premises.

The report also states that a delegation of vendors has held talks with Politika's chairman Zivorad Minovic, who informed them that "so far, 10-year lease agreements have been signed for a dozen newsstands and there are plans to lease another 42." According to Minovic, the company was forced to make this move as "these were the units with the poorest results, they had the greatest losses," and for that reason "the company has decided to lease them to generate extra income."

According to a 350-word unattributed report citing a statement by "the Collegium of Editors of POLITIKA, the paper from which the Politika Company has emerged," POLITIKA's editors "condemn most sharply the attempt to sell off for next to nothing the property that has been created over decades by the generations of POLITIKA's journalists, printing workers, and other employees.

The statement goes on to say that "more than 700 journalists employed in the Politika Newspaper Publishing Company take the view that the sale of newsstands also places them in danger because they, too, have ownership rights, and especially because more than 65 percent of the publications sold through the Politika's vendor network are the papers published by the Politika Newspaper Publishing Company."

According to them, "the decision by Politika's management contravenes the Statute of the Politika Company

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and should therefore be a subject of interest to the legislative organs if the property rights of the oldest newspaper company in the Balkans are to be protected."

According to a 200-word report attributed to I.S., the workers in Politika's newsstands have also sought the opinion of the Belgrade municipal public prosecutor, who says:

"If the Politika company's regulations state that newsstands or assets worth over 10,000 German marks cannot be leased or sold without the decision of the management board, but someone, for instance, does this without the board's decision, then one could talk about the possibility of someone committing the criminal offense of abusing his position." The public prosecutors office also adds that it needs more information about the case before considering any action.

**Arkan Views Role in Bosnia, E. Slavonia**

*AU0211112895 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 95 pp 4-6*

[Interview with Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, commandant of the paramilitary Serbian Volunteer Guard, by Zoran Lukic; place and date not given: "I Am Leaving the Bosnian Krajina, Eastern Slavonia Comes Next!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "After more than a month of severe fighting and 16 dead and 13 wounded members of the Guard, we are leaving Bosnian Krajina. We are going back to Erdut, because the situation in eastern Slavonia is becoming more and more tense. We are observing the Croatian Army, which has withdrawn its elite units from the Bosnian Krajina and dispatched them to eastern Slavonia. My scouts are informing me that Spacva forest is full of equipment and that Croatian troops are amassing there. Therefore we have to offer an adequate response," Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, commandant of the Serbian Volunteer Guard, said in an exclusive interview for TELEGRAF.

[Lukic] Does that mean that the situation around Prijedor and Banja Luka is stabilizing?

[Arkan] Yes. There has been no shooting or shelling, everything has ceased, and I hope that a lasting peace will be accomplished. However, the deranged minds of Muslim converts want the war to continue, and I do not trust the Ustashi either. The enemy is now in a much better position to attack Banja Luka. Their troops are 20 km away from Prijedor, and they also have Mount Cadjavica, Mrkonjic Grad and the so-called AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] route under their control. I know that the Croats want to take everything, if we allow them. We shall not cede anything to them, but, for that reason, the army of the Serb Republic must recover and transform.

[Lukic] When do you expect the Croatian attack on eastern Slavonia to take place?

[Arkan] I do not trust the Latins. That attack may start at any moment. We are ready to withstand them, and the Croats should know that we are not like the troops of the Army of the Serb Republic from the lower part of Krajina, who ran away. The Guardsmen will stay to fight to the last man. They are awaiting the Croats fully prepared, as are the 11th Corps of the Serbian Army of Krajina and the local people, because they are aware of the coming clashes. In my opinion, there are only two solutions for eastern Slavonia: either a war or a blue zone. There is no third solution. Personally, I would like eastern Slavonia to be declared a blue zone, which means peace, because any normal man does not want war.

[Lukic] Will the Yugoslav Army become involved in possible conflict in eastern Slavonia?

[Arkan] It does not have to get involved. The force of the 11th Srem-Baranja Corps is sufficient to defend the territory, and even to launch a counteroffensive. The complete 5th Brigade of the Serbian Volunteer Guard is stationed there and is ready to take offensive actions.

[Lukic] What are the relations like between the Guard and the part of the Serbian army of Krajina stationed in eastern Slavonia?

[Arkan] Our cooperation is quite all right, and, as far as the army is concerned, everything is operated from a single center.

[Lukic] You have probably heard that U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke demanded of President Milosevic that he "keep Arkan under control."

[Arkan] Yes, I have. The Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ] regularly receives the bulletins of the U.S. Embassy, and I have read the demand there. First, I am not under Milosevic's command, and I came to Bosnian Krajina to defend people here. The Guard has been here under the command of the Interior Ministry of the Serb Republic, and it has carried out actions as a part of it. Second, what does it mean "to keep Arkan under control"? As if I were some naughty boy who has to be curbed. I am curbed by myself and I know what I am doing. Their false allegations that I expelled thousands of Muslims are sheer nonsense. I was engaged in fighting all the time, and I did not have time to expel two Muslims, let alone so many people.

[Lukic] The rumors say that Holbrooke demanded of Milosevic your extradition to the tribunal in The Hague.

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[Arkan] I have heard about that demand. But it was not only about me. If we ever extradite any Serb, the state and its leader will go to ruin. I do not believe in that story about the The Hague tribunal because it first has to bring to justice those who bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those who committed genocide against the people of Vietnam and Cambodia, and those who devastated Panama and Grenada—in other words, the world policemen who are engaged in global politics and are attempting to tame "Indians" throughout the world. The Serbs are not Indians. I do not believe that Milosevic will yield to those demands. If he does yield, and it is not necessarily in my case, the people will pronounce him a traitor and no option, not even the communist one, will save his face. And any Serb whom he or anybody else would extradite to The Hague would be pronounced a saint by the people. On the other hand, I support bringing to justice those people who have committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. But they should be tried at home rather than by some German who is relieving his frustrations over Nuremberg. The Hague is nothing but an international conspiracy against the Serbs.

[Lukic] Let us go back to the war in the Serb Republic. How do you view the suspicions and even loud protests on the part of the top brass in the army of the Serb Republic since your arrival in the Bosnian Krajina?

[Arkan] That is normal when an outsider arrives. They probably feel endangered because they think I will take over the army and their authority, but I claim here and now, in TELEGRAF, that it is not our intention. We have come here to help both the Serbian people and them. The army of the Serb Republic is weary, it has been waging war for quite a long time. Alcohol is taking its toll, and it must definitely be banned from the army of the Serb Republic. They have to form small, mobile brigades of special forces. They have to be given everything, and they have to justify that trust by defending the Serbian people and territory.

[Lukic] After your arrival in the Bosnian Krajina, were you called by General Mladic, and what did you discuss?

[Arkan] No, he did not call me then. By the way, I am invited for a lunch at his place today. I think that this invitation is a very cordial gesture. I also met Gen. Mladic at Mount Cadjavica on the front line. That encounter was very sincere—we greeted and hugged each other, and I can tell you I have good relations with him. And all those stories that Gen. Mladic wanted to dispatch me to Belgrade in a coffin or a bodybag are invented by the fifth column, and those people ought to be caught.

[Lukic] When you and your Guard were recently within reach of Kljuc, the army of the Serb Republic did not provide you with artillery cover even though that had been agreed upon. Can that move be called a treason, or is it something else?

[Arkan] I do not want to regard that situation as treason. I want our relations to be good, because the war will continue. However, there is something else. I was present when a colonel of the Army of Serb Republic did not want to obey the order issued by a general, a corps commander. In my army, no such thing can ever happen, and, for that reason, the army of the Serb Republic must be transformed promptly.

[Lukic] The Serbs were on the verge of defeat here. What happened to the myth of the Serbian soldier's invincibility?

[Arkan] Frankly, we depend on our enemies' mercy. They stopped where they intended to, and the Serbian Volunteer Guard was not able to get everywhere. First, we were stationed at Kljuc, after which there was an attack on Sanski Most. So we rushed to help there. Then we returned to Prijedor, and, in the meantime, Sanski Most fell. We succeeded in defending Prijedor and Banja Luka, and if we had entered Kljuc, Mrkonjic Grad would not have fallen.

[Lukic] Was there a realistic possibility of Prijedor and Banja Luka falling?

[Arkan] That possibility was more than realistic. The enemy concentrated a lot of troops and equipment there, particularly the Croats, and they were able to advance further. But that advance would cost them many lives, as was the case with the Muslims. They scattered, so we made a flank attack. We crushed their 502d Brigade, destroyed their tanks, armored vehicles.... Although I do not like to praise enemies, I have to say that Gen. Dudakovic is a brilliant fighter and officer. While he was stationed at Bihac, he was buying arms from the Serbs, and fighting against them at the same time. I take my hat off to such an enemy!

[Lukic] In the last few months, the Serbs have experienced perhaps the most severe defeats and exoduses of their people in their history. In view of all this, how do you view the policy of President Milosevic?

[Arkan] We lost 12,500 square kilometers in the Republic of Serb Krajina, and we lost around 7,000 square kilometers in the Serb Republic. Those 20,000 square kilometers of the Serbian land have been lost because we formed fake units and fake armies. In the four years of war, the Croats and the Muslims have formed modern and mobile units. They were buying modern arms and equipment while we were shooting in the air, wasting

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ammunition at celebrations, and talking in bars about what great Serbs we are and how we shall show everybody who we are, and, consequently, we experienced the greatest defeat in the history of the Serbian people. This fact hurts me, and for that reason I am fighting. I have to restore the honor and dignity of the Serbian warrior and people. And the only way I can do that is to hoist the Serbian tricolor on top of Knin citadel. Before that, the entire Serbian corps must help us create the Serbian army, but a real and disciplined one, with the heart of Obilic [Serb hero of Battle of Kosovo].

[Lukic] Many people blame Milosevic for all those defeats.

[Arkan] Even if he wanted to do something about it, Milosevic could not, because he has those communists around him, an army of frustrated communists who are clutching at straws and drifting on the surface as some sort of half-politicians. Those anonymous people are attempting to make a new Yugoslavia, while Yugoslavia cannot be restored by anybody. The Serbs are tired of such failed Yugoslavias. Although I have to say that I do not hate Muslims, Croats, Hungarians, Albanians.... I hate nobody, but all those nations living on Serbian land must understand that that land cannot be their reserve fatherland.

[Lukic] The federal elections are approaching, and Serbia is getting closer and closer to some leftist option. Where, in such a context, do you see room for the SSJ?

[Arkan] The left is getting stronger in terms of the media. It is the richest party because it has assembled the wealthiest people in Serbia, and they are struggling for equality and communism. Those former politicians used their positions to acquire wealth, and now they are denouncing Arkan, saying: "Look at that thief, what a large house he has!" They know that I had that house and a confectionery even much before the war. The entire fuss about the left exists only to win over the voters of Milan Panic. This means the votes of the Muslims, Hungarians, Albanians, and some Serbs. In Serbia, there is the right wing, which ignores the votes of the non-Serbian populace that is endangered in Serbia. If it is endangered, then it is only in bars, where arrogant Serbs drink and curse everything that is not Serbian. As for the SSJ, I have frozen my role as chairman, and I am now a soldier. But it is normal that the party will run in the elections, because I have a lot of regional boards. We are quite strong in the Serb Republic, Montenegro, Serbia.... The Serbian people need this party.

[Lukic] What are your political ambitions?

[Arkan] I do not have political ambitions, and I do not want to be the president of Serbia. My only ambition is that my party will enter parliament and that it will struggle for our goals by democratic methods. I am not interested in political functions, because I have a 22-year-old wife, a job, and I do not have much time.

[Lukic] Among the public, there are at least two stories about you. One says that you are Milosevic's man, who implements his policy, and the other is that you are an authentic Serb who is struggling for the national interests. Which is true, in your opinion?

[Arkan] I have to say that I was present at all the rallies organized by Milosevic. When the Serbian revolution began, I was again on the front lines, and if this means that I am Milosevic's man, then I am. I remind you of the fact that I was in Croatian jails, and not because I am Milosevic's man, but because I am a Serb. And such epithets are invented and used by various Serb leaders. They feel endangered because they have never defended the Serbian people save in sheep's brigades. They visited the fronts only when there were feasts, after which they strolled up and down Knez Mihajlova Street [in Belgrade] saying what great Serbs they were. Those leaders think that I, as a military commander, will endanger them sooner or later, so they have started a campaign against Milosevic, and labeled my party and me as "the reserve party of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]" and "Milosevic's men."

That is not true because we are independent people. How can I be anybody's man since I am a warrior who spearheads almost every attack? I am reproached for having a house in Belgrade, while, on the other hand, I brought my 20-year-old son to the front. Bullets and grenades do not choose whom they will hit, and I can get killed whether I have a house or not. I have been lucky so far. I have been wounded only once, but the war is still not over. I am not looking for any profit. Simply, in such things, there is no playacting because one's life is at stake.

The SSJ is completely independent, and I have to say that the SPS was not fair to us in the past elections. For the next elections, we shall be better organized and should ensure that everybody plays fair.

[Lukic] There has been much talk about your business activities; big turnovers, and money earned through smuggling.

[Arkan] Arkan is to blame for everything that happens in Serbia. A factory has not delivered a shipment of pate to a buyer—Arkan is to blame. The same happened with oil. Last year, I was reportedly the major buyer of raspberries, even though I did not taste a single

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raspberry. It is true that I have a couple of companies, but they are not doing that well in business because the current climate is not good for business. Second, I made a big mistake with the director of my company. He made a mess and left big debts behind. Now it will take a long time for me to repay the debt, that is, the loan, to the Commercial Bank and the Union Bank. And I cannot work because I am here. My business is managed by other people, and you know yourself that when the cat is away, the mice are all over the place.

[Lukic] Who finances the Serbian Volunteer Guard?

[Arkan] The Guard is primarily financed by donors and my firms. Priority is given to the wounded and the families of the fallen. They receive 600 dinars a month, although I would like it to be at least 2,000 dinars. But, right now, those are huge amounts, and we are short of money. Earlier we used to buy apartments for members of the Guard. We bought 26 apartments for the families of the fallen, the wounded, and some officers of the Guard. This is the first time I have stated this publicly, because I did not want to boast.

**Poll Shows NASA BORBA Most 'Reliable' Paper**

*AU0111185295*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 1 November carries on page 9 an approximately 1,000-word report on the results of an opinion poll on the "reliability and credibility" of the media reporting in Serbia. The poll was carried out by the Medium Agency of the Institute for Political Studies.

According to the report, "the respondents were foreign correspondents—that is, those who dispatch information obtained from the local political and media circles. They were asked to express the reliability of the sources on a scale of 1 to 5. The 52 correspondents gave the lowest rating (of 2 to 2.5) to the state radio and television—that is, the radio and television programs of the RTS [Radio and Television of Serbia]. Near the bottom of the list of the reliable media, in this case electronic media, are also Politika Radio and Television, while NTV Studio B and Radio are in the upper part of the list. Of the electronic media, foreign correspondents trust Radio B 92 the most (the average is 4.5), which is followed by BK Telecom [Braca Karic Television] (3.77)."

The report then goes on to say that "there is a direct correlation between the credibility of the state media as a source of information for foreign correspondents and the 'generators' of information, as only 15 percent of the foreign correspondents rely on the information provided by the state organs, which, logically, represents the core of information programs of the official government or privileged media. As many as 89 percent of them rely on the Yugoslav media and only 4 percent on the bulletins and statements issued by political parties. Foreign correspondents also go for personal contacts with politicians and economists (69 percent). About 62 percent of them receive information with help of colleagues from the local media."

According to the report, "on the list of the dailies and weeklies that foreign correspondents use most frequently as a source of information, NASA BORBA is in first place in the poll conducted by the Medium Agency. As many as 69 percent of the correspondents cite our paper as the most reliable source of information, 35 percent cite VREME, 31 percent cite NIN, and 19 percent cite POLITIKA. Several respondents gave more answers to this question. With the average mark of 4.29 on the 1-5 scale, NASA BORBA leads the table. It is followed by VREME with 3.92, TELEGRAF with 3.88, and NIN with 3.84. At the bottom of the list is POLITIKA EKSPRES, while POLITIKA is in the middle of the table.

"In the general placement, as the researchers of this agency have established, first place in the table of reliability of the media used by foreign correspondents as a source of information goes to NASA BORBA and Radio B 52. It is interesting that the list does not include BORBA, the paper that 'the state has return to itself and the readership,' as stated by Federal Information Minister Dragutin Brcin, the paper's former, imposed chief and responsible editor."

The report also says that the Medium Agency has established that "58 percent of foreign correspondents are sending reports from Serbia every day, 12 percent of them do it every second day, while others send their reports less frequently depending on the media they work for. The list of topics of their interests is led by conflicts in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, interethnic relations in Serbia, and the local political situation. These are followed by social and economic issues, culture, and sports."

The report also carries a bar chart depicting the Medium Agency's findings on the reliability of some print media. The ratings range from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best.

| | |
|---|---|
| NASA BORBA | 4.29 |
| VREME | 3.92 |
| TELEGRAF | 3.88 |
| NIN | 3.84 |
| TV POLITIKA | around 2.9 |
| POLITIKA | around 2.8 |

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| | |
|---|---|
| INTERVJU | around 2.6 |
| DUGA | around 2.4 |
| VECERNJE NOVOSTI | around 1.8 |
| POLITIKA EKSPRES | around 1.6 |

## Kosovo

### Police Arrest Podujevo Albanians Over Shoot-Out

*AU2810185495 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the aftermath of a yet unclarified last Saturday's [21 October] shoot-out incident at Gerdovc village when three Serb policemen were wounded, the Serbian police has ensued a wide-scale campaign of harassment and intimidation of Albanians at this village and wider in the Podujeva [Podujevo] municipality. Throughout night between Saturday and Sunday the Serbian police carried a house-to-house raids campaign harassing and arresting dozens of Albanians. Sources in Podujeva said that over the past week the Serbian police has stepped up a campaign of arrests and home raids on the Albanian homes in the town of Podujeva and adjacent villages. On 26 October the police raided on the homes of Ismet Billali in Podujeva and Sahit Bejtullahu at Sveqla village. The former was beaten up brutally in front of his family members, while the latter was detained and subjected to a long-hour ill- treatment at police the station. Rrahman Bejtullahu, principal with the elementary school at Sveqla village was reported detained yesterday by the police and beaten up brutally under the pretext of arms possession.

The LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] Information Commission said Serbian police expeditions have raided on at least dozen of Albanian families in the villages of Podujeva during the past three days. Half a dozen LDK activists and leaders in Podujeva were detained today morning by the Serbian police and questioned about the last Saturday's incidents. The Serbian police authorities have not so far issued any official statement as the shoot-out incident at Gerdovc village, while Serbian press, however, has rushed to brand it "an act of Albanian terrorists."

### Club Denounces Serb 'Crackdown' on Journalists

*AU2810143595 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 25 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After having covered the proceedings of the Convention of the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] Women's Forum at Samadraxhe village of Suhareka yesterday, a group of journalists were arrested en route to Prishtina. After a thorough inspection by the Serbian police, the BUJKU journalists, Ms. Evliana Berani, Mr. Behxhet Haliti, and Mr. Ridvan Slivova, as well as Ms. Valentina Saracini, a DEUTSCHE WELLE Albanian Section correspondent, and their driver Mr. Faik Bince were taken to the police station in Suhareka. Ms. Evliana Berani and Ms. Valentina Saracini were subjected to interrogation. They were eventually released, for they had allegedly been arrested "by mistake," BUJKU newspaper reported.

The Correspondents Club, a Prishtina-based journalistic organization that gathers correspondents reporting for foreign media, denounced today the Serbian police's crackdown on Kosova journalists. The journalists who were halted and harassed by the police on their way back from Samadraxha, had their notes and journalistic dictaphones inspected, the Club said. The Correspondents Club calls on international journalistic organizations to denounce the Serbian regime's crackdown on Albanian journalists. The journalists have been impeded in their work but have yet maintained coverage on Kosova, so they should therefore be supported, the Correspondents Club said.

Meanwhile, another BUJKU journalist was reported harassed by the Serbian police. Curr Mazrekaj, a correspondent form Decan, was arrested by Serbian security yesterday. During a two-hour-long interrogation, Mr. Mazrekaj was questioned in connection with his articles carried by BUJKU, first and foremost reports on massive-scale raids by the Serbian police of local Albanian households.

### Serb University Offers Facilities for New Hires

*AU2510174495 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 20 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serb University in Prishtina has for years now been hiring new staff through the Serbian Labor Market Board, the Serbian POLITIKA EKSPRES daily reported today. The last competition, open till 25 October, envisions the hiring of over 300 university teachers to be facilitated by local Serbian market labor network in Serbia. "The Serbian Labor Market Board will assist in this action (acquiring new faculty staff for the Serb University in Prishtina) by offering telephone services, photocopy facilities, and mail services free of charge to all applicants in the local offices of the labor market, namely the employment bureaus in the municipalities and districts (in Serbia)", POLITIKA EKSPRES writes. All applicants will be refunded travelling expenses during the completion procedures, but also given per diem allowances, whereas "those who will eventually be hired will be paid the house-moving expenses," the Belgrade daily says. This

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is the sixth competition the Serb University has realized through the Serbian labor market bureau, the writer B. Bozic says, noting that apartments will be allocated to 139 would-be teachers of the Serb university, "on condition that they (the teachers) accept full time jobs and settlement in the seat of the University schools." The practice of hiring university teachers through local (municipal) employment offices has been a new phenomenon introduced by the Serbian regime. The local labor market network has traditionally facilitated employment of low skilled or technical and administrative workforce for the economy. The Serbian regime's University in Prishtina has been promoted into an institution which should further Serbian colonization schemes in Kosova, focusing on Serbianization of Kosova's capital city Prishtina. More than half of the alleged 18,000 students of the Serb university in Prishtina are Serb arrivals from Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and other territories of the former Yugoslavia. The University of Prishtina campus, from which Albanians have been forcefully kicked out, has for four years now been turned into a collection point for Serb students and refugees. New Serb monuments are being planted in the university campus at a time a huge Serb orthodox church has been under construction for nearly three years now. The Albanian-language University of Prishtina, the successor of the University of Prishtina (formerly a two-language University, offering instruction in both Albanian and Serbian, to a 75:25 percent ratio, respectively), has been forced into operating in private homes and other makeshift classrooms in the wake of the Serbian regime's continued crackdown.

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